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INTRODUCTION
Whatr kind of ma.n was Admiral Jean Francois
Darla.n?

Was he merely a.n ambitious and crafty politician,

a Nazi collaborator and opportunist, or a true French
patriot?

To facilitate understanding it is necessary

to describe some of the events surrounding the fall of
France and the formation of the Vichy government.
The chief purpose of such a study is to analyze
the actions of Admiral Darlan from the fall of France
until the Allied invasion of North Africa on November 8,
1942 and his assassination on Christmas Eve_ slightly
more than a month later.

By an examination of Darla.n's

part in the Vichy regime and an explanation of the man's
motives, whenever possible, one ca.n hope to.strip at
least part of the enigma from the man and his career.
The navy did not share the French Army's defeat.
It was still intact on Armistice Day, and the very survival
of France as a nation seemed to depend on it.

The French

Army, regarded by niany as the best in Europe a.nd perhaps
the world, succumbed quickly to the German onslaught.
France's defeat was not the army's alone.

But

The turbulence

of the interwar period created increasing corruption and
divisiveness in French social and political life.
bankruptcy of the French military soon followed.

Strategic

5

By the very act of saving his navy Darlan assumed

a tremendous burden of hatred,

When France fell, both

Churchill and Roosevelt wanted Darlan to become the leader
of Frenchmen who would fight against Germany,

It is more

likely that they simply wanted the French Navy brought into
the war on the side of the Allies,

At this time there is

no question that the loyalty and allegiance of·the French
naval officers and men belonged to Darlan,
give the order and they would obey,

He had but to

Darlan 1 s refusal to

commit the French fleet -- his sole possession and source
of bargaining power with the Nazis -- to the Allied cause
brought widespread indignation in England,

The British

radio, press and political leaders, Churchill included,
branded him a traitor, renegade and pro-Nazi,

Lesser

criticisms included being called an ambitious opportunist,
Darlan was certainly a politician, for he had struggled
for years with the government, seeking naval appropriations,
More than any other person he was responsible for making
the fleet the most powerful in France's history,

It is

true that he had but to sail to any Allied port to become
the leader of France,

His error and miscalculation was

the belief that Great Britain as well as France was beaten,
It would be only a matter of weeks until England too was
defeated,

By suing for peace and maintaining his control

6

of the navy Darlan hoped to reserve for France a leading
role in Hitler's New Order for Europe,
This paper deals with many of the more important
incidents, decisions and events leading up to Darlan
joining the Allies in November, 1942,

It discusses some

of the more significant diplomatic moves.on his part in
his association with both the Germans and the Allied envoys
to Vichy and North Africa,

Finally, it includes a dis-

cussion on Earlan 1 s presence in North Africa and the
consumation of his deal with the Allies which brought
his approval and cooperation to the "Torch" landings
there in November, 1942,

CHAPTER I
THE FALL OF FRANCE

The defeat of France in 1940 had its roots in the
great victory a score of years before.

In 1919 France

was worn-out, battered and devastated.

She had lost

1.5

million men in the First World War and had another

300,000 permanently disabled.

Following the First World

War French military leaders preached the superiority of
defensive warfare.

The offensive should be taken only

when having a vast superiority in firepower and numbers.
The defensive psychology that the Maginot Line created
helped to undermine France's will to resist in 1940 by
creating a false sense of security.

To the French military

World War I had taught two lessons.

The first was the

superiority of defense over attack, and the second, the
value of permanent fortifications capable of resisting
the most sustained attacks.
throughout the 1930 1 s.

This doctrine was practiced

Despite the relative decline in

population and inferiority of industrial strength, France
insisted on following a program of military preparedness.
Whatever the political complexion of the government,
civil-military relations were characterized by mutual
distrust from the very beginning of World War II.

1

1

I
John Steward Ambler, Soldiers Against the State: The
French Jli,m~ in Politics (New York: Do~bleday and Company,
1968), p, 8-.

8

The long-delayed act of 1938 governing the "Organization
of the Nation in time of War"

2 failed to solve the problems

developing between the high command and government.

The

respo~sibility of operations was given to the high command,
miile the general conduct of the war was reserved for the
government,

The fear of concentrated military authority

prevented a tight centralization of defense organization
under the Ministry of Defense and a chief of staff for
national defense,

Entangling political and military

rivalries were to affect the French War effort.
When Paul Reynaud replaced Edouard Daladier as
Premier in March, 1940, civilian-military tensions mounted
rapidly.

Reynaud dared not replace General Maurice-Gustave

Gamelin as chief of staff of national defense, for Gamelin 1 s
defender, Daladier, had to be kept on as minister of defense
in order to draw the support of his Radical Socialist party
3
into the government.
Gamelin accused Reynaud of encroaching
on his powers over operations in the Norwegian campaign,
but the French defeat in the Netherlands finally enabled
Reynaud to replace Gamelin as well as Daladier.

By re-

placing Gamelin with the formerly retired General Maxime
Weygand on May 9, 19~0, Premier Reynaud embraced an even

3Philip C. F. Bankwi tz, "Maxime Weygand and the Fall
of France: A Study in Uivil-Military Relations," Journal
Modern History, Volume XXX, Number 3, (September, 1959),

~

P• 229.

9

more dangerous rival than Gamelin.

Just the day before,

Reynaud had invited Marshal Petain to join the government as vice-president of the cabinet.

Unknowingly, the

two men who would contribute most to the fall of the
government were brought into the fold by the Premier himself.
General Weygand was a militant Catholic obsessed
with a hatred and fear of collllllunism and only scorn for
politicians.4

His abiding distrust of French politicians

was the result of his encounters with an unsympathetic
national assembly in the 1930 1 s.

Weygand has been accused

in some circles~~ being a Fascist, owing no doubt to his
extreme hatred of collllllunism, but it seems more likely that
his accusers mistook his authoritarianism for totalitarianism.
The German offensive launched on May 10, 1940 broke
through the French front and concluded the battle of France
within six weeks.

The overwhelming and humiliating defeat

produced a series of events which eroded the foundation
of future military discipline.

It signaled the beginning

of the end of unquestioning obedience to civil authority.
With the exception of collllllander-in-chief, General Maxima
Weygand•~,and Aomiral Jean De.rlan 1 s clashes with the
economy minded ministers in the 1930's, civil-military

4Ambler,

.2E.• cit., p. 60.
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relations had been comparatively peaceful during this
period.

But the crisis of June, 1940 far outweighed

all previous tensions between the general staff and
political leaders, and with the outbreak of the war
tensions gradually mounted as the weakness of the French
military machine became apparent.
Unlike Weygand, who upon taking command thought
the situation no matter how unfavorable could be reversed,
Philippe Petain harbored no doubts that the wan was
virtually lost.

As he left his embassy post in Spain to

assume his new duties as vice-president, he was already
convinced that his role in the government would not be so
much to conduct the war, but to conduct its conclusion,
and if possible negotiate an acceptable peace. 5
shared Weygand 1 s distrust of the politicians.

He fully

However,

there is no reason to believe that the marshal supported
or participated in any of the right-wing activities during
the interwar period, and it is doubtful that he ever
plotted to overthrow the Third Republic as has been charged
in some quarters.

Although ambitious and eager to exercise

power, despite his eighty-four years, he was probably as
De Gaulle described him, 11 Too proud for intrigue, 116

5

Robert Aron, ~ g'ichy Regime 1940-1944
Beacon Press, 1969), p, •
6
charles De Gaulle, The Call To Honor
Viking ·Press, 1966), p. llb. - - -

(Boston:

(New York:
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From the day the disasters began with the German
o££ensive on May 10, France had lost 100,000 men, 7

Gen-

eral Weygand, never one to mince words, demanded that the
govermnent £ace the consequences 0£ the greatest disaster
ever su££ered by the French Army,

By June 10 the battle

0£ France was lost and General Weygand demanded that the
government sue £or peace immediately,

Petain, ready to

accept the word 0£ the military, voiced the same opinion,
Thus the minister and President 0£ the Republic met at
Chateau 0£ Cange, in the vicinity 0£ Tours, to decide
8
the country's £ate,
The military situation was already
so grave the government had been £orced to £lee £rom Paris,
Af'ter the council heard Weygand's report, it postponed a
decision pending a meeting between Reynaud and Churchill,
at Tours the next day,
any tangible result,

The Tours meeting broke up without
The French were asking £or planes

to continue the war, convinced that the army was already
beaten,

Churchill re£used to send planes £earing their

destruction on French air£ields be£ore they could be
brought into use,

As he le£t the meeting Churchill turned

to Admiral Darlan who had accompanied Reynaud, and asked
that he not surrender the French fleet,

Darlan replied

that this would constitute a· breach 0£ naval tradition

7

Aron, .QE.• cit,, p,

Bill£,

4,
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;

and honor, and that he would give the order to scuttle in
the event the fleet was in danger of capture.

Churchill

advised that his country would neither condemn nor approve
of a separate armistice with Germany, and suggested again
a joint appeal to President Roosevelt to bring America
into the war. 9
Reporting back to Cange that Churchill had spoken
so as not to either accept or reject the French proposal
of a separate armistice, Reynaud encountered a rebellion
10
on the part of Paul Baudouin and Yves Bouthillier.
They
had persuaded their colleagues in the Reynaud cabinet during
the Premier's absence at the Tours conference, that an
innnediate armistice was necessary and desirable and expressed
their wishes to conclude an armistice and retain the government in France rather than carrying on the war from the
colonies in Africa.

Although adamantly opposed by Premier

Reynaud, this proposal was supported by both Petain and
Weygand.

In a stormy session that lasted far into the

night Weygand and Petain reiterated their decision not to
leave France, at any cost.

When reminded that the removal

of the seat of government was a political question and outside the military command, Weygand abruptly left the room,
slamming the door behind him.

9

The meeting ended with no

w1nston s. Churchill, Their Finest 1!QB!:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), p. 158.

10

(Boston:

Aron, .2£• cit., p. 9. Baudouin was Undersecretary
of State for Foreign Affairs and Bouthillier was Minister
of Finance in Reynaud 1 s cabinet reorganization of June 6.
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decision being reached and the following day the government fled to take refuge in Bordeaux.

With the French

Army only a ghost of its former self the German advance
was gathering speed.
Upon arrival at Bordeaux, and the political and
military situation growing graver by the hour, Reynaud
drew up a final appeal to President Roosevelt in the
early morning hours of June

14.

It read in part:

In the most tragic hour of her history
France is faced with a choice. Is she to go
on sacrificing her youth in a hopeless struggle?
Is her government to leave her soil to avoid
falling into enemy hands and to be able to
continuEl the fight at sea from North Africa?
The only chance of saving the French Nation,
the advance guard of the democracies, and
hence of saving Britain, at whose side France
will be able to remain with her powerful fleet,
lies in throwing the wefught of flerican power
into the balance this very day.
,
Drexel Biddle, who had replaced William O. Bullitt
as the United States ambassador to the French government
when the latter remained in Paris to represent American
interests as German forces occupied the capital, was
given to understand at the time the cable was transmitted
that unless American declared war within forty-eight hours,
France would have no alternative but to surrender.
urgently cabled the conversation to Roosevelt.

He

A cabinet

meeting was postponed until Roosevelt's reply was received,

11 Paul Reynaud, In The Thick of The Fight (New Yo:ruc:
Simon and Schuster, 19~)~. 511. - --
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for everything depended on the President's answer,

During

the interlude Petain sent a note to Weygand informing him
of the discussion that followed his sudden departure the
day before, and invited him to attend the meeting scheduled
for Bordeaux on June 15,
At 11 a,m, on June 15 Roosevelt's negative reply
was received:
In these hours, so heart-rending for the
French people and yourself, I assure you of my
deepest sympathy, and I can furthermore assure
you that, so long as the French nation continues
to defend its liberty, and in so doing the cause
of democratic institutions in the world, it can
rely upon receiving from the United States in
ever increasing quantities of materials and
supplies of all kinds.
I know that you will understand that these
declarations imply no military commitments.
12
Congress alone can undertake such engagements.
This strengthened the hand of those advocating an armistice
and Reynaud played for time in requesting that Churchill
be consulted for his views once again.

When the British

Prime Minister had not replied by 10 a.m. on June 16,
Reynaud could stall the·cabinet no longer,

When asked

what the reaction of the Nation Assembly would be to
transferring the seat of government to North Africa, Reynaud
received their approval.

But the approval of the council

of ministers was a more difficult matter.

12

When informed o~

Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses
6f Franklin D, Roosevelt. War :-:-And Aid to Democracies
TNew York: Macmillan Company, 194iJ~Number 59, exchange of
cablegrams between Roosevelt and Premier Reynaud, June 14-15,
1940. pp. 266-267.

the decision to once more delay the request f'or terms of'
an armistice and further discussion on moving the government, Petain stunned the cabinet by announcing his intention
13
to resign f'rom the government.
But the majority of' the
ministers begged the Marshal to continue on and af'f'ord the·
government the benef'it of his prestige,

He agreed to stay,

but only on the o~ndition that a decision be reached soon,
Meanwhile, Sir Ronald Campbell, the British ambassador,
arrived with a telegram f'rom the f'oreign of'f'ice giving
England's f'ull consent to an inquiry to determine terms
of' an armistice, provided the French f'leet sailed to a
British port,

This was the f'irst of' two telegrams, that

day, which later led to colossal misunderstandings between
Vichy and Great Britain,
Admiral· Darlan considered the f'leet his private domain
and interpreted the message to mean that the British wished
to take his f'leet hostage in return f'or allowing France to
conclude a separate peace.

14 To of'f'er up the French f'leet

would have lef't the North Af'rican colonies unprotected and
.
closed the door to an exile government. Although at this
time, probably undecided as to which course of' action he
might approve, the surrender qf' the French rreet certainly
was not included in his plans,

Expecting to keep the f'leet

13 Jules Roy, The Trial of' Marshal Petain
Harper and Row, 196b), p. xiii.

(New York:

14Alec de Montmorency,~ Enigma of' Admiral Darlan
(New York: E.P, Dutton, 1943), P• 59.
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out of German hands, England had used the wrong strategy.
Premier Reynaud, by now de~perately playing for time, nor
1.5
an Anglophobe such as Darlan,
would entertain the suggestion
of turning over the French fleet to England,

In the final

analysis· the ultimate decision regarding the French fleet
would rest with Admiral Darlan. 16 The British proposal
:Cunthered Reynaud 1 s complications in holding his government together, for it now confirmed the fact that England
17
was prepared to sanction an armistice,
As the Premier prepared to convene a cabinet meeting
on the afternoon of June 16, the British Foreign Office
appeared to have saved the day after all.

Churchill was

calling to voice his approval of a proposed Declaration of
• 18
Union
between the two government and their citizens, To
Reynaud it now seemed that France could stay in the war.

1.5
Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 12~. Also see
De Montmorency, .QE.• cit., pp. 118-119.
16
Sir Edward L. Spears, Assi~nment to Catastrophe
(New York:' A.A. Wyn, 19.5.5), p. 30. Also see Churchill,
.2E.• cit., p. 202.
17

Sppars, .QE.• cit., pp. 290-291.

18 churchill, .212.• cit., p. 210.
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The declaration was a product of the imagination of Jean
Monnet, head of the French economic delegation in London,
and General Charles De Gaulle, then Undersecretary of State
for War.

De Gaulle was chosen to press the idea on Churchill

during a luncheon engagement,

It provided for the two

countries to pool their entire resources under a single
cabinet to do battle against the Axis.

Reynaud at once

submitted the proposal to the cabinet where it was rejected
without discussion or vote.
None of the cabinet took time to consider or analyze
the declaration, simply dismissing it after brief mention.
Petain charged that it was just another trick by the British
to delay an armistice and gain time for themselves.

Others

charged that under the proposal France would become hardly
more than a British colony,

There might be a degree of

truth in both charges, but their assessment of the grave
situation before them could not allow for an overall and
far-reaching view of the advantages,

The proposal had

arrived at a most inopportune time,

By now the cabinet

had divided into two factions, those insisting on an
armistice, and those dedicated to continuing the war from
the colonies,

When it became apparent that the impasse

could not be resolved, Reynaud had no choice but to offer

18

his resignation, but the President of the Republic,
Albert Lebrun, refused to accept it and adjourned
the meeting.
Reynaud remained adamant and Petain was called
upon to form a government;

thus those supporting the

policy of opening negotiations for an armistice had
carried the day.

Among the newly appointed ministers

in the Petain cabinet were General W~~gand as Minister
of National Defense and Admiral Darlan as Minister of
Marine.

Sometime after midnight on June 16, the new

government inquired, through the Spanish ambassador,
19
under what terms hostilities might come to an end.
Hitler kept the French cabinet in~uspense for
three days before replying.

During this time he was

conferring with Mussolini, for Italy had declared war
on-'France, June 12.

When he finally answered, the message

proved only instructions to name delegates to a meeting.
They would be notified later as to the time and place.
During the critical periodl'Petain wavered at least onee
and considered moving the government to Algiers.

He

ordered Darlan to prepare a ship for departure, but at
the last minute Petain was persuaded by Laval to retain
L.

the government in France.

19
20

20

Aron, EE• cit., pp. 46-47.

William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble
Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 4f;

(New York:

19

Since Hitler's foreign policy concerning France had
been neither long-ranging nor specific, the request for
an armistice came quite unexpected.

21

The three days

wait permitted Hitler to formulate a new program.

It

seems that the hopes for an early peace with England were
uppermost in his mind when the armistice terms were dictated,
for he hoped to arrive at an agreement with Britain without further military operations.

His immediate objectives

were to keep the French government from continuing the war
from the colonies, and to keep the French fleet in French
hands where it would be out of the war.

The armistice

terms-allowed an area of France to be governed and administered by Frenchmen, plus a standing army of 100,000 men.
The two conditions that loomed so large for the future were
that North Africa was to remain unoccupied and the fleet
was to remain under French control.
The Allies' main concern regarding the armistice
issue was the control and disposal of the French i'leet.
Great Britain coveted the French fleet for their arsenal
of defense.

Darlan and his countr-ymen were greatly relieved

that Hitler did not ask for its surrender.

In the end Darlan

saw it as his only effective bargaining tool.

20

Hitler thought it politically unwise to occupy the
whole of France and had little interest in French colonies.
This reasoning may have been one of the Fuhrer•s great
strategic mistakes in the war, for from southern France
it would have been possible to sweep into the Mediterranean
and head for North Africa at once.

Men such as Weygand

and Darlan were quick to point this out, and just before
his death Darlan stated,

11 In

getting Hitler to sign the

armistice, France at least succeeded in making him commit
the first and possibly the most serious of his military
blunders. 1122

This however cannot be used in Darlan•s

defense, for in 1942 he enjoyed hindsight, and it in no
way suggests sagacity on his part in the decision made
two years earlier.
Darlan considered himself honor bound to his
sailor's word to both the British and the Nazis in accordance with the terms of the armistice,

He promised the

Germans that the fleet would not be brought into the war
against the Axis and the British that the fleet would never
surrender to her enemies.

Apparently unable to accept the

German's word of honor, Darlan issued specific instructions
that the fleet be scuttled if Germany attempted to seize it, 2 3

22

Langer, .EE.• ill•, p. 61. Quoted from "Darlan:
Message To Amei>ica,11 (Cosmopolitan. Magazine, January, 1943).

23Aron, .212.• ill•• PP•

~

49-✓ 0•
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Yet Darlan could only offer his word to the British and
this they did not consider a sufficient guarantee,

The

propaganda efforts immediately issuing from Great Britain
were directed at Darlan and the fleet rather than the
armistice and the Petain government.

The admiral voiced

his belief to Ambassador Bullitt that England could hold
out only a matter of weeks under the heavy air bombardment
and thus he saw no reason to turn over the Frenuh fleet
to Great Britain when it would be of no consequence in the
war effort,

Churchill later recalled this in a speech to

the Canadian Parliament, December 30, 1941,
When I warned them (the French government)
Britain would fight on alone whatever they did,
their generals told their Prime Minister-and
his divided cabinet: 1 In three weeks England
will have her neck wrung 1ike a chicken.•
Some chicken! Some neck124
But even if England survived and won the war,
Darlan doubted that a single vessel would be returned or
treatment accorded France by Great Britain would be more
generous than that accorded by Germany,

Darlan believed

that Germany would probably win the war and that a Ge!lll1an
victory was desirable from the French point of view,

He

was confident of a leading role for France in Hitler's

2'1.

.

""v/inston S. Churchill, The Unrentlentin ustru.ggle
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 19
, p. 367.

22

.Europe.

Darlan feared Great Britain's post-war ambitions

in the French empire in the event of an Allied victory, but
these fears later proved quite unjustified and the British

25
.
•
prom i ses o f the res t ora t ion
of France ha d b een sincere.
Thus, when the armistice was signed between France
and Germany at Rethondes on June 22, four days after Charles
De GaUlle had proclaimed a rival French government in London,
France in effect had interests on both sides of the war.
For the time being she was~1.allowing herself to play both
ends against the middle.

But her empire and fleet were

intact, and she had avoided annihilation -- the fate of
Hitler's previous conquests.

25

Adrienne Doris Hytier, !!!Q_ Years 2f. French Foreign
Policy, Vichy 1940-1942. Etudies d 1 Histoire Economique,
Politique et Social, Volume XXV (Paris: Librairie Minard,
1958), p. 271.

CHAPTER II
SIX MONTHS OF CRISIS
The Petain cabinet selected Vichy as its seat or
government,

It is still not clear why, but probably they

expected this to be only a temporary arrangement ror the
Germans had promised at Rethondes to allow the government
to return to Paris,

The resort city or Vichy, ramous ror

its medicinal mineral water, orrered its many spacious
hotels, casinos and villas to the new arrivals.

Here,

the dazed government, staggering under catastrophic
military reverses tried to pull itselr back together,
The ministers and their leader abandoned Clermont-Ferrand,
to which they had rled rrom Bordeaux, and arrived at Vichy
July 1,

During the next ten days Pierre Laval devoted his

full attention to the rinal destruction of the Republic,
and on July 10, 19~0 the National Assembly, by the necessary
constitutional majority, committed suicide by legally delegating to Marshal Petain the power or revising the constitution,
Af'ter Laval.engineered the surrender or the National Assembly,
Petain was named Head or State and charged with carrying out
a National Revolution,

2

The Vichy government's political

philosophy or "work, ramily, country" replaced the once
cherished motto or "liberty, equality, rraternity, 11

This new

1

William L, Shirer,~ Collapse or the Third Republic:
1fil. Inquiry .!!rt£ the Fall .Q.f France in 19[07New York: Simon
and Schuster, 19b9>, pp, 29-30.
2
Andre Geraud, The Gravediggers of France
Doran and Company, 19m, p, 4o/i.

(New York:

1

24

philosophy rang more true to the ear of military officers
serving in political posts of the Vighy regime after the
armistice,

During the following week the Marshal moved

to consolidate his powers,

He

reduced the number of his

cabinet from fifteen to twelve and named Laval his eventual
successor,

Petain now ruled by executive decree and the

Third Republic came to an end,
The first six months of the Vichy regime com.Prised
its most critical period,

It was during this time that
decisions were made which determined its character, 3 In

spite of its somewhat precarious position, it was almost
universally recognized, and tlJt_r,ty-two goveI'Ilillents, including
the Soviet Union and United States maintained diplomatic
relations,4

Diplomatic pressures brought by the British

as well as the Germans served to bring Paul Baudouin,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Pierre Laval, as VicePremier, to the front in the cabinet,

Laval was an out

and out Naziphile and wished to see France drawn into
the Axis camp, 5 Baudouin on the other hand sought to
negotiate with the British and ease the blockade,

3Paul Farmer, Vichy Political Dilemma
Columbia University Press, 1955), p, 177.
¾1illiam D, Leahy,,! Was There
House, 1950), p, 16.
5

(New York:

(New York:'

Whittlesey

Michael J asperson, "Laval and the Nazis: A Study
of Franco-German Relations," (Unpublished Ph, D, dissertation,
Georgetown University, 1967), P• 63.

25

Oddly enough it was the British who were the first to
eXpress a firm attitude t~ward the Vichy regime.

Through a

rupture of diplomatic relations and communications, the two
governments lost oontact.

Campbell, the British ambassador,

had left Bordeaux immediately after the armistice, fearing he would be taken prisoner by the Germans.

The French

ambassador had left London at the same time, although the
two countries had not as yet severed relations.

This was

done on the afternoon of July 3, following the British
attack on a part of the French fleet anchored off Mers-el-Kebir,
Algeria.

6

During the night of July 2-3, the Royal Navy Command
Force H under the command of Admiral Sir James Somerville
appeared off Mers-el-kebir, the French naval base located
in the naturat harbor near the _Algerian city of Oran.

Shortly

after midnight of July 2, Churchill's War Cabinet sent
Somerville a carefully conceived communication to relay to
the French Admiral Marcel-Bruno Gensoul.
It is impossible for us••• to allow your
fine ships to fall into the power of the German
or Italian enemy. We are determined to fight
on to the end, ••• we shall never forget that
France was our ally••• and that our common
enemy is Germany. For this purpose we must make
sure that the best ships of the French Navy are
not used against us by the common foe. In these
circumstances, His Majesty's Government has instructed me to demand that the French Fleet now
at Mers-el-Kebir and Oran shall act in accordance
with one of the following alternatives:

6

York:

Leon Ma~chal, Vichy, Two Years of Deception
Macmillan Company, 19ffi, P• 73.
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(1) Sail with us and continue to fight for Victory against the Germans and Italians,
(2) Sail with reduced crews under our control
to a British port, The reduced crews will be
repatriated at the earliest moment.
If either of these courses is adapted by
you, we will restore your ships to France at
the conclusion of the war or pay full compensation, if they are damaged meanwhile,
(3) Alternatively, if you feel bound to stipulate
that your ships should not be used against the
Germans or Italians unless these break the armistice, then sail them with us with reduced
crews to some French port in the West Indies -Martinique, for instance -- where _they can be
demilitarised to our satisfacti_on, or perhaps
be entrusted to the United States and remain
safe until the end of the war, the crews being
repatriated,
If you refuse these fair orders, I must
with profound regret, require you to sink your
ships within six hours,
Finally, failing the above, I have orders
of His Majesty's Government to use whatever
force may be necessary to prevent your shi:i,s
from falling into German or Italian hands,
Faced with this ultimatum, Admiral Gensoul replied
in writing that in no case would the French warships be
allowed to fall intact into German hands, and that force
would be met with force,

All day negotiations continued

between Captain Holland of the Royal Navy and Lieutenant
de Vaisseau Dufay representing Admiral Gensoul,

They

had once been classmates and were still on friendly tenns,
It was hoped their friendship might offer some basis of
8
adverting the impending disaster,
Admiral Somerville was
then informed of Darlan 1 s secret orders transmitted to the

7churchill, Their Finest Hour, QE, cit,, pp, 234-235,

8
Aron, -2.P.• cit,, p. 76.
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fleet on June 20, and again on June

24.

The text of the

orders were:
You will be clearly notified elsewhere of
the armistice terms. I am availing myself of
this final connnunication, which I transmit in
code, to make known my thoughts on the matter.
These orders will remain in force, regardless
of any orders to the contrary you might receive
in the future, even if they are signed by me.
(1) The demobilized warships must remain French,
under French colors, with reduced French crews-,
and remaining in French Metropolitan or colonial
ports.
(2) Secret precautions against sabotage must be
undertaken so that an enemy or former ally seizing
the ship by force will not be able to use it.
(3) If the armistice commission should arrive at
an interpretation decidedly different from that
in the first article above, at the moment of this
new decision the warships should be taken without
new orders from me to the United States, or if
nothing else can be done, they should be scuttled
to deprive the enemy of them. In no case should
they be left intact to the enemy.
(4) Vessels seeking refuge with foreigners ought
not be used in war operations against Germany or
Italy without orders from the Chief of French
Naval Forces.
(5) :tn no case should you obey orders from a
foreign adrniralty.9
These orders were reissued from time to time to remind
the fleet that it must never deliver itself to a ~oretgn
power, and these last secret instructions, issued before
the armistice, seem to prove the good faith of the French.
In the eyes of French sailors these orders rendered the
attack at Mers-el-Kebir still more unjustifiable.

9

Hytier, QE.• cit., p.

37.
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Somerville was in continual contact with the War
Cabinet throughout the day in hopes of averting a clash
of arms.

It was all to no avail, however, since by the

time the admiralty 1 s final message was received, the battle
had actually begun.

That message read:

11

French ships

must comply with our terms or sink themselves or be sunk
10
by you before dark. 11
The British mined the harbor to prevent escape.
Caught in the trap and shelled at point-blank range, a
portion of the fleet was virtually destroyed and the battle
over in less than fifteen minutes.

The Strasbourg was the

cruiser to successfully evade the bombardment and run the
mine field.

The battleship Dunkergue r.an aground.

Provence was beached.

The

The Bretagne blew up and capsized.

Of the big ships, only the Connnandant-Teste remained untouched
in the harbor.

French casual.ties came to 1,297 killed or
11
The dead were buried on
missing, and 351 wounded.
July

5.

British casualties were nil.

The Mers-el-Kebir attack was only part of the Briti1;h
strategy to seal the fate of the French fleet.

On

the same

day, they seized without warning French warships and crews
in Portsmouth; Plymouth and Southampton.

French merchant

ships in British ports were also boarded and captured.

That

10 churchill, Their Finest Hour, .QI!.• cit., p. 236.
11 Rear Admiral Raymond De Belot (French Navy, Ret.),
~ Struggle For the Mediterranean, 1939-~ (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 29.
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part of the French fleet in Alexandria was blocked in port,
and only a personal agreement between Admiral Andrew Cunningham and Admiral Rene Godfroy prevented the same treatment
12
meted out to the French at Mers-el-Kebir.
The French
admiral agreed to discharge his ships' fuel oil, remove
the fir~ng mechanisms from their guns and notify the British
upon receiving orders to sail.

The fleet was virtually in

uaptivity, but it did not matter.

Vichy was so disgusted

with ,Godfroy 1 s actions that the naval ministry refused to
answer his telegrams for more than two months.
Finally, on July 8, the iqplete battle-cruiser Richelieu
was bombarded and crippled at Dakar, where she had taken
refuge,

Her guns remained to be mounted and this task could

not be done at Dakar,

These British attacks furnished Laval

excellent arguments in bringing the Republic to an end, and
the government which had founded its foreign policy on an
alliance with a nation that now attacked defenseless ships,
was heaped with scorn.
The Vichy response to the attacks was moderate but
nevertheless marked an important turning point in Anglo-French
relations,

Previously an advocate of friendly relations with

England, although never offering close cooperation, Darlan
now became outspokenly anti-British.

He openly favored

a declaration of hostilities against England after the attacks, 1 3

12
Admiral Sir .Andrew B, Cunningham,! Sailor's Odyssey,
The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham
of H;yndhope {London: Hutchinsonand Company, 19.51), pp. 247-49.

13 Ambler, 2P.• .Q.ll., P• 69,
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Meanwhile, the efforts of Laval in favoring a broad
collaboration with Germany, brought Eranco-German relations
to a critical point.

As tensions increased and German

pressure mounted, evidence seems to indicate that France
might have been driven into England's arms, had the British
not attacked at Mers-el-Kebir and tightened the blockade
as we11. 14 Churchill prevented any hopes of French-Allied
cooperation with the attack and the refusal to ease the
blockade, despite the United States• desire that France
be allowed to trade with her colonies.

As the government

concentrated its efforts on securing food stuffs and approving
economic collaboration with Germany during July and August,
it was continually undergoing internal reorganization.

Laval

took credit in realigning the cabinet, but his moves were
15
more in the nature of compromises than victories.
General
Weygand was sent to North Africa as Pete.in 1 s personal representative when he was dropped from the cabinet on September 7.
Meeting with Petain on October 24, the Nazi Fuhrer
took great pains to be cordial to the Marshal.

Petain was

l4Farmer, .QE.• cit., pp. 184-186.
l5John M. Hyde, "Pierre Laval: The Illusions of A
Realist, 1939-1940, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1962), p. 43.
16~-

16
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informed that he must surround hims elf with men Hitler
could trust, and Laval was one of the men Hitler considered
most trustworthy •17 The meeting, and famous handshake of
Petain and Hitler, caused Paul Baudouin to resign his
foreign ministry in disgust, in the belief that active
military collaboration was soon to come.

The vacancy

permitted Laval to become Foreign Minister as well as
Vice-Premier, pressing his case for collaboration throughout
November and the first weeks of December.

His meeting with

German Foreign Minister van Ribbentrop in Paris and then
18
with Hitler in Berlin gave him added hope and courage.
When a scheme by Laval and Otto Abetz, the German representative in Paris, was uncovered, Petain angrily dismissed
Laval from the government.

They had planned an elaborate

welcome for the Marshal when he was to attend a ceremony
marking the one-hundredth anniversary of the return of
Napoleon's ashes to France.

The Germans were returning

the ashes of the Duke of Reichstadt, Napoleon's son, at the
same time as a gesture of friendship.

The warm welcome

would persuade Petain to return the gover!ll11ent to Paris,
where Laval could bring collaborators into the government
more easily, and become the real master of France, which
19
The scheme failed completely, Yet
he so desired to be.

17

·
Marchal, .2£•

ill•,

P•. 93.

18 Jasperson, .21!.• cit., p.
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the real cause ror Laval 1 s dismissal is not to be round
in his schemes, petty jealousies or intrigues, but simply
his railure to obtain tangible results by his collaboration
policy.

Laval 1 s dismissal did not meet with Hitler 1 s

approval and a war or nerves ensued, with Petain holding
his ground on the armistice terms that permitted an independent government, while at the same time wishing to honor
his pledge or collaboration.

For although he had made no

real concessions at Montoire on October 24, both Laval
and Hitler thought Petain had committed France to a policy
or military collaboration. 20
When Hitler insisted upon Laval 1 s reinstatement,
Petain sent Admiral Darlan to Paris as intermediary.

The

point was won that Petain could indeed revoke the constitutional act that named Laval his successor.

Laval was

orrered a choice or two minor cabinet posts in an attempt
to please the Germans, but he wanted the ministry or interior,
21
which Petain refused.
Laval's rorced retirement and the
diplomatic crisis that rollowed paved the way ror the political
triumph or Darlan two months later.
Following Laval I s dismissal, Petain summoned Pierre
Flandin to Vichy, where he served brierly, rrom December 1940
until February 1941, as Minister or Foreign Mrairs.

20 Pierre Laval, The D[B}y or Pierre Laval
Charles Scribner•s Sons";-19
, p. 161.
21 Herbert Cole, Laval: ! Biography
Putnam•s Sons, 1963), p. 307.
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Flandin was too willing to run the risk of sharp conflict
with Germany. 22

He adamantly opposed the Nazi idea of a

directory which would bring Laval back into the government.
In Paris the German representative, Abetz, was still demanding a position for Laval in the foreign ministry, along
with the dismissal of the ministers who assisted in the purge
of Lavai. 23 Finally, Flandin was pressured into tendering
his resignation, and thus opened the .doqr for Darlan as
Minister of Foreign Affairs after Abetz let it be known
24
that the Admiral was acceptable to the Germans.
In assuming his new post on February 21, 1941, Admiral
Darlan gave further indications of his thirst for power and
his a·ctions during these fourteen months of his career may
ultimately prove to be history's case against him.
armistice in 1940 opened the door for Darlan.

The

He rapidly

emerged as one of the. most influential men in the French
government.

Collaboration was a risky policy at best, and no

one realized this more than Darlan. As a thoroughly ruthless
politician, 2 5 long submerged in the intrigues and bickerings
of the Vichy gover:rµnent, he often replied to his accusers:
"One plays politics with realities, not with sentiments. 1126
Although Admiral Darlan 1 s sentiments were qui:te;;s:t;rongly

22Aron, op. cit., p. 271.
2 3cole, op. cit., p. 308.
2 4Farmer, op. cit., pp. 206-207.
25De Montmorency, op. cit., p. 128.
26 Ibid.
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anti-British., they were not as yet pro-German.

Many

real and imagined incidents caused him to harbor a great
deal of anti-British sentiment and often the British themselves made his decisions much easier for him.

Such

occasions were the personal attitudes of the British Admiralty representatives, Sir Dudley Pound and First Lord of
the Admiralty, Mr. A.V,A. Alexander.

In discussing the role of the French fleet innnediately
preceeding the armistice, Pound advised that it be put at
the disposal of England.

When Darlan would not agree to

this, Alexander then proposed that it be dispatched to
American waters for the duration of the war.

Darlan pointed

out that England was asking a great sacrifice on France I s
part, which would lend nothing to the British war effort.
Alexander stated that it was the opinion ·of the British
government that these measures were necessary in order
to prevent the French fleet from falling into German hands.
Darlan replied:
Marshal Petain has given the British government his soldier's word that he will not surrender
a single unit of the French fleet to the foes of
Great Britain. You also have my wo
Is that
not a sufficient guarantee for you?

2?.

11 We

have no use for words, 11 28 said Alexander.

Thus the two

government's dipl011latic relations had declined to a personal

27
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level, and the incident was later recalled as vividly by
the old Marshal as by Darlan.

Despite continued assurance from both Petain and
Darlan that the fleet would be scuttled before it would
be allowed to fall into Gennan hands, the British were
not convinced and thus attacked at Mers-el-Kebir.

From

the time he refused to hand over the fleet, which resulted
in the British decision to attack at Mers-el-Kebir, Darlan 1 s
relations vnth England went from bad to worse.

Although

still unwilling to ally Vichy with Nazi Germany, he faced
the dilemma of military collaboration or annihilation as
he assumed his new role of Foreign Minister.

CHAPTER III
DARLAN 1 S MINISTRY:
COLLABORATION OR ANNIHILATION?
The official policy of the Vichy government was to
carry out the terms of the armistice, for as Darlan pointed
out, for France not to apply the armistice loyally and
thereby give the victor a motive_for denouncing it, might
amount to suicide for herself and her empire.

1

Caught

between the Axis and Allies, Darlan made special efforts
to pursue a policy of exclusive Francophilism.

2

was the ultimate fate of France and her empire.

The problem
To resolve

. this Darlan pursued a policy of military collaboration with
Germany on one hand, while reminding Great Britain of'
France's promise that her fleet woUld never come into the
war against a former ally.
Military collaboration was distasteful and dishonorable
to Darlan, 3 but in early 1941, he still believed in a German
victory and desired a leading role for himself' and France
in Hitler's New Europe.

Moreover, since Mers-el-Kebir, Darlan

1 Ro.bert o. Paxton, "Army Officers in Vichy France:
The Krm:hstice Army, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1963), pp. 265-266.
2
Hytier, op. cit., p. 290. As quoted in Jerome
Carcopino•s Souveni~de Sept Ans (Paris: 1953), pp, 289-290.
Carcopino was Secretary of State for National Education
and Youth in the Darlan Ministry.
3oe Montmorency, .2£• .£!:!:,., p. 128.

5{

expressed a more intense dislike of the British, and
sometimes went so far as to hope for a German victory:
"Great Britain," he said to American Charge d 1 Ai'fairs,
H, Freeman Mathews on December 14, 1940, "would ask too
much, probably Madagascar and Dakar, whereas Germany
would content herself with Alsace-Lorraine, which is lost
in any case, 114
Darlan 1 s efforts to steer the Vichy ship of state
along a course of exclusive French self-aggrandizement
were off-set by two of the most momentous events of the
war,

On June 22, 1941 the Nazis launched their Russian

campaign and six months later the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor,

These events turned the European coTirlict into

a world conflagration and the role of France in world
affairs suddenly les·sened,

The survival of a sovereign

France seemed of small consequence as the scale of the war
changed,

Only after the German army completely bogged down

in Russia did Darlan have second thoughts about the outcome
of the war,

"What will be the outcome of the war?

not know, 11 he replied,

5

We do

With Russia involved, the Admiral

4Forei'rw Relations of the United States, 1940.
Volume II, Washington, n":"c7: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1957), pp. 490-491,
5Alain Darlan, L 1 amiral Darlan parle
Amiot-Dumont,'1952), p. 114.
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feared an Allied victory would lead to a communist triumph
in Europe and a victorious Germany was preferable to this.
Especially if France were to be Hitler's favorite vassal.
Under this illusion Darlan had pressed for collaboration
following his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs.
With the helm of the machinery of government completely
in his grasp, he entered into delicate negotiations with
Germany in hope of preserving French sovereignity in the
emp1re.

6

Petain I s first instnuctions to Darlan were to

resume a policy of collaboration as outlined at Montoire. 7
These instructions were quite similar to his own thoughts,
for on January 30, he wrote, "We should think first of the
present and, continuing the policy which led us to ask
for an armistice, we must collaborate. 118

Just before

Petain named him Vice-Premier and "dauphin, 11 Darlan again
wrote on February 21, "Collaboration, is in my opinion,
'

indispensable not only for the recovery, but for the very
life of the nation. 11 9
At the onset of his ministry, Admiral D~rlan found
himself in a most difficult position.

Diplomatic relations

had not been completely broken off with the Third Reich,
for haggling between General Huntziger and General Wilhelm
Keitel continued daily at the armistice commission meetings

6

George Mel ton, 11 Darlan and ll'ichy Foreign Policy,
1940-1942, 11 (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University
of North Carolina, 1963), p. 106.

7Darlan, op. cit., p. 90.

9 Ibid,, p. 281,
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in Wiesbaden, while diktats and Nazi pressure for military
collaboration increased.

Neither Petain nor Darlan succeeded

in re-establishing top-level relations and negotiations
with Germany during March and April.

Near the end of April

unexpected political circumstances caused the Germans to
consider French cooperation once more.

A rebellion,

fostered by Axis agents, broke out in Iraq,

This was

part of an overall German strategy for the Middle East
which proposed a pincer movement aimed at Suez.

The north-

ern drive would be launched across the Balkans, where the
Germans occupied Yugoslavia, while the southern offensive
would be aimed at the same objective through Tripolitania
10
and Egypt.
By the end of April the Nazi forces were
ready to begin their push,

Rommel had crossed the Egyptian

frontier, and Crete and Greece had been occupied, If Iraq
fell, the British position would become untenable,

Iraq

declared war on England on May 2, 1941, and in order to
support her new allies, the Germans had to pass through
French mandated Syria.
indispensable.

Thus Vichy's collaboration became

It was at this point that Darlan entered

the picture.

lOH,R, Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler's War Directives
1939-19,45 (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), Directive
Number 32, p. 80.
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On May 3 he was summoned to Paris by the German
ambassador, Otto Abetz, thus initiating the negotiations
which Darlan had been trying to bring about for two
months.

11

It was imperative that Vichy act quickly, and

owing to the delicate situation the negdtiations were
shrouded in secrecy,
acted first and

There is no doubt that Darlan often

7eported

to Petain and the cabinet later.

He was willing to make concessions first in hopes of later
attaining greater and more definite concessions from the
Germans.

Before he went to Paris Darlan had already agreed

to make available to Rommel a number of French military
12
trucks stored in North Africa,
General Maxime Weygand
was furious about this, but had to accept the fact accomplished.13
Delighted at being received at the conference table
by the victors. and assured that the matter of Pierre Laval I s
return to Vichy would be left out of discussions, Darlan
agreed to everything. 14 In addition to aiding with the
transportation of supplies across Syria, he agreed that
France would furnish a certain amount of arms and ammunition

11
Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 312.

13 Langer, .2E.• ill•, p. 148 •. Quoted from the unpublished diary of a French diplomat who was very close
to the developments at this time, The diary co.vers the
period April 26 to June 6 in great detail.
1 4Hytier, 21?.•

ill••

p. 254.

to the Iraqi rebels, as well as a few airplanes.

All

of these were to come from French stocks in Syria and
were readily available.

France would also CJDntribute

to the refuelling and repair of German aircraft in
transit at the airfield of Aleppo, in northern Syria,
1.5
and this facility was placed at German disposal.
On
May 9 the first German aircraft (three Messerschmitts and
a Junker .52 camouflaged in Iraqi colors) landed at Damascus
with a team of technicians whose job was to study the
16
problem of refuelling the transit aircraft.
A Franco-'German
mission arrived at Aleppo on the same day.

The group included

a man bearing the name, Renier, but who in fact was a German
17
whose name was Rahn.
This was a direct violation of
Vichy's word that only Germans who were members of the
armistice commission would be allowed in the French empire.
The mission came to Aleppo to insure the smooth transmission
of French arms to Iraq, and was quite active.

A hundred

German aircraft and four trainloads of munitions swiftly
crossed into Iraq,18 At this p<i>int the Vichy government

l.5Aron, .QE•
16

ill••

Ibid,

17 Ibid,, p, 313.
18

Ibid,

p. 311.

seems to have accepted military collaboration, although
Darlan denied it,

He based his argument on Article 10
of the Armistice Convention, 19 In his interpretation of
Article 10, he pretended not to see the difference in
abstaining from hostile acts and effectively aiding
the Germans,
In return for his military collaboration, Darlan
was granted a relaxation of conditions at the demarcation
line that permitted a freer flow of mail and less restricted
20
travel between the occupied and unoccupied zones,
In
reality this was no concession, for it was more in the
interests of Germany than Vichy,

The Germans also granted

re8.Dmament of six destroyers and seven torpedo boats and
21
a twenty-five per cent reduction of occupation costs.
The German concession of freeing certain prisoners of
war (~on-commissioned officers and soldiers who has served
in World War I) was a great propaganda victory for Vichy
22
since this amounted to approximately 83,000 men,
Over and

19 Documents of German Foreign Policy, Volume IX, Series D
(Washington, D,C.: U,S, Government Printing Office, 1962),
PP, 674-675, The first paragraph of Article 10 of the Armistice Convention stated: 11 The French Government undertakes
not to engage in any hostile actions with any part of the
armed forces left to it, or in any way, against the German
Reigh,"
20
Aron, .2£•
21

.£11.,

.Thld,, p. 313.

22 Ibid.

p. 312.
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above these concessions, the first important once France
had obtained in nearly a year, the Paris talks of May 3-6,
at last, enabled Darlan to obtain another meeting with
the Fuhrer. 23
Collaboration seemed to be taking a new direction
at last when Darlan was invited to see Hitler at Berchtesgaden on May 11 and 21.

But the Nazi Fuhrer 1 s attitude

had changed from the congenial reception he had previously
given Pete.in and Laval, for he was in the mood that Darlan
so well remembered.

Hitler was brutal and authoritarian.

Perhaps his mood might be explained by the disappointing
news of the previous day.

Rudolf Hess, Cheif of the Party,

the Fuhrer 1 s s.econd successor, had on his own initative,
flown to Scotland on May 10, where he intended to propose
that Great Britain conclude a separate peace with Germany.~_
Perhaps too, French collaboration was increasingly more
important in May 1941, than it had been when he met Pete.in

23 Admiral Jules T. Docteur, La Grande Enigma de la
Guerre: Darlan, Admiral de le Flotte (Paris: Editions
de la Couronne, 1949), pp-.-l'ob-107. Darlan had been received by Hitler in the Fuhrer 1 s personal railway coach at
Ferriere-sur-Epte, near Beauvais on December 25, 1940. At
this time Darlan was acting as Petain 1 s intermediary during
the Flandin-Laval Cabinet crisis. "Never, 11 he told Admiral
Docteur, "have I scolded one of my officers as I. was scolded."
2
4rhid., p. 120,

Also s~e Aron, .212.• cit., p, 314,
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and Laval in October 1940.

To the Reich Chancellor collab-

oration was not an end in i tsel1'.

"I have only the protection
01' German interests in view," he said. 25 From then on, the
11

principle 01'
ations, 26

11

give or I take" became the basis 01' all negoti-

It is high time France prepared h'e peace,

She

must decide whether she wishes to collaborate or not, 112 7
the Fuhrer stated,
Hitler placed Darlan in the dilemma 01' military
collaboration or annihilation,

The decision came quickly.

Darlan informed Hitler France was willing to help Germany
win the war,

Vichy, he added, had already manifested its

desire to collaborate economically and militarily by lending
support to the Reich in Syria.

France was ,tllling to continue

this policy, but Darlan stressed the point that it would be
a most opportune time 1'or Germany to make certain concessions,
The Admiral also took the opportunity to further his -mm
interests (obtaining a leading role in the New European Navy)
when he assured Hitler that his government would

11

direct

French policy towards an integration with the New European
Order, 11

28 and assured continuity of this line of policy.

Darlan did not have to be won over to military collaboration

25Aron, £!!• cit., p, 314.
26~.
27 Docteur, op. cit,, p. 321. Docteur discusses at
length the territorial readjustments Hitler used to threaten
Darlan.
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for he actively sought it,

To him this seemed the only

acceptable course of action in order to avoid annihilation,
He argued that it was possible for France to help Germany
win the war without being in a state of co-belligerency
with her, and at the same time refrain from a state of
hostility against Great Britain,
When he returned to Vichy on May 13, Darlan called
an important Council of Ministers meeting for the following
day. Four Secretaries of State 29 and Petain were present
to hear the Admiral's report on his conversation with Hitler
and a plea favoring collaboration.

As he outlined the

points favoring a course of action to pursue collaboration,
he stat"ed:
(1) It is the last chance we shall have
for a repproachment with Germany,

(2) If we favor the policy of England,
France will be crushed, dismembered and
cease to·be a nation, , ,
(3) If we endeavor to maintain a policy
of vacillation between-the two adversaries,
Germany will create many difficulties for us
in the exercise of our sovereignty and will
foment unrest. In any case the peace will
be a disastrous one.
(4) If we collaborate with Germany, without going so far as to place ourselves at her

29

Those present were Yves Bouthillier, Minister
of Finance; General Charles Huntziger, Minister of War;
Pierre Caziot, Minister of Agriculture; and Joseph
Barthelemy, Minister of Justice,

Lj.b

side for the purpose of making deliberate war
on England, that is is say work for her in
our factories, if we give her certain facilities,
we can save the French nation, reduce our
territorial losses to a minimum, both metropolitian and colonial, and play an honorable
part, if not an important one in the Europe
of the future.30
In conclusion he stated,

11 My

choice is made, and I will

not be ·deterred from it by the unconditional offer of a
ship-load of wheat or a ship load of oil. 1131 This was a
direct illusion to the Murphy-Weygand accord reached in
32
Algiers, February 26, 1941.
The agre·ement provided that
the United States would supply needed products to North
Africa, as long as the shipments were not allowed to accumulate there, and all such shipments were exclusively
consumed in North Africa.

Darlan presented his case for

collaboration as the lesser of two evils.

It was the

inevitable deal which provided the means of avoiding the
worst, for it was not a military alliance and it would
enable the government and populace to escape annihilation.

30

Aron, .QE• cit., p. 316.

31

Hytier, op. cit., p. 260. Quoted from Weygand•s
Recalled to Service --riiaris: Flammarion, 1950), p. 442.
It must be emphasized that General Weygand was not present
at the meeting, and his information could only be second
hand at best.
3 2Murphy, .2..:.
nn • _cit
-•, P • 88 •
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There was nothing absolute or eternal about it;

it was

simply a provisional expedient which corresponded to the
circumstances. 33 Having carried the day with his policy
favoring military collaboration to avoi'd annihilation,
Darlan and Petain gave their decision all possible publicity
hoping that France might eventually benefit from it.
three speeches, one by Petain on May

15,

In

and by Darlan on

May 23 and 31, they informed the public of the choice they
had made:
In a triumph~nt Anglo-Saxon world, France
would only be a dominion of the second importance.
It is a question of choosing life and dejth. The
Marshal an_d government have chosen life. 4

33Aron, .2£• .£!!., p.
much the same thing in his
the Admiral as saying that
was ceded to Germany." De

317. De Montmorency states
defense of Darlan, and quotes
"nothing of vital importance
Montmorency, .2E.• cit., pp. 128-129.

34Aron, EE.• cit., p. 317. Also see Leahy, .QE.• cit.,
p. 32, and Langer, EE.• cit., pp. 151-152 for a fuller
account of the Petain speech on May 15. Leahy wired the
text of it in full translation to the State Department.
An interesting note to the Darlan broadcasts is added by
the British correspondent Sisley Huddleston in France: The
Tragic Years, 1939-1947: An Eyewitness Account of War,-Occupation, and Liberation (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955),
p. 114. He~tes, "The voice of Darlan, as it came • • •
over the radio, was unimpressive. It was high-pitched,
without distinction. Doubtless, it is absurd to judge
ministers by the accident of their voice but, now that
the radio is the principle vehicle of communication of
rulers of the masses, it is surely a handicap to be 1unradiophonique.1 Character is conveyed in the spoken word, in
the enunciation, in the tone, and in the case of Darlan,
the effect was disagreeable."

1. The Protocols of Paris
On May 21, ten days after his meeting with Hitler,
the top-level negotiations Darlan had sought so long,
opened in Paris, at the German embassy.

Admiral Darlan,

along with General Charles Huntziger who had signed the
armistice agreement, presented Vichy's views.

They were

assisted by Jacques Benoist-Mechin and Fernand de Brinon,
both ministers without portfolio.

The agreements reached

at this meeting, known as the Protocols-of Paris, were
signed by Darlan and the German representative, General
Karl Warlimont.

These documents dealthessentially with

military questions and mark 'the nearest point reached by
the Vichy government to entering the war. 35

These agree-

ments provided the Germans:
(1) Use of the airfield at Aleppo and
cession of Syrian stocks of munitions to the
Iraqi rebels. (These had previously been
agreed upon between Darlan and Abetz in Paris
earlier in the month.)
(2) Use of the port of Bizerta (in
Tunisia) and passage through Tunisia to aid
Field Marshal Erwin Romnel 1 s Afrika Korps,
as well as the sale of French military
vehicles and arms stored in Africa to Germany.
(3) The right to organize a submarine
bas~ at Dakar and Vichy cooperation to drive
the Gaul!ist forces out of French Equatorial
Africa.3

35Aron, .2£• cit., P• 317.
3 6 Ibid. The complete text of the Paris Protocols is
- found (untranslated) in Langer, .212.• cit., pp. 402-412, A.D.
Hytier disputes Lange~•s claim of having been the first to
publish the complete text of the agreements, stating that
French historian Albert Kammerer published the documents at
least twice in 1945.
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In exchange for military collaboration, France would be
allowed to take certain steps toward rearming her empire.
But these minor concessions on Germany's part did not
satisfy Darlan and he argued that the three military
protocols must be subordinated to political and economic
concessions that would justify Vichy's collaboration to
French public opinion. 37 Darlan strengthened his own
hand by drawing up a list of concessions he was detennined
to extract from the Germans before giving them the bases.
These included the reinforcement of African defenses by
the French and political and economic concessions such as
liberation of all French prisoners and rolling back the
demarcation line to north of Paris.

He also wanted a

drastic reduction if not the comp.lete elimination of
occupation costs.

These concessions he felt were necessary

to justify his military collaboration to his countrymen.
Hoping to establish some basis for negotiation and hard
bargaining, he had convinced himself that these demands
were not unduly harsh on the Germans.

He also felt that

collaboration rewarded by German concessions would serve
to enhance his own popularity and _effectiveness at Vichy.

37Robert o. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy:.
French Officer Corps Under Marshal Petain {Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 233-,

~

Although he had not been well known to the public
bef'ore the war, those who did know him respected his
ability in bringing the French navy to it peak of' ef'f'iciency.

Of'ten the object of' hostile reactions during his

f'requent visits to Paris,. he was also not a popular man
at Vichy.

During the negotiations in Paris he was seemingly
unanimously distrusted. 38 It was during this time that
the Admiral's personal propaganda agents made themselves
known and Darlan 1 s picture began to appear with greater
f'requency in the papers.

Store f'ronts in Vichy displayed

his portrait, and those who did not were discreetly visited
by the agents and advised to do so.
In order f'or the collaboration to become of'f'icial,
Petain had to ratif'y the documents.

Expecting this to be

a mere f'ormality, Darlan was taken by surprise when the
old Marshal would have nothing to do with the agreements
.
39
f'ormulated behind his back.
A cabinet crisis ensued
and owing to the alleged bad f'aith of' the Germans with
their continued haggling over occupation costs, Darlan
gained much needed time.

Petain had two alternatives.

He could ref'use to sign the agreements, which would mean
a disavowal of' Darlan and necessitate f'orming a new
government with the possibility of' Laval's return; or he
could ask even greater political concessions that would

38

Leahy, .2£• cit., p. 34.

39Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 318.
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be wholly unacceptable to the Germans and thereby nullify

.

the agreements,

40

If the Germans had granted even a part

of the demands by Darlan, it is quite likely that the
Protocols would have been ratified and carried out by
Vichy,

So the Admiral, as well as the Marshal, was in

a most precarious position,

How could Darlan continue

to call himself collaborator, if the agreements were not
ratified?
Faced with this dilemma, Darlan and Petain called
General Weygand and his Governor-Generals from Africa
for consultation,41

It was thought by Weygand 1 s friends,

as well as Darlan 1 s enemies, that the General was the one
man with sufficient power and authority to successfully
protest the Admiral 1 s actions and protect the government
at the same time,42 In the meetings, between June 3-6,
Weygand used his influence and personal intervention to·
force a showdown and rejection of a collaboration policy.
He even threatened to resign if such a policy was pursued.

4 oibid., p. :323.
4lHytier, EI!.• _ill., p, 265,
42 Aron, 212.• cit,, pp. 323-324, Aron contends that
Darlan summoned Weygand from Africa to act as the scapegoat
and shield the government from the Germans when the agreements were not ratified, Indications are however that
Darlan was sincere in his wish for collaboration, as dictated
by his belief in a Nazi victory.

On June 6, another cabinet meeting was held and Darlan
outlined in more detail his demands of Germany,

They

included:
(1) The total restoration of French sovereignty over the whole of metropolitan territory,
and taking into account the necessities of an
occupation army, the demarcation line to be no
more than the limit of military occupation,
with citizens being free to move from one side
of the line to the other;
(2) A special statute for Alsace-Lorraine
until the treaty of peace;

(3) Total suppression of occupation costs
and appropriations by the Wehrmacht from all
branches of French production;
(4) Suppression of
all activity by the
.
X
•
1 0stland'" and return to their
organization
lands of dispossessed proprietors and farmers;
(5) Return to their homes of all non-Jewish
Frenchmen;

(6) The staggered liberation of ·all prisoners; prisoners necessary to the economy of
the Reich being made free workers engaged under
contract;
·

(7) A public assurance to be given by
the Axis governments that they make no demands
on North Africa, French West Africa and Syria
(only the territories mentioned in.the Protocols
were named);
·
(8) The suppression or considerable reduction of Commissions of Control, particularly in Africa;
(9) The cessation of all anti-French
propaganda in Afri6a;

~-

A society of Germans and pro-Nazis who occupied
French territory with the ultimate aim of annexation
to Germany.
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(10) The handing back of all armament
factorlhes of every kind and o"f assistance
from Germany by the supply of raw materials,
materials of all kinds, munitions and all
varieties of fuel;
(11) Anti-airc ~ft rearmament to assure
necessary security; j

4

The demands appear ·to those of a victorious father than
a vanquished nation,

In fact, it might be said that they

appear to be preposterous, but there is no indication that
Darlan himself calculated the demands to discourage German
acceptance,

He hoped the Germans would seriously consid-

er the prop~sals and be tempted enough (especially with the
prospect of the African bases) to engage in broad political
talks that would enable France to once more assume an
honorable role in the affairs of Europe,
The fact that the main objectives (bases at Bizerte
and Dakar) were never carried out haB given rise to the
generally accepted belief that Vichy avoided application
of the Protocols by means of trickery,

The fact was, Vichy

setsits demands too high for Germany to accept and Darlan•s
frie_nds have even given him credit for the ruse that saved
France from this disaster,44

The only point about which

there has been disagreement or discussion is whether Darlan
was or was not in favor of accepting the Protocols.

Darlan

probably favored their ratification, but he was not as

43 Aron,
· £.E.• cit,, p. 323,
~ytier, ~- ~ . , p, 265.

interested in how the agreements would be implements as
how negotiations would develop.

Collaboration was still

the cornerstone of Darlan 1 s German policy,

Had not Hitler

told him, for little things, little things, for big things,
big things745

Had Germany granted the French demands, or

even a part of them, the agreements would probably have
been ratified and carried out by Vichy.

2. The Syrian Crisis
To further complicate the problem of near co-belligerency with the Germans, war began in Syria on June 8.
As a result of the German use of Syrian airfields, Bri-tish
forces under the command of General Sir Maitland Wilson
and Free French Forces commanded by General Paul Legentilhomne crossed the Syrian frontier,

General Georges

Catroux of the Free French Forces issued a proclamation
ending the French mandate and declared Syria and Lebanon
free and independent.

From June 8 - July 18, 1941, French-

men who had fought the same enemy a year before, now opposed
each other in battle •. The Vichy troops in Syria, whose
loyalty lay with Petain, numbered some 30,000,46 but were
aided by about 15', 000 Syrians.

Free French Forces in the

invaders ranks were in the minority (one division), but
combined with British, Australians, Indians and an Arab
Legion, the invaders numbered ap~roximately

45,ooo. 47

Gen-·

eral Henri Dentz, leading the Vichy forces at first refused
the German offer to provide air cover for his troops.48
Reconsidering, he wired Petain and Darlan for instructions.
Realizing that German intervention could not be prompt,
massive and continuous, they hesitated to approve it.
order to insure a Vichy victory, the Germans would also

46 Aron,

op. cit,, p. 324•

47~.
48

Paxton, .£!:!.•.£!_!.,pp. 236-237,

In

have had to bomb the British fleet in Middle East waters,
and the political repercussions of co-belligerency with
Germany scared Darlan and the Marshal.49

At this point

Darlan no longer sought military collaboration and sent
a mission to Beirut, headed by General Jean-Marie Bergeret
to ask that the Luftwaffe not intervene,

50

Germany no

longer needed the Syrian bases (for she had launched the
Russian invasion) and despite the Nazi pressure to destroy
pipelines and oil depots, the fighting caused no serious
disruption of industrial or economic life in Syria.
An armistice on July 14 ended hostilities,

About

2,000·Vichy soldiers crossed over and joined the Gaullist
forces, and the dead on both sides received full military
honors,

Vichy lossesnnumbered 1,038 dead, while Free French

. 51
losses were put at about 800.
The dead lie in the cemetery of Damascus
to which I had them brought, They will not
lie there alone, Their graves lie next door
to those who were their adversaries, They are
all alike and carry the same epitaph in these
words:
·
'Died for France.,52

49 Ibid,,

p, 241,

Also see Aron, .2.E• cit,, p, 326,

50Hy t·ier, .2.E• ~"t- , p. 282 •

51

Aron, S?E.• ,ill,, p, 324,

52~ . ,

pp, 327-328,

Quoting General Catroux,

;,

(

During the first four months of Darlan•s government,
France faced the alternatives of military collaboration
with the Third Reich or annihilation.

Vichy seemed to

have chosen the first, and on several occasions drew
near to entering the war.

But never deciding to do so,

and somehow managing to avoid the worst, after four months
she still faced the extreme danger of. Polandization.53
Was General Wilhelm Keitel 1 s threat to be realized?
France suffer the same destiny as Poland?

53

Aron, .21?.• cit., p. 328.

Would

3. Vichy's Relations With England
The confusion and disagreement surrounding Vichy's
attitude toward England centers around two diplomatic
missions in the fall of 1940, both unknown to Darlan,
The first was undertaken by Louis Rougier, a professor
of political economy, when he arrived in London on
October 22. 54

As the first Petain emissary to England,

since the armistice, he stressed the anti-German attitude
prevailing at Vichy,

Ironically, the meeting was over-

shadowed by the news of Petain 1 s meeting, at the same
time, with Hitler,

Rougier was received at the Foreign

Office and la.ter by Prime Minister Winston Churchill.
According to Rougier,~5 agreements were reached that
promised restoration of France's integrity and sovereignty, if she did nothing to assist the Axis powers;
the easing of the blockade and transfer of colonial
produce to France;

no attempt would be made to invade

the colonies remaining loyal to Vichy, and the British
radio would cease its attacks on Petain.

For her part

Vichy agreed not to attempt to recapture the colonies
which had gone over to De Gaulle; cede no bas~s or ports
to the Axis powers; to bring the empire back into the war
as soon as the British could supply sufficient troops, as

54Hy t·ier, .212.• ~••
"t
55 rbid,

p, 101 •

Hytier quotes Rougier 1 s works, Mission Secrete
and~ Accords Secrets. According to the author, Rougier.
goes into great detail, with substantial evidence, to refute
the British denial that such agreements were reached,

well as supplies and arms to colonial troops, and finally,
Darlan promised to scuttle the fleet rather than let it
fall into German or Italian hands.
Rougier testifies that these protocols were brought
back to Vichy for Petain to ratify, but controversy has
arisen over the interpretation of the conversations.
Rougier convinced himself t~at he was playing an historical
role of utmost importance,

56

while Churchill's interpret-

ation seems to be that the professor was not of sufficient
political importance to engage in political agreements. 57

In the eyes of the British, Rougier was to be used as a
source of information and for an exchange of views.

58

Thus

the British versions of the·conversations differ greatly
from Rougier 1 s and the emphasis is altered by the British
to the extent that no protocol existed, but simply an
announcement which might constitute preliminary arrangements
for agreements later on.

Petain believed that these arrange-

ments were more substantial that the policy of collaboration
he had outlined at Montoire, and it is reported that these
two documents (the Rougier mission and the Montoire agreements) were the only ones he kept in his office safe. 59

56Louis

Rougier, Mission Secrete a Londres: Les Accords Petain-Churchill (Paris: Les Editions du Cheval
Aile, 1948), p. 6.

57 churchill,

Their Finest Hour, 2£• cit., pp. 508-509.
Churchill states only that he received a certain M. Rougier.

58Aron,
59ill£.,

£E.• ,£!!,, pp, 220-221.

60

Whether anything was really achieved in these
Rougier-Churchill conversations remains uncertain,
According to Rougier a gentlemen's agreement which was
to serve as a basis ror permanent agreement later on,
60
was reached,
According to the British there was no
agreement, and they produced a memorandum or a supposed
conversation between Weygand and Rougier, which was no
more than a premature errort on Churchill's part, to
draw French colonial troops into the war on the Allied
side,

Churchill called the proposal to Weygand, "the

most brilliant opportunity ever orrered .to bold men," 61
There is no way or knowing where the truth lies
concerning these agreements, ror both sides produce excellent
evidence to support their point or view,
trial, Petain stated on June

8, 1945,

Prior to his

that the treaty

negotiated with Churchill was "intended to remain secret,"
He used this to discredit his meeting with Hitler at
Montoire which occurred the same day that Rougier was
in London,
Great Britain was rinally rorced to open new avenues
or discussion as a result or orrensive action by Ga:ullist
rorces in the heart or equatorial Arrica when Gaullists
captured the colony or Chad.

Great Britain got wind or

60 Rougier, £E,, ~ . , p.
or the agreement.

25.

Photostat or page 1

61 Hytier, op, cit., quoting W~yga:nd 1 s Recalled To
Service, .212.• cit-:-; p7"473,

62

Roy, .212.. cit • , p •

154.

62

61
Vichy's planned military collaboration with Germany to
recapture the colony.

Lord Halifax, the British ambass-

ador to the United States, had known Jacques Chevalier
during their school days together at Oxford.

Chevalier

was Secretary General of the Minister of Public Information
at Vichy, so Halifax took the opportunity to initiate
63
indirect discussions,
hoping to avoid a French-British
clash of arms in Chad.

Pierre Dupay, the Canadian Charge

d 1 Affairs at Vichy, acted as intermediary.

Dupay took a

draft of the agreements with him when he left for England
via Madrid and Lisbon on December 9, 1941.

The Halifax

and Chevalier agreement ratified by Petain only two months
before·naming Darlan Foreign Minister included:
(1) A state of artificial coolness will
be maintained between France and England.
(2) The status quo of Gaullist colonies
will be respected, it being understood that
they will eventually revert to France by
simple substitution of the police and troops.

(3) Vichy will surrender neither fleet
nor empire to the Axis.
(4) The B.B.C. i-lill refrain· from intervening in domestic affairs of France.

(5) Great ·Britain will consider food
shipments as coastwise shipping, the question
of gasoline will be discussed by specialists
in Madrid.
(6) French troops in the French empire
will protect the territory against gPY
attack from wherever it might come.~

63

·
Hytier, op. cit., p. 104.

64Ibid., p. 106.
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The agreements proved satisfactory to all parties
and since the interests of both countries were served,
all were for the most part carried out,

Other attempted

agreements between Great Britain and Vichy failed to
materialize and in general the relations between hhe two
nations remained unfriendly,

Motivated by his belief in

the ultimate defeat of Britain, Dar~an made no effort to
seek an agreement with them during his ministry. ·There
seems no doubt that his policy of collaboration was based
upon the same premise.

In the spring of 1941 it seemed
improbable to him that England could win the war, 65 and
even if she did, Darlan believed her p~st-war friendship

would be of little value, for as he told Freeman Mathews
in December of 1940, 11 A German victory is really better
66
for France. 11
Convinced that France could play no
honorable role in a triumphant Angl6-Saxon world, and
realizing France was not prepared to go to war against
England, he maintained a policy of undeclared war and
hostility towards Great Britain throughout his ministry.

65Darlan, op. cit., p. 153.
66

See Supra,, p. 37,

4.

Vichy's Relations With The United States

"Above all cultivate the United States. There
lies the future, 116 .Za.n aging Joseph Caillaux advised
Paul Baudouin at the collapse of the Third Republic.
In 1940 the United States was the only great power with
whom France could be on good terms.

De13:pite the armistice,

Germany was still the enemy; Russia was temporarily allied
with Germany, and England was engaged in a life and death
struggle with the Axis.

France desperately needed a friend

and the United States seemed to r&present their best hope
in a world at war.

Should England win the war, the United

States could be counted on to exert herself at the.peace
table, and if a compromise peace came, the moral pressure
of the United States would be needed against Germany. The
far-sighted were optimistic enough to foresee America's
entry into the war and a tipping of the military scales.
Whether pro-German, such as Laval, or anti-British, such
as Darlan, most Frenchmen would agree that American friendship had to be maintained.
Attempts toward better understanding had already
been made with the Murphy-Weygand agreements and the establishing of an American consul in Algiers headed by Robert
D. Murphy.

A new dimension to diplomatic relations was

67 Hytier, 2P.• cit., p. 184.

64-

added when at midnight on Friday, January

5,

l94l, in

the midst of what Frenchmen said was the coldest winter
in ninety years, the new American ambassador arrived
at Vichy. 68 Washington had ordered Admiral William D.
Leahy, a military man like Petain and Darlan, to Vichy
as a full-fledged ambassador.

This represented a psy-

chological victory for the Petain regime, for it indicated
the abandonment of Roosevelt 1 s tough policy with Vichy,
and ushered in a friendlier one which would perhaps produce
better results.

Leahy was a sailor.and spoke the naval

language of Darlan.

Fear of the results of military

collaboration, upon which the Darlan government had
embarked, also brought a more conciliatory attitude
from Washington.
Leahy 1 s major tasks were to keep France on the
Allied side', so far as possible and to prevent Vichy from
extending aid to the Germans other than that required by
the armistice.

In the first category, this meant keeping

an eversha.pp eye on the French fleet, 69 as well as efforts

68

Leahy, .2E•

.£!1.,

p. 6.

69 rbid. ~lso see Kenneth Pender, Adventures In
Diplomacy (New York: Dood, Mead and Comp~ny, 194,5"'), p. 6.
The French fleet was indeed, as Pender, one of the American
Vice-Consuls in North Africa put it, 11 a morbid preoccupation"
for London and Washington, 11 and both·discussed it so much with
Vichy and scolded Vichy so much about it, that you would have
thought it was our own fleet, which the French had somehow
managed to steal from us."

v;;,

to get American relier shipments or rood and medicine
to the population,

In addition to these duties, any

gathering or intelligence the embassy could perrorm
would be greatly appreciated by the Allies,

In recognizing

the Vichy government, the United States intended to take
.
70
every possible advantage rrom such recognition.
Admiral Leahy met with Darlan ror the rirst time
on February 24, 1941,

The ilmerican ambassador had been

surprised by Darlan 1 s succession to power, ror he had the
impression that Petain had less than full conridence in
71
I
n.;•
the Adm].. ral.
~i,,.,.ing
an h ours
conversa ti on, Le ahy surmized that the Admiral was an able, rriendly and.agreeable
man, probably the best Petain could have round, although
he was quite disappointed in Darlan 1 s conciliatory attitude
72
toward the Germans.
Leahy also to.ok advanta,ge or an
opportunity in early March to meet secretly with General

70 Langer, .2£, cit., passim. The American Vichy policy
was one or expediency, dictated by circumstances which permitted no choice, Had it not been attacked viciously and
logically by its critics, there probably would never have
been a serious attempt on the part or the State Department
to justiry it, For the most critical examination or this
policy see Ellen Hammer I s "Hindsight On Vichy, 11 Poli ti cal
Science Quarterly, Volume LXI (June 1946), pp, 175-188.
Also see Louis Gottschalk' s 11 0ur Vichy Fumble, 11 Journal
Qf Modern History, Volume XX (March 1948), pp. 47-56.
71Leahy, .2E.• cit., p. 19. Aron, .2E.. cit. , pp. 308- 309
states that many men surrounding Petain apparently held
the same view,

bb

Weygand on one of the General's frequent trips back to
Vichy,

The agreement reached with Murphy was discussed

and the necessity of preventing Axis penetration of the
African empire reiterated,

Weygand also stated that 11 If

the British come with four division, I will have to fire
on them,

If they come with twenty, I will welcome them, 1173

The State Department was pleased with Weygand 1 s apparent
approval of the United States economic mission in Algiers,
headed by Murphy, although he General was quite aware that
it was staffed with numerous spys and military agents.
Murphy's diplomacy in North Africa was for the most part
more successful that Leahy 1 s in Vichy, for the controlled
press in the occupied zone continued to attack Leahy as
the tool of Jewish bankers, a British agent, and a sailor
friend of Darlan.

As these attacks on the two admirals

m-ounted, Vichy trembled in fear of Laval's return,
Leahy was successful in his mission as personally
outlined by President Roosevelt.

"Popeye," the American

State Department's code name for Darlan, had been persuaded
to maintain the existing friendly relations with the United
States and in some instances the ambassador was personally
responsible for thwarting Darlan•s attempts to further
collaboration with the Third Reich, by forcing him to

73Ibid,, p, 23, Darlan later claimed to have
agreed completely with Weygand.

67

reveal results of his talks with the Germans.

This was

accomplished by tenacity on Leahy 1 s part, for he soon
realized that Darlan never intended him to have an audience
alone with Petain.

Leahy 1 s sources of information turned

out to be quite accurate and Darlan soon found himself
forcing opposition from Petain as a result of the ambassador's
keen judgement and hard work.
But relations with the United States was never
Darlan•s most pressing problem.

As early as August of

1941, the Paris press renewed its attacks on him, and
rumors of a drastic change in the Vichy government continually
circulated.

It was the Germans who presented the problems,

and they slowly began to tighten the screws.

CHAPTER IV
COLLABORATION FAILS
The German attack on Russia in June, 1941, did
more to alter the course of Vichy policy than any other
single event,

l

This attack changed the Nazi attitude

toward France and.Darlan slowly came to realize that
France was nothing more than a pawn in the vast and
complicated conflict,

As long as the war remained a

duel between Great Britain and Germany, the French empire
and the fleet represented a great military asset,

The

changing situation received added emphasis near the end
of the year when the United States was drawn into the war,
Now what Vichy did, or did not do, was of little consequence,
Hitler neglected Vichy as he became more deeply involved
in the Russian campaign, and even when he thought of France
it was only to wonder how she could be further exploited,
The eastern campaign was increasing Germany's need for
all types of food and industrial products, as well as
a labor force,

As German demands became greater and

their attitudes grew harsher, Darlan and his supporters
became more reluctant to cooperate,

When Nazi repressive

1 Hytier, .£E_, cit, , p , 286.

2Ibid,, p, 287, quoting German General Gustav Jodl,

2

measures in the occupied zone increased, Frenchmen began
to voice doubts about the outcome or the war. 3 The
German victory did not seem so certain as Hitler I s army
bogged down in Russia.
As the Germans unleashed their military might against
Russia, Darlan attempted to recoup his personal prestige,
lost as a result or the riasco cau1\ed by the Paris Protocols.

To accomplish this he pursued a two-pronged approach

to his collaboration attempts.

On the one hand he continued

to assert his willingness to collaborate and advised his
ministers to do the same, thus conceding things or a minor
or secondary nature to the conquerors,

Darlan railed to

see, that by making these small concessions with which
Germany could not possibly be satisried, .he ran the risk
or nullirying his policy or resistance on the ¢ajor
concessio~s.4

Weygand shrewdly pointed this out to the

Admiral and Petain, in his opposition to concessions made
in the empire. 5 Although Darlan held rirm on the essential
points and would not yield to the demands ror an Axis base
at Bizerta, he authorized rour-hundred trucks to be sent

3Neville Lytton, Lire In Unoccupied France

Macmillan and Company, I9Ij2)-,pp. 74-75,
doubts see Darlan, .2.E.• ill• ' p. 114.
.

(London:
For Darlan I s own

4Aron, .2.E.• cit., pp. 331-332.

· 5Philip

C.F.· Bankwitz, 11 Weygand: A Biographical
Study," (Unpublished Ph, D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1952), p, 468.
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from France to North Africa, and their use, to transport
supplies to Lybia from the Armistice Control Comrnision
headquarters in Tunisia.

He also authorized an increase

of commission personnel at Bizerta to forty-one. 6

Weygand

pointed out that in fact Vichy had met Germany's demands
for African concessions in principle, and that it would
only be a question of their infiltrating into the remainder
of the empire. 7 The Reich however failed to press its
advantage or make reciprocial concessions, so during July
and August the state of tension that had always surrounded
Franco-German relations became even more taut.

On August 1

diplomatic relations· were broken off as Otto Abetz left
Paris.

At the same time General Otto von StujLpnagel',

arrived, which seemed to indicate that hencef~rth all
8
relations would be carried on at the military level.
This move pleased Darlan for he thought his collaboration policy would be more fruitful dealing at the military level.

But throughout August and September relations

deteriorated rapidly.

6

On August 21, a German officer was

Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 331.

7Bankwitz, loc. cit., p. 469.
8
Darlan, .2J2.• _ill., p, 122,
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assassinated at Vichy and the Nazis retaliated by threatening to shoot hostages and demanded a special court which
would condemn terrorists on their orders. 9 Despite the
court's creation, the Nazis continued to shoot hostages
and when a German was killed in Paris on September 3,
three were executed.

Nine days later when a German was

killed, twelve Frenchmen were shot.

On the morning of

October 20, Lt, Colonel Holz, Feld-Kommandant of Nantes
was killed by unknown assassins, not far from the cathedral. W

General van Stulpnagel ordered fi f ty hostages

executed that evening,

The following day sixteen hostages

were executed at Nantes,

On October 22, twenty-seven
·
11
political prisoners were executed at Chateaubriand.
Among these was the sixteen year old Guy Mocquet, the son
of a Connnunist leader found guilty of distributing Gaullist
. 12
pamphlets,
Beginning with the attack on Russia, the
Connnunists had taken a more active role in the resistance
movement and intensified their prop,aganda efforts, 13

Von

Stulpnagel threatened to execute fifty more hostages unless
the assassins were arrested within forty-eight hours and

9

.

Aron, .Q.E_.

..£!1. ,

lOibid., p. 334,
11 Ibid,

p • 330.

12

Ibid,

13~.
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at this point Petain conceived the idea of giving himself up as a hostage in order to prevent further executions,
but at the last minute he was persuaded that the Nazis
might force him to sign decrees which they dictated and
the idea was abandoned.

14

On October 27 in a broadcast

he condemned the assassinations of German officers without a word of protest against Nazi reprisals.

15

Two days

later the newspapers announced Hitler's reprieve of the
fifty hostages_ von Stulnagel was prepared to execute, but
French public opinion was indignant over Petain 1 s failure
to protest the Nazi slaughter.

l4Tlle details of this scheme to have Petain give
himself up as a hostage can be found in the diary of
General Emile Laure.

15Huddleston,

.2E.• cit., p. 229. Also Hytier, .2E.• .£ti.,
p. 298. The execution of hostages had aroused world public
opinion to a fevered pitch. President Roosevelt expressed
his indignation and denounced the murder of hostages as a
"barbarous act." De Gaulle also denounced the Germans but
advised the French against killing Germans because retaliation
was too easy.

1. The Weygand Case
As the German-controlled French language press and
Paris radio continued their attacks on Darlan and his
"Vichy traitors 1116 the Admiral could sense the reins of
power slipping from his grasp..

Despite holding the

offices of Vice-Premier, Vice-President of the Council
of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of
the Interior, Minister of the Navy, and as designated
"dauphin" to succeed Petain in case of the old Marshal I s
incapacity or death, Darlan was prompted to shore up his
position after the setback he had suffered with the Paris
Protocols,
The meetings between high ranking personalities of
the governments, which Darlan had always relied upon to
keep collaboration moving, were not being held.

The

opportunity to alter the situation was presented on November 12 by Ambassador Abetz while in Vichy to attend the
funeral of General Huntziger.

The Army's Commander-in-

Chief had been killed in an aircraft accident: while r·eturning
from a North African inspection trip. 17 At this time the
German demand for Weygand's dismissal, an almost continued
request since his appointment in 1940 as Consul-General
18
of North Africa, was repeated by Ambassador Abetz.
In his

16 Leahy,
'
£E.• cit,, p, 34•
p. 19.5.
17 Bankwitz, loc. cit., pp.

18 ·
Aron,

.QE.,

cit., p.

33.5.

Also see Marchal, .2.E.• cit.,

34.5-346.
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position, Weygand had remained relatively independent
of Vichy and by.virtue of his anti-German attitude had
continued to thwart German penetration of the empire when
Darlan was willing to concede it via the Paris Protocols.
As a man of great personal prestige with many friends,
very close to Petain, and in control of France 1 s only
asset outside the fleet, Weygand was a man to be reckoned
with.

Because Weygand was continually reminded of the
''undefeated navy 1119 and influenced by the natural rivalry

between the army and navy, he was always disappointed to
see government posts handed to junior navy officers as
senior army men were passed over.

The General 1 s opinion

was always highly respected by Marshal Petain and Darlan
envisioned him as a rival for power since Weygand was
opposed to any collaboration beyond the terms of thearmistice.
Thus Darlan had personal as well as political reasons
for wanting the dismissal of Weygand.

The antagonism

between Darlan and the General was no secret and the two
men were quite unlike.
Darlan as the

11

General Sir Edward Spears described

squat, strong, burly Admiral who although

taciturn and secretive by nature, affected a vulgar joviality
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to mask his timidity, ambition and wily shrewdness. 1120
Weygand was a natty, aristocratic, domineering little
21
general whose wit was as quick as his temper.
Darlan
did not like the General's outspoken independence, or
his way of making himself appear more pa trioti.c than
anyone else,

Neither had much respect for the other,

and the two had very profound religious differences.
While Weygand was a pious practicing Catholic, Darlan
was anticlerical and skeptical. 22 It would be a gross
oversimplification to blame Darlan ailione for Weygand 1 s
dismissal in November, 1941, but the Admiral is not
without his share of responisbility for the event,

The

Weygand case was a complicated affair for the Germans
were more than suspicious of Weygand, and Darlan played
upon this distrust which had exist'1d since the Laval
cabinet crisis of December 1940.

When they finally

brought pressure to bear upon the Vichy government to
dismiss him, they knew that there were men in Vichy,
and especially on man, Admiral Darlan, who would be more
23
than glad to do so,
It is quite likely that Darian would have been
satisfied with being Weygand 1 s superior, for on a number

20 spears,

.QI!.,

cit., p. 261.

21 Ibid,
22 Ambler, .QE.• cit., p. 60.
2 3Paxton,

12.£.

_ill., p. 2.58.
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of occasions he asked Petain to make him Commander of
All French Forces -- air, land, and sea,

This commanding

position would have permitted him to gradually oust
Weygand without fanfare or difficulty.

In a letter to

Petain on July 21, Darlan complained about Weygand.:
I am constantly attacked and even opposed
by men holding important posts. General Weygand makes himself the willing echo of these
attacks, kept informed by a liason agent whom
he maintains on your staff, . His entourage and
he·himself are hostile to the policy you have
asked me to follow, Although General Weygand
is faithful to you, he is only faithful in
outward appearance to your government,
So that I can continue to carry out
usefully the tasks you have entrusted to
me, I need not only your confidence, but
the public conviction that I enjoy your
confidence. It is necessary too that my
authority be total, and that you be the
sole judge of my acts, The oaths of
fidelity to the Marshal ought also to be
oaths of fip.elity to the person of his
successor,24The last.paragraph of the letter was aimed at·weygand, obviously the only official of Vichy who had any
real independence,
.Six days later, Darlan wrote again to the Marshan
urging that Weygand and his three Governor-Generals be
summoned to Vichy, and that the policy of the government
be explained to all ministers and secretaries of state,
They must be instructed to obey Darlan as they would the
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Marshal, in all circumstances, and to recognize Darlan
as Petain 1 s successor.

Darlan wrote:

He (Darlan) must have complete delegation
from the Marshal and authority over everyone
whatever the rank, the position, the office,25
In a clear attempt to discredit Weygand, Darlan continued:
A reliable person has said, IJm odor
of Gaullism emanates from Weygand•s wake, 1
I will add that a desire for independence
is apparegt in the acts of the Delegate
General. 2
He then approached the subject from a point of view that
he hoped would appeal to Petain I s desire to preserve
the empire,
You have chosen me as your eventual
successor, I am not sure that, if the
occasion arose, that he (Weygand) would
respect my authority, If he by-passed it,
there would be separatism in French Africa, 27
Darlan then followed with an ultimatum, listing several
men from which to choose,
of importance on the list,

Weygand 1 s name was the only one
Darlan had forced a showdown,

asking Petain to express confidence in either himself or
General Weygand,

25 Hytier, 21?.• cit,, p, 304, Both Hytier and Paxton
use the manuscript diary of General Emile Laure as their
source for the Darlan notes to Petain,
26 Ibid,, p, 305,

27 Ibid,
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The Admiral's note continued:
If you consider that I run no longer
qualified to carry it (my task) out, I
beg you, Monsieur le Marechal, to replace
me in all my duties.
If I still enjoy your confidence,
I ask you:
(1) to be so good as to say so publicly
with energy;
(2) to convoke General Weyg§.lld, General
Nogues, Governor Chatel, and Admiral
Esteva, and in the presence of the Ministers and Secretaries of State, to be
so good as to define the general policy
and to ask them to obey me as your
eventual successor.
,
If not Monsieur Marechal, or if
they hesitate, it is I who 2ijill ask
you to give me my freedom.
Then the Admiral warned Petain what would happen if he
did not choose him:
I don't want to be at any price, in
any way whatsoever, the instrument of the
dismemberm~:ot of the French empire and of
civil war. 'J
Darlan added the clincher by appealing to Petain 1 s vanity:
The moment seems to me to have COjfl
for you to save the country once more.
Petain balked at taking the steps Darlan suggested
and the case of Weygand remained suspended, not resolved.
Darlan 1 s maneuvering and attempts to subordinate Weygand
emphasizes another reason for seeking his dismissal -another reason that is at least as important as their

28

Ibid.

29 Ibid.
30ibid.

differences in temperament and policy.
fear of Weygand.
est man in Vichy.

Thil.s was Darlan I s

Next to Petain, Weygand was the strongHis ouster from the Ministry of Defense

and War in 1940 had resulted in the General becoming more
powerful and independent in his North African post.

When

the German overtures were made in November, the condition
was made that Weygand 1 s presence in North Africa was no
longer tolerable and Darlan jumped at the chance to
dismiss the general and enhance his own collaboratist
standing, at the same time.
When Abetz let it be known that the meeting of some
high-ranking German military person, which Petain and
Darlan had so long been hoping for, might be arranged
after Weygand 1 s dismissal, the General was summoned to
Vichy on November 16.

Just as he had previously offered,

Petain once again suggested that Weygand take a political
post and supervise the drawing up of a constitution for
the empire.

The General refused and it appeared that

another stalemate would develop.

On November 18, Weygand

met with Darlan and Petain in the latter's office along
with Lucien Homier and Henri Moysset, both ministers of
state without portfolio. 31 Various compromise offers were
made, but Weygand stood firm.

He demanded a decision be

reached, and offered the suggestion that the government

_., p . 336 .

1
3 Aron, op. ci·t

Bo

either support him against the Germans, or dismiss him
without delay.

~e matter was resolved and Weygand

dismissed, as Darlan stated:

11

It is settled. 11 32

Petain

asked Weygand to submit a memorandum on policy and personnel which would have the effect of keeping Germany
out of the empire.

The Marshal promised to execute this

memorandum.

2

3 Ibid.

Also see Darlan, .2E.• cit., p. 91, The
Admiral 1sson sums up the meeting by simply stating that
Weygand~accepted the fact that he had to retire,

2, A Last Try At Collaboration
Darlan 1 s obsession to rid himself of Weygand was
only a part of the desperate power push he undertook in
the fall of 1941,

By his desire to be appointed Commander

of All French Forces, he hoped to centralize his control
over the ministers of the other services,

This proposal

was opposed by both Weygand and General Huntziger, who
feared the concentration of military power in Darlan 1 s
hands, 33 A compromise was made, whereby the post of
Minister of National defense was re-created, for it had
been dropped in 1940,

The Minister of National Defense

could not s:ln!ultaneously be a service chief, and Darlan,
although recognizing his grasp for absolute dictatorship
could not be realized, agreed that if he accepted the
post he would appoint a successor as Minister and Commarlderin-Chief of the Navy "after a certain delay. 1134 Darlan
was appointed Minister of National Defense in August, 1941,
but failed to keep his part of the bargain,

Within two

months in an unexpected turn of events, owing to General
Huntziger•s untimely death on November 12 and General
Weygand 1 s dismissal on November 18, the Aclmiral was now
Minister of National Defense and commanded two of the
three services,35

· 3:3Paxton , lac, cit,, p, 260.

-- --

34-Foreign Relations of the United States,
Volume II, .2£• cit,, p. 423, - 35Paxton, lac, cit,, p, 261.

1.21:bh,
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The Nazis rewarded Darlan for ridding himself of
Weygand by releasing all naval prisoners of war. 36 Also
as a counterpart to the Weygand case, they agreed to a
meeting between Marshal Petain and a high-ranking military
personage.

On December 1, 1941, at Saint-Florentine-en

Bour$ogne {near Auxerre) the Marshal and Darlan met
Reichrnarschall Hermann Goering. 37 Petain came armed with
a long list of French grievances which he proceeded to
read to the amazed Goering.

The document also repeated

many of the same conditions attached to the ratification
.
·
38
of the Paris Protocols.
Petain went on to give Goering
a severe tongue-lashing and it was one of the few times
during the Vichy regime that Petain acted as a ramrod-stiff
soldier.

The Marshal reaffirmed his understanding that

collaboration implied equal footing with Ge=any, and that
negotiation on a victor and vanquished basis was a diktat. 39
He reminded Goering of the disastrous peace of 1919 and
told him the Germans were running the risk of making the
same mistakes-the allies had made.

Goering responded to

Petain•s unexpected harsh attitude and tone in a like
manner and flatly declined to accept the document, and even

36 Ibid., p. 262.
37Aron, .2E.• cit., p. 338.
3

8

.fil9:.

39 Ibid.

Also see Darlan, .Ql2.• cit., pp. 90-91.

refused to allow it transmitted to Hitler.

Petain calmly

stuffed the memorandum into·Goering 1 s pocket.
While the Petain-Goering negotiations were a
complete failure, Darlan appeared to have put together
another plan which would lead to renewed collaboration.
He offered to establish contact with the German navy to
relay British ship movements. 40

This seemed most desirable

to him, for he always thought collaboration could be realized
throught military channels.

Although he never stated such,

Darlan appears to have preferred that

11

less be asked and

more be granted" in dealing with ·Germany.

As usual, when

putting up his trial balloon, Darlan quickly lost his
reserve, gave vent to his .Anglophobia,41

and became open,

comradely, intimate and warm as he proposed further avenues
of cooperation with Germany.

No doubt the Admiral envisioned

this action as a link between himself and Berlin, but the
German~ were concerned solely with its combative value to
their navy.

In the end this amounted to very little.

Al-

though the Germans thought Darlan was offering something
new and valuable, there was already an exchange of information between the two naval staffs.

In spite of the definite

4°Hytier, .2.E.• .£.!1., p. 316. The author 1 s source here
is the Nazi officer to whom Darlan made the proposal, Admiral Erich Raeder, Mein Leben, Volume II, (Tubin-Neckar,
1957), p. 281.
1
4 Ibid. Raeder states that Da.rlan insulted the
British at great length, calling them "hypocrites and liars."
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prospects, nothing positive came of this proposal, for
seemingly Hitler was just not interested in collaboration
42
with Vichy, no matter what form it might take.
Until this time Vichy had never made any real attempt
to collaborate with Gennany 1 s allies (although the French
had earlier been forced by the Japanese to accept the
principle of co-defense of Indo-China)~

But immediately

after the fruitless Petain~Goering conversation and Darlan 1 s
reaffirmation of his willingness to cooperate, the Admiral
mem with Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Fbreign Minister
and Mussolini 1 s son~in-law.43

The Italian complaints,

channeled to Vichy through Berlin, always centered around
occupation of a few Franco-Italian border districts and
the promise of goods which the French were failing to
deliver.

However, Darlan was correct in his assumption

that the key to Rome lay in Berlin, and besides, he never
con~idered the Italians important enough for collaboration.44
The Darlan-Ciano conversations were held at Turin
on December 10, but nothing came of the meeting. 45 There was

42~.
43Darlan, ~• cit., pp. 90-91, p. 123.
44De Montmorency, .2E.• cit,, pp. 122-123. The author
pictures the meeting as an immense practical joke by Darlan
at the expense of his counterpart.
45Hugh Gibson (ed.), The Ciano Diaries (New York:
Garden City Publishing Company, 1947), pp. 4J.6-4l7.

u;,

no agenda and only generalities were discussed.

The

meeting was conducted in a cordial atmosphere with both
6
men well disposed.4
Seeing no harm in spouting the
words his Italian host wanted to hear, Darlan savagely
attacked the British, and in between drinks went so far
as to express his "conviction in the victory of the Axis
and his prayers for it, 11 47

Darlan 1 s efforts to get

along with the Italians proved only momentary and
without significance.
The month of December altered the Admiral's thinking
as to the eventual victors in what was now a world-wide
conflagration.

For on December 7 the attack by Japan had

forced the United States to accept an active role and this
may have stiffened Darlan 1 s backbone, during the meeting
with Ciano, three days later.

On the same day, as the

meeting with the Italian Foreign Minister, word arrived
that the British Eighth Army had definitely won out in
the western desert and Rommel's Afrika Korps was in full
48
retreat.
Darlan no longer believed in German victory.
On

December 13 Darlan expressed his uncertainities and Fiis

refusal to agree to military collaboration.

On that day

he gave American Ambassador Leahy his solemn assurance that

4 6 Ibid, Ciano noted "my impression of the man was
good. He is a small man, energetic, willful, and rather
boastful, who talks without reticence • • . Is he sincere?
I cannot say, except for one thing, he hates the British,"

47Malcolm

Muggeridge (ed.), Stuart Hood (trans.),
Ciano•s Diplomatic Papers (London::, Odhams Press, 1948 ), p·. 471,
48,_
't , p.
.
.w.·on, op. £:!:..._.
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Germans would never penetrate into the empire.

It was

the first time Darlan had made such a promise. 49

49 Leahy,

op. cit., p. 475. Leahy stresses the fact
that Darlan intended to defend the empire against all comers,
including the Allies. For Leahy 1 s telegram to the State
Department see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1.2!:l:1,
Volume II, 2.E.• cit., pp. 502-503,- - -

3. Darlan 1 s Dismissal
The last three months (January - April, 1942) of
Darlan 1 s government, which brought about the final rupture
between the Admiral and the Germans, discloses the ever
hardening and firm attitude he was taking toward the
Nazis.SO

Ironica1i7, diplomatic documents of the same

period furnish Darlan 1 s adversaries with their strongest
arguments that although he appeared to be resisting, Darlan
had in fact decided to enter the war on the side of the
Axis.

51 ·

Owing to the diplomatic imbroglio produced by

Otto Abetz and the Vichy Secretary of State, Pierre
Benoist-Mechin, illusions, lies and contrivances made it
appear that a triumphant diplomatic success was about to
be realized and that Franco-German relations were about
.
.52
to enter a new era of cooperation and reconciliation.
Both men felt that they were destined to play a historic
role in resolving Franco-German problems in accordance
with their own solutions and policies.
their great hour had arrived.

Both now felt

They pursued parallel dreams

of being archatects of a policy of reconciliation in the
interests of their o,m countries.

Ambassado Abetz had

promised Hitler the French fleet and a Vichy declaration

.50Aron, 2E.• cit,, p, 340 •
.5libid •
2
.5 Hytier, .2£., _ill,, p, 316,
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of _war against Great Britain.

Secretary Benoist-Mechin

promised Darlan political concessions that would put his
government on equal footing with the Germans.

Abetz 1

capacity for distorting the truth, and Benoist-Mechin 1 s
readiness to make concessions which the Germans knew he
was not authorized to deliver, brought Franco-German
relations once more to the breaking point, in mid-January
1942.

While no longer believing in the certainity of a

German vic~o~y, and tired of repeated failures to negotiate
and collaborate, Darlan and Vichy took the opportunities
these situations presented and began to make open and
public protests against Nazi pressure.

Finance Minister

Yves Bouthillier published a report denouncing the diktat
concerning occupation costs,53

When no reply was forth-

coming, Darlan addressed the same complaint to the Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden.

Darlan refused to agree

to the departure from France of another 150,000 workers
for German factories; he refused to put 9,000 skilled
railway workers at Nazi disposal; he ordered prosecution
of German agents and approved curtailing electric power
.54
t o factories whose product i on was earmarked for the Nazis,
He officially protested Germany's anti-Semitic mea·sures
in Vichy -- the ordering of all Jews to wear the Star of David -

53 Aron, ~• cit., p, 347,
.5lJ.Ibid., p, 348,
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and began to more frequently refuse the German's summons
to P~ris.

It looked, at the beginning of 1942, that he
had chosen open resistance to the Nazis. 55 Darlan's failure to obtain beneficial collaboration and difficulties
in domestic matters served to undermine his position in
Vichy.

The apparent course of open resistance compromised

his government 1 s existence with the Germans, and they let
it be known that "there could be no political conversation
with the present French government. 11 56

Clearly, Darlan 1 s

position had suffered and the days of his government were
numbered.
Early in 1942 Admiral Darlan faced intrigues from
the very men_he had brought into his government, and from
Ambassador Abetz as well. 57

The Reich ambassador in Paris

had personal reasons for disliking Darlan, for generally
the Admiral refused to deal with him, preferring to talk
with military personalities.

Darlan 1 s new policy also

constituted a serious threat to Abetz 1 position, in view
of the fact that Abetz had continually promised Hitler
the fleet and empire.

Abetz had never given up the hope

of returning Laval to power, for he knew he could deal
with him, his personal friend.

For these reasons the Reich

55Hytier, .2E.• cit., p. 328.
p. 348.
5 6 Darlan, .2£•

.£ii., p. 91.

Also see Aron, .2£· cit.,
Also see Docteur, .2£• cit.,

p. '2:32.

57 Marchal, ~- cit., p. 195.

Also see J)ar.lanr P• '72.
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ambassador took an active hand in the increasing Nazi
pressure brought to bear on Darlan 1 s government, 58

Both

the Nazi and.Vichy pro-Laval factions would not forgive
the Admiral for the contempt he had shown them,

So in

February 1942, the Germans, along with supporters of
Laval in Vichy, reopened the question of Laval's return, 59
From that time on Petain was besieged with demands
for Laval's return,

He was continually told that only a

government headed by Laval could appease Hitler,

At the

same time, Laval was active in his own behalf with the aid
of Abetz in Paris,

On March 20 Laval met with Goering in

Paris and was alarmed by the thinly-veiled threats concerning the fate of France made by the Reichmarschall.
He was still more shocked by Goering's

advice for him

to remain outside of Vichy politics.
France shall be treated as she deserves,
If the Marshal offers to t~ke you back into
power, refuse. For you, it will either be
much too late or much too early, You have
been an honorable enemy to us, Perhaps we
shall meet agaih one day after the war, when
peace has been signed, and then you will be 6o
able to uphold the interests of your country,
Laval decided to warn the Marshal of Goering's threats and
at the same time strengthen his own position and demand a
return to power.

On March 26, Rene de Chambrun, Laval's

58 Aron, .2.E• cit.• , p. 349.

59 Toid.
~
'
cit,, pp, 94-9;,,
Goering
felt that
France was going to have to be dealt with severely, and
perhaps Laval would be more valuable and more successful
after the German's occupied the whole country and established him as a puppet.

60 Laval

.QE.,
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son-in-law, arrived at Vichy and arranged for Laval to
meet with Petain at the Forest of Randan (20 kilometers
from Vichy) the next day, in the strictest of secrecy, 61
Laval imformed Petain of the Goering interview, and blamed
Darlan for bringing France to the brink of disaster,

This

meeting set in motion the events that would bring Laval's
return to power in three weeks.

In one of his many weak

moments, faced with what seemed to be a tragic situation,
Petain as usual felt powerless.

Torn between his suspicions

of Laval and Darlan 1 s failure to gain concessions, he
wavered,
Darlan was furious when he learned of the Laval-Petain
meeting.

Event piled upon event,

P6litical blunders seemed

the order of the day for both Darlan and Petain.
lost control of the situation.

Then Darlan

Petain attempted to pacify

Darlan by assuring him that Laval would play no political
role in Vichy,

62

and the threat by Admiral Leahy that the

United States would break-off diplomatic rela ti ans ( as
Leahy delivered Roosevelt's ultimatum to this effect) 63
seemed to reassure Petain that he and the Darlan government
would be able to turn the tide.

Petain firmly refused the

German demands, and another Laval crisis seemingly was averted.

61

~ - , p,

95,

62 narlan, 2:2.• cit., p, 294.
p. 233.
63
Leahy, 2:2.• cit., pp, 88-89,
pp, 294-295.

Also see Docteur, 2:2.• £!..!.,
Also see Darlan, 2:2.• cit.,
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It is evident that the Germans had written off negotiations
with any French govetnment, whether headed by Darlan, Laval
or anyone else, which seems to indicate that the Nazis
would have accepted Petain 1 s refusal to readmit Laval to
the government, had two political blunders not occurred.
Both were made on April 3,

The first was by Petain when

he expressed the idea of sounding out Goering concerning
a ministerial reorganization, 64 He still had no intention
of accepting Laval, but the Marshal 1 s·willingness to sacrifice Darlan was all Abetz and the Gennan 1 s needed.

It

is likely that Petain was thinking of replacing Darlan with
Joseph Barthelemy, Minister of Justice. 65 On the sgme day
Darlan made the tactical error of relating Petain 1 s fear
of the American ultimatum to German-Consul Krug von Nidda,
warning the Germans that their efforts to reinstate Laval
66
were doomed to failure.
This was all that was needed
to transform the crisis into a show of strength between
the Germans and the United States, and,iwith Hitler holding
all the cards, the Nazis could not lose,

When faced with

the ultimatum to choose between Nazi and American friendship, Darlan did not submit immediately,

His plan was to

offer Laval the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
retain the position of Vice-Premier for himself, 67

Laval

64Aron, .2E.• cit,, p, 352.
65

Ibid,

Anon offers no evidence to support this assumptio

66 Ibid,
nn_

r,it. .. nn. l <0-1 <l _
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would simply answer

11

yes 11 or "no" and under these con-

ditions be forcedto refuse.

The Nazis would be notified

of his refusal and the crisis would be resoived,

But

Laval tricked the Admiral by refusing the Foreign Affiars
ministry, and demanded a position as Head of Government.
Laval painted much the same picture of France for Darlan
as he had for Petain, and like the Marshal, Darlan was
68
prepared to capitulate.
The Admiral wrote Petain suggesting
that Laval form a new government imnediately, asking only
for a military post for himself.

Now it was Petain 1 s turn

to refuse defeat and persuade Darlan to recons~der.

The

Marshal charged Darlan to deliver the decision to German
authorities in Paris, stating that Laval had refused the
Foreign Affairs post, and the government was suspending
indefinitely negotiation with Laval.

Darlan agreed to

this, provided Petain would write a second letter reaffirming
his support of the Darlan government,

So on April 12, it

appeared that the old sailor had weathered the severest
storm of his career.

But Abetz got wind of the solution

and made the decision to refuse Darlan access to Paris,
fo~bidding him to cross the demarcation line until the Laval
matter had been settled.

69

Darlan 1 s mistake was succumbing

68

Laval, .21?.• cit., p. 95. Also see Darlan, 2£• .£11.,
pp. 297-298 for the text of Darlan 1 s proposal concerning
the formation of a new government.

69

Aron, 2£•

ill•,

p.

354.
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to-Abetz' blackmail and failing to proceed to Paris.
Laval met with the Marshal on April 14, and after the
meeting indicated to the press that he was about to form
a new government under his own conditions, which included
dropping all ministers who had a part in his dismissal
in December of 1940.

The next day Darlan took the offensive

and refused to dissolve his government.
old Marshal hesitated to recall Laval.

True to form, the
Henri Moysset,

speaking in support of Darlan, concluded with the prophetic
warning:
Germany has lost the war. She will drag
into the abyss all those who have marched or
have seemed to march in her wake. Take care,
70
Monsieur ·1e Marechal, not to _survive your glory.
Petain agreed to receive Laval once more in the evening and
pose a series of questions which would draw out Laval's
political intentions.

Knowing in advance that they could not

agree on a joint program, Petaih would refuse him.

Laval

threatened Petain with German reprisals of immediate occupation of the Vichy zone, the loss of political autonomy
and what independence the unoccupied zone enjoyed if he
was·not recalled to form a new government,

Once again

the Marshal proved he did not have the strength and willpower to argue with Laval,
Friday, April 17, 1942 there was held the final
Council of Ministers of the Darlan government,
circulated the collective letter of resignation,

The Marshal

CHAPTER V ·
OPERATION TORCH:
THE ALLIES INVADE NORTH AFRICA
Admiral Darlan• s departure from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs marked the ascendancy of Pierre
Laval in fact, if not in title, as the real Head of
State in the Vichy regime.

The Admiral retained his

position as Petain 1 s successor, but should death remove
the Marshal, Darlan was destined to inherit a position
which would be that of a figurehead,

Although he had

received the promotion to Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, Darlan had no real political
power, not even his former prerogative to attend the
Council of Ministers meetings.

He now attended these

meetings only when summoned to discuss strictly military
questions.

He seemed content with his work, in this

capacity, and made frequent inspection tours to North
Africa.

Even before his dismissal, the event that would

play the most significant role in his life and lead to
his subsequent assassination, had already
motion,

been set in

The Allies were studying maps and strategy in

their preparations for an invasion of North Africa,

Oper-

ation Torch was to serve as a rehearsal for the invasion
of Europe, and Frenchmen were making an agreement aimed
at driving the Germans out of France.
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The conspiracy began to take shape near the end
of 1941.

The chief instigator was a wealthy industrial-

ist, Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil whom the Germans mistakenly
believed to be a Nazi.

Associated with him was Colonel

Van Heck, a veteran of the Foreign Legion and head of a
North African Vichy youth organization numbering some
30,000, which the Germans _mistakenly believed to be:'a
version of the Hitler Youth.

Another conspirator was

Jean Rigault, a former journalist, closely associated
with Lemaigre-Dubreuil in the industrialist 1 s business
empire.

Also included in the 11 Group of Five 111 as the

conspirators came to be called, were Jacques Tarbet de
Sainte-Hardouin and Captain Henri d 1 Astier de la Vigerie.
Sainte-Hardouin was a diplomat connected with the office
of the Delegate-General in North Africa, General Alphonse
Juin, who had replaced Weygand.

Captain de la Vigerie

was a somewhat romantic figure who had been a fixture at
Harry 1 s Bar in Paris before the war.

He was responsible

for the conspirator 1 s security organization.
Robert D. Murphy, President Roosevelt's personal
representative in Algiers, talked at length with LemaigreDubreuil on December 5, 1941.

He learned that the indust-

rialist was angry over the dismissal of Weygand and that
1 A complete list of the 11 Group of Five II can be
found in Murphy, .2.E.• cit., pp. 122-123. Also in Aron,
.2.E.• cit., PP• 393-39S:--and in Renne Pierre Gosset,
Conspiracy in Algiers (New York: The Nation, 1945),
pp. 34-39.
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he desired to see some kind of provisional government in
Algiers that would be "independent of Vichy, 112

Once this

was accomplished, the empire might be brought into the
war.

Lemaigre-Dubreuil stated that his group represented

no political party and would be willing to work with all
who shared their goals,

Their attitude toward Vichy would

be determined by the government's reaction to their new
program,

The group realized that Allied assistance would

be necessary for the success of their venture and Murphy
offered such,

The achievements of the "Group of Five"

would to a great measure determine the Allies• success
in the planned invasion and their cooperation would
be of valuable assistance when troops would land to
occupy Algiers,

The problem of finding a figure of

sufficient public stature and ability to head the
conspirators was not so easily solved,

Weygand was

living in retirement on the French R1vie~a but declined
to participate in the venture, replying to Roosevelt's
personal letter that he was

11

too old to become a rebel, 11 3

De Gaulle was out of consideration owing to his decided
lack of popularity with the officers and civil servants
in North Africa who had remained loyal to Petain and
Vichy, 4
2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
.£E_, cit,, Vol. 11, p, 4957

3
,
Aron, op • .£.!.!_,, p, 396,
4Dennis ·Fay Wachtel "De Gaulle And The Invasion
of North Africa" (Unpublished Ph. D, dissertation, St,
Louis University, 1964), p. 187.

Then suddenly, in April, the escape of General
Henri Andre Giraud offered a ready-made solution to
the problem of finding a leader,

The General

met

with Lemaigre-Dubreuil near Lyons on May 19, and
expressed his enthusiasm for the plan,5

Giraud•s

objective was to encourage a massive upris"ing in
metropolitan France, but he was willing to lend himself to the North African invasion, and it was agreed
that General Charles E, Mast, commander of Vichy 1 s
Algiers Division, would be Giraud•s representative
in North Africa.

Murphy wired his assessment of

the situation to the State Department on July 6:
Since his escape from Koenigstein
in May, the leaders of the North African
group have been in touch personally with
-General Andre Giraud, He has given them
his authorization to continue their effort,
and has designated certain military officers
in French North Africa for this purpose,
One of these officers, General Mast, is
stationed in Algiers as Chief of Staff of
the 19th Army Corps •• , According to
Mast., General G:l!raud is heart and soul
for the resumption of hostilities
against the Axis and will take command
of French forces either in France or
North Africa • • • • Referring to North
Africa, Mast states the opinion that we
could·count on the cooperation in French
North Africa of at least 14 divisions
composed of French officers and French
and native troops •• , , It is refreshing

5weygand, .QE.• cit,, p, 62,
op, cit,, p, 396,

Also see Aron,
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to have the point of view expressed
by General Mast who, with other
officers, insists that it matters little
what politicians in Vichy may say or
do during the coming t·ew months. He
ins is-cs that they will disappear, and
that France•s destinies will be oaken in
hand by the military • • • • The
representative of General Giraud in
French Morocco is General Bethouard, a
divisional gommander now stationed at
Ca!!ablanca.
Giraud hoped.to rally supporters in North Arrica
as well as in metropolitan France thus assuming
the role of leader of the resistance
movement.
' On account of Giraud's maneuveri11s for position,
and the fact that America did not trust the "Group
of Five" sufficiently to give them complete information,
the Torch operation was a precarious undertaking from
it!! conception.

Ledc to believe that they were the

only group the ~ericans would recognize and that
only American troops would take part in the North
African landings, the conspirators pressed Murphy
to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking United
States military.man to coordinate activities.

After

trips to Washington and London, where he briefed
Roosevelt and Eisenhower respectively, Murphy returned to Algiers with the news that a meeting would
soon be arranged: 7

6

Foreim Relations of the United States, 1942,
Vol. II, pp. 3 1-342.

7Murphy, .2£• cit., p. 109.
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The Allies were still avoiding the most dirricult
or all problems surrounding the invasion, ror
Giraud was still under the illusion that he would
be Commander-in-Chier or the operations,

He was

also convinced that the invasion or both North
Africa and France would take place sometime in
early 1943,

General Eisenhower was staunchly

opposed to revealing the dates and sites or the
invasion, 8 and when the projected meeting between
the American military and conspirators was not
rorthcoming, the group's anxiety increased,
American Consul-General Felix Cole wired Washington
rrom Algiers:
Our saintly rriend here reports
that the other rriends, the rxagpole
sitter, are anxious to know what has
become or the projected secret meeting
or their and our "general starrs"
which they state was tentatively
pJa nned rar Sept~mber 15 somewhere
in North Arrica.
Dame rumor also had her day and di rricul ties were
mounting as the result or a growing suspicion that
Vichy might have discovered something about Torch,
The rears proved groundless,
8

Dwight D, Eisenhowe.r, Crusade in Europe
(Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc,, 1946),
PP, 86-87, Eisenhower relates the details or his
meeting with Murphy in London, when the latter
attended military conrerences as a ricticious Lt,
Colonel McGowan •
.QE.,

9Foreigh Relations or the United States, 1942,
cit,, Vol, II, p, 376, The "saintly rriend 11 must be

Sainte-Hardouin and the "rlagpole sitter" is General
Mast, ~ . , p, 405,
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While Murphy was in Washington he received
from President Roosevelt a directive spelling out
the duties-he was to resume upon returfiing·to North
Africa.

After the landings, he was to serve as

General Eisenhower's political adviser, and the invasion was to be justified to local French officials
on the grounds that it was necessary to prevent
Axis occupation.

Murphy was still denied permission

to inform the conspirators of dates or sites, being
assured only that he could give them

24

hours

advance notice when he received a coded message
from the President. 10

Meanwhile, the suspicions of

the conspirators as well as the suspicions of Vichy
increased alarmingly, but for different reasons.

The

success of the "Group of Five" would depend upon
accurate coordination of their activities with the
Allied landings.

Reports from Vichy indicated an in-

creasing concern in government circles that an Allied
invasion of French Africa was imminent, but French
West Africa and Dakar were be.lieved to be the targets. 11
When Murphy returned to Algiers on October 16, he was
10Murphy, op. cit., p. 127. The message ·broadcast on the BBC inFrench was 11 Allo, Robert. Franklin
arrive." It was received shortly before-midnight,
November 7, thus enabling Murphy to give the "Group of
Five" only a few hours notice. They had learned the date
of November _7-8 at Cherchel, but the fact that the invasion
was postponed: from 2 a.m. until 5 a.m. was still unknown.
11
Docteur, op. cit., p. 157.
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confronted by General Mast, representing Giraud, and
soon afterwards by Admiral Raymond Fenard, representing
Admiral Darlan.

11The

Darlan proposal did not come- as

any bolt from the blue, he had been making discreet
overtures to us f·or thirteen months. 1112 Fenard had
been instructed to contact Murphy by office_rs in
Admiral Darlan's entourage owing to the fact that the
political situation-in Vichy was very fragile and
might collapse at any moment.

Fenard informed Murphy

that Darlan was convinced the Germans were going to
make their move for North Africa before November 1 and
under the circumstances, Darlan
• • • is faced with a decision.
If Darlan could be informed that should
he as Commander-in-Chief of French armed
forces decide to come to Africa entraining with him the Fre~ch Fleet that the
u. s. would" be willing • • • to supply
immediate large scale aid • • • there is
a strong possibility that Darlan would
undertake such cooperation. If he did
the military and naval forces in French
Africa would-undoubtedly obey his command.
This is obviously of the greatest
importance and my French friends and I
are convinc d of reliability and sincerity
of contact .• 13
12
·
Murphy, op. cit., p. 113. Although Murphy had
known the Admiral casually for .several years, their last
meeting had been at Vichy in March, 1941. Murphy states
that after Leahy 1 s departure from Vichy on May 1, 1942,
Darlan made overtures to the Allies throught Fenard and
Alain Darlan. Darlan 1 s son confirms this throughout his
work, L 1 Amiral Darlan Parle, op. cit •
. 13 Foreigh Relations of the United States, 1942,
£!?.• cit., Vol. II, p. 393.

103

Murphy favored encouraging Darlan 1 s overtures, and felt
that somehow this could be reconciled with any promises
made to Giraud,

He then proceded'to notify Giraud's

representative, General Mast, of Roosevelt 1;s directive
(to justify the invasion on the grounds of imminent
Axis occupati'on) and the possibility of Darlan 1 s
involvement,

Mast accepted the terms with a warning

which Murphy immediately dispatched to Washington:
Mast also told me bluntly that
Giraud contemplates that we deal with him
and not with Darlan, Mast has learned
that Darlan is seeking to climb on the
bandwagon but in his opinion Darlan could.
not be trusted. I replied that we hoped
the French would demonstrate some unity,
that Darlan is the Commander-in-Chief of
French Armed Forces, that the admiralty
comm.ands the ports and coastal batteries
in French Africa. Mast reported that
Giraud will command the Army which is
loyal to him and not to ·Darlan and that
the Navy in French North Africa would fall
in line 1,i th the Army. I urged that
success of the operation is the cardinal
point and that we wa1_r~ the French to
consolidate with us. 4
Mast also pressed Murphy for a decision on the longawaited meeting between the conspirators and the U, S,
military man from Eisenhower's staff,

While discussing

the date of the meeting, Mast pointed out that Giraud
had hopes of being able to seize and·hold part of the
occupied zone of France, at the time of the North

14Ibid,,

p. 394,

104
African landings and fC!t' the first time openly raised
the question of the Torch command,

The conspirators

expected this to fall to Giraud, as did the General,
Murphy tried to avoid discussion of the question,
hoping to work out some solution to salve the wounded
French pride,

A solution that would not hamper

Eisenhower's overall control of the operation,
Murphy then made arrangements to slip Eisenhower's
deputy commander, Brig, Gen, Mark Clark, into North
Africa to meet with Mast and the conspirators, 15 This
meeting·was set for the night of October 21, but in
the meantime, other matters had arisen that complicated
the situation, ·on October 18, Admiral Darlan 1 s son,
Alain, entered an Algiers hospital suffering from
infantile paralysis, 16 Secondly, General Alphonse
Juin, Weygand I s replacement in North Africa·, ·sounded
out American intentions concerning Germany's forcible
entry into North Africa, for he was anxious to gain
American military support.

Murphy assured him of

support, and in turn was informed that Darlan, who
was expected in Algiers shortly, would favor resistance
to Axis agression. 1 7

l5Murphy, op• cit,, p. 119,
16
Darlan, 2E.• cit,, pp. 184-185,
17 Murphy,
op• cit,, p. 129,
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On the night of October 21-22, at Cherchel some
sixty miles west of Algiers, General Clark was landed by
.
18
submarine.
Clark was under definite instructions from
Eisenhower not to mention Admiral Darlan at the meeting
since selection of the French commander was "a matter
. 1119
to be handled by the French themselves.
He emphasized
that French administration would not be interfered with
and that the question of a French commander would be
. 20
settled after the operations accomplished.
At this
meeting Mast was.informed that a large American force was
preparing to land in Africa at a future date, and he
responded by suggesting the establishment of a bridgehead
in France at the same time, in accordance with Giraud's
plans.

It was also agreed that Giraud would be informed

by letter of the Allied intentions and his role in their
plans.

A letter was prepared for Eisenhower's approval

guaranteeing the restoration of France's pre-war boundaries, acceptance of France as an ally, and the transfer
of the supreme command in North Africa to a French officer
11 at the appropriate time. 1121
18
Mark W. Clark, Calculated~
and Brothers, 1950), pp. 78-79.
19

(New York: Harper

George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing .lli
I~itative in The West (Washington, D.C., Department of
the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957),

p. 81.

20 Ibid.

21~., p. 82.
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The French in North Arrioa were not told
the date or the coming invasion, as the Allies
reared a breach or security.

In raot, Clark lert

the conspirators with the impression that the
operation could not take place berore the end or
November.

As General Clark was leaving the rarm-

house to board the submarine to return to Gibraltar,
an inrormer in the conspirators:•. hire phoned to warn
them that Police were on their way to investigate a
report that strangers had been seen on the beach the
night berore. 22 General Mast and his party lert
immediately ror Algiers, while Clark and Captain
Godrrey Courtney, who had piloted the small boat
ashore, hid in the wine-cellar.

Murphy and M. Henri

Teissier remained in the dining room, where the
oonrerenoe had been held, to greet the polios.

They

convinced the police orrioial~ that the remains or the
conrerenoe, American cigarette butt~ and empty whiskey
bottle~, were in raot the result~ or an innocent
party being thrown by the American Consul in Algiers,
when Murphy produced his identirioation papers. 23
22

23

Clark, 2.E• cit., pp. 80-81.

Murphy, .2E.• cit., pp. 119-120.
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Murphy played his bluff to the hilt, begging the police
not to embarrass the girls who were upstairs changing
clothes.

The police departed and Clark's submarine
put to sea heading for Gibraltar. 24
The Cherchel meeting had not clarified the
question of French command.

Even worse it had

further muddled French preparation for Torch.
Previously the conspirators assumed they had months
to prepare, while in reality they now had but sixteen
days and they were even ignorant of this fact.

Although

ordered not to do so, the discussion of Darlan•s role,
if any, could not be avoided at the talks.

When Mast

pressed Clark for reassurance that Giraud would be
given over-all command of the operations, Clark agreed
that Giraud would be given over-all command
as possible 112 5 -- a purposely vague.phrase.

11

as Boon

Mast

realized immediately that it was Darlan 1 s status
which prevented a clarification of the political and
military affairs surrounding the Torch operation.
He brought up the question of Darlan and Clark out24clark,. op. cit., p. 86. For his account. of the
Cherchel conference, including his picturesque description
of how he lost his pants and moneybelt boarding the submarine for the return trip to Gibraltar, see pages 78-79.
The Clark group included two officers who later gained military
renown, the then Brig. Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, who later served
as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Captain (later
Admiral) Jerauld Wright, chief naval commander of NATO and of
U.S. forces in the Atlantic. For Wright's account of the
episode see 11 Clark 1 s Secret Mission" Life Magazine, Vol, 13,
No. 26 ( January 14, 1946), pp. 75:.8o.-25Murphy, op. cit., p. 119.
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lined Eisenhower's proposal, by which Giraud and
Darlan might work as a team, dividing the top French
command between them with Giraud heading the Army
and Darlan rallying the Navy to the Allied cause.
Mast objected vigorously to the inclusion of Darlan,
accusing the Admiral of being nothing more than a
belated opportunist.

Clark explained that the question

of command was impractical during the preliminary
operations, and left the status of African military and
political affairs to be s_ettled after the invasion was
accomplished.
Although the problem of General Giraud's role
in the operations had not been settled, the General
had definite ideas of his own.

"We don't want the

Americans to free us; we want them to l;l.elp us free
0

ourselves, which is not quite the same. "26

But Giraud

could not afford to set his price too high, for there
was the possibility that the Allies would- give consideration to Darlan 1 s overtures, and these overtures were in
fact already being studied in the State Department.
·Shortly after Admiral Fenard and Colonel Chretien had
approached Murphy in Algiers, in mid-October sounding
out-the possibility of Darlan 1 s cooperation, Mr. Paul
Guerin, an economic adviser in the French Embassy in
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Washington told State Department officials that:
• • • Admiral Darlan was bitterly
hostile to Laval and that he could be
expected to interest.himself in any
movement which might react against his
enemy, • • • The chief argument in any
movement to influence Admiral Darlan
• , •• was the argument of military
and naval strength, and if the United
Nations could produce proof of adequate
strength, Admiral Darlan might be prepared to render assistance, • , at a
critical time such as this, no harm
could be done in approaching Admiral
Darlan and the attempt might su~Qeed
with highly gratifying results, r
Meanwhile, to Giraud the results were not so
gratifying, as M, Iiemaigre-Dubreuil arrived in Ly,cins on
October ·24-25 to relay to the General the events at
Cherche1, 28 Giraud was very dissatisfied at the turn
of events, for his plans call.ed for a revolt of the
French Army in metropolitan France as well as in
North Africa, with early spring of 1943 being the
earliest possible date for operations.

Now the Allies

were asking him to forget :,about the bridgehead in
France and concentrate llll efforts on a North African
invasion.

The North African venture had always been

incidental to the revolt in France, but Giraud still
maintained hopes of establishing the bridgehead ,in
southern France.

He decided to go along with the Allies

27
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
Vol, II, 21?.• £!.!,, p. 404,
28Aron, 21?.•--ill•, pp,

397-398,
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plans, especially since he was led to believe that the
Allies were massing an invasion force of half a million
men and that he would be its commander-i~-chief. 29
Murphy informed.Eisenhower on October 26 of Giraud's
tentative approval of Allied plans, but Eisenhower
wishing to clarify the matter of command in North Africa,
submitted the following changes in a letter Murphy
proposed sending Giraud.

Eisenhower stated:

• • • during those phases of the
operation that involves the landing, establishing the security of French North Africa, and
providing the necessary bases, it is considered
essential that the American Command and
organization which has been set up with so
much effort and difficulty for this special
operation, should remain unchanged. By the
time this has been accomplished it is to
be assumed that the French Forces • • • •
will be. sufficiently strong to insure the
complete security of French tepritory.
Thereafter the primary interest of the
American Commander lies in the use of the
area as a base of further operations
against the Axis, and the defense of French
North Af~~ca will be turned over to French
Command.>
At the same time Eisenhower gave Murphy authorization
to inform Giraud and Mast on November

4 of

the date

of the invasion and the name of the commander-in-chief.

-'
?9Aron, 2E• cit., pp. 397-398.

Clark had hinted
at Cherchel tha~ the invasion force would consist of
500,000 American troops, although leaving Giraud's
role unsettled. See Clark, 21?.• cit., 'pp. 81-82.

3°Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
.2£• ~ . , Vol. II, p. 406. - - -
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While these instructions were being forwe.I'.ded
to Algiere, Murphy had sent a long letter to Giraud
giving the same guarantees the Allies had made previously, and Giraud signed what he called

11

an agreement in principle" and forwarded it to Murphy.3 1 Still
laboring under the illusion that he was to be commander~
in-chief of the invasion forces Giraud dispatched a
lengthy·letter to Murphy, in which he stated:
It is quite normal and it is understood, that all landing operations will
be regulated by the General Staff of the
Ame'ri can Army •. ;
The Inter-Allied Command will
begin to function after the landing,
forty-eight hours after the 'hour set
for the beginning of the first convoy.
With respect to subsequence operations,
the American troops will come under
the Inter-Allied ~0imnand as soon:a:s
they are landed. 3
It is clear that when Giraud used "Inter-Allied
Command" he was referring to himself.

This is

further confirmed in the :l'inal paragraph of the
document:
To sum up, the Inter-Allied
Commander-in-Chief in North Africa
accepts the propositions of the
American General Staff for the debarkation in Algiers and Morocco, provided
he himself sets the date for landing,
following American advices ]hat
preparations are completed. j

31Murphy,c.2E_. cit,, p. 120.
Vol.

3 2 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
II, p. 420.
33Ibid., p. 422.
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Giraud was well aware of the widespread Anglophobia
in North African military circles, so he wrote
Murphy the following day insisting that the invasion
force consist solely of American troops, under American
command.
Such obvious and wide divergence between Giraud's
and the Allied plans quickly led to difficulties.
Lemaigre-Dubreuil returned from his visit to Giraud
and found Algiers in a state of confusion.

Mast had

been notified that the invasion was imminent and that
a submarine had been sent to take Giraud out of France.
Since Clark had indicated at Cherchel that the invasion
would not come until the latter part of November, the
French felt they were being pushed into a situation
without consideration for their own plans.

Mast de-

manded that the Allies show confidence in Giraud and
delay the operation several days or even weeks to give
the conspirators time to complete arrangements in
North Africa as well as France.

At this time Murphy

wired Washington, requesting a delay in Torch operations,34
but any delay was of course out of the question.
was told to deal with Giraud as best he could.

He
Murphy

34For the text of this request see MurRhY,£E_. cit.,
pp. 120-121. He states that in the years since he hacrlearned enough about military operations to realize
how "ridiculous" this must have seemed to General
George Marshall and General Eisenhower.
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again repeated the formal assurances that he had previously given the General.

In an effort to pacify

Giraud in his demand to be named Allied Commander of
the operation, Murphy included in these assurances
essentially the same solution Eisenhower had proposed,
and threw the problem back to Ike.

Murphy told Giraud,

I am communicating your suggestion
to the General Staff of the American
Army and I am certain an agreeable solution
will be found • .• , While the equipping
and organizing of the French Army will
thus be accomplished, the details concerning the coll'lllland can be complet%d
so that the French will be in a positlon
to take ?ver he Supreme Command at the
proper time. 35
The time for arguing with Giraud and the
conspirators had passed for Allied troop convoys
bound for North Africa were already at sea, and there
was very little the French could do except fall in
line with the Allied plans.

The French complained

that their plans and preparations were ruined for
the invasion would be taking place sooner than they
had expected.

They further protested that the Allies

would have to take the responsibility if the invasion
was opposed by great force.

Mast informed Murphy

that in the short time remaining the conspirators
would only have time to complete their coup in Algiers

35Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,

2£• ~ . , Vol. II, p. 417.
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and pointed out that landing forces would have to deal
with local authorities at the other sites, 36
Giraud was waiting in Marseilles for the submarine to take him to Gibraltar, where he hoped to
iron out the question of command with the Allied Staff,
After several narrow escapes he managed to elude the
local police and boarded the submarine on the night
of November

4-5, to discover that it was a British,

not an American vessei,37

Nevertheless, he arrived at

Gibraltar during the afternoon of November 7,

But his

verbal confrontation with Eisenhower, deep within the
bowels of the Rock, was not a pleasant one. 38 On
entering the command post Giraud informed Eisenhower
that he had arrived to take command of the Allied
expedition:
I wanted him to proceed to Africa,
as soon as we could guarantee his safety,
and there take over command of such
French forces as would voluntarily rally
to him • • , • General Giraud was
adamant; he believed that the honor
of himself and his country was involved and that he could not possibly
accept any position in the venture
36 Murphy, op. cit., p, 120,
·,

3 7Eisenhower; .2E.· cit,, p, 99, The submarine was
commanded for this trip by Captain Jerauld Wright of the
United States Navy.
38rbid, Although the interview was unpleasant,
Eisenhower described Giraud, "though dressed in civilian
clothes, looked very much a soldier • • • well over six
feet tall, erect, almost stiff in carriage and abrupt in
speech and mannerisms, He was a gallant if bedraggled
figure, 11

.,
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lower than that of complete command.
This, on the face of it was impossible • • • • All this was
laboriously explained to the General.
He was shaken, disappointed, and after
many hours of conference, felt it
necessa
to decline any part in the
scheme.

39

The Frenchman replied:
General Giraud cannot accept
a subordinate position in this
command; his countrymen would not
understand and his hsnor as a soldier
--would be tarnished. 4
H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews of the State Department
and W.H.B. Mack of the British Foreign Office,
Eisenhower•s· political advisers, suggested that Giraud
be given a nominal command for appearances, but
Eisenhower rejected the idea, and insisted that Giraud
would have to content himself with command of French
forces in North Africa.

Seeing that Eisenhower

would not alter his position, Giraud finally gave
in the following morning when he was promised that the
Allies would deal with him as head of the French
administration in North Africa,

But this only settled

the matter for the'time being.41

39rbid., p. 100.
40ibid.
4 1 c1ark, 2£• cit., pp. 95-102. Although Eisenhower's
command of the French language was probably equal to Clark's
Q~~era~ Clark relieved Mack and Matthews as interpreter
periodically during the long and dr.awn out conversations.
Clark adds that the job was not too difficult however, since
the discussions merely repeated what had been said during
the first hour of the meeting.
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Meanwhile, Murphy was busy placating General
Mast•s initial misgivings which soon turned to complete
cooperation as he made final preparations for the
coup in Algiers.

On receiving the news of Giraud's

decision to leave France, Murphy wired Washington
that he was giving Mast the date of the landing on
Novemper 4, ninety-six hours before H-hour.

That

evening Murphy was invited to visit General Alphonese
Juin, Commander-in-Chief in North Africa.

Juin

assured Murphy that North Africa would be defended
against all comers, but that in case of German attack
he would ask for American support.

If the Americans

attacked, however, he would have to order his troops
t9 resist.4 2 Juin added that Admiral Darlan might be
interested in discussing the possibility of eventual
American assistance.

On the following day Murphy was

visited by Colonel Chretien, Juin 1 s aide, who was also
Darlan 1 s intelligence agent.

Chretien told him that

Juin would be glad to open discussions with a highranking American officers concerning eventual, FrancoAmerican military cooperation.

Murphy was relieved

that neither Juin nor Chretien appreciated the immediacy
of the situation:

11

They • • • indicated no immediate
anxiety regarding our plans. 1143
2
4 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942,
cit., Vol. II, p. 42$.
43Ibid.
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But the greatest surprise of all came later in
the day with the arrival of Admiral Francois Darlan in
Algiers.

The Admiral's son, Alain, had been hospitalized

since October 27 with infantile paralysis and it was
reported that he was dying.

The Allies found Darlan•s

presence at this particul$r moment embarrassing, and
hoped that he would return to Vichy before North
African D-Day.

1.

Darlan in North Africa

The Allies were completing final preparation
for the landings when Admiral Darlan arrived in Algiers,
late in the afternoon of November

5.

It was believed

that the fears of Vichy officials would have to be
calmed, at the outset of the invasion, and to this
end Roosevelt had prepared a series of messages to be
delivered to Petain and the North African governors.
After a few objections to the original drafts by
Churchill,41-~ the messages remained the same in
substance, expressing sorrow at the suffering of
France under the heel of the Nazis and concluded wi.th
this -final paragraph:
Today, with greedy eyes on that
empire which France so laboriously
constructed, Germany and Italy are
proposing to invade and occupy French·
North Africa, in order that they may
execute their schemes of domination
and conquest over the whole of that
continent • • ·• • In the light of all
the evidence of our enemy's intentions
and plans, I have, therefore, decided
to dispatch to North Africa powerful
American armed forces to coopera!;,e
with the governing agencies of Algeria,
Tunisia and Morocco in repelling this
latest act in the long litany of German
and Italian international crime • • • •
I am making all of this clear to the

~Churchill, The History of the Second World
.£!?.• cit.:, Vol, IV, p, 528 •
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French authorities in North Africa,
and I am calling on them for their
cooperation in repelling Axis threats.
My clear purpose is to support and aid
the French autho ties and their
administrations.

45

In the early morning hours of November 8,
Allied f'orces landed in strength at Algiers and Oran.
By dawn other landings had taken place ·on the Moroccan
coast and Torch was underway.

The outcome of this

operation had depended largely on the French reaction
to the unexpected turn of events in North Africa.

As

the Allied troops hit the beaches, General Mast's
group of conspirators and irregular partisans seized
control of a number of key points in Algiers (the
police stations, communications centers, government
administrative offices and the Vichy garrison in the
city).46 They succeeded in holding these posts until
about 7 a.m., 'on the assumption that Allied forces
would relieve them.

But troops were still some dis-

tance away, having landed east and west of Algiers
by several miles.

Meanwhile, Murphy called on General

Juin to inform.him of the landings and ask him to

45Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins:
An Intimate History, (New York: Harperand Company,
1948), pp. 476-47746For a detailed account of partisan actions on
the night of November 7-8 see Murphy, .QE• cit., pp. 130-1'33,
Tompkins, .QE• cit., pp. 73-82, and especially Pender,
.2E• cit., pp, 102-116.
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place himself under General Giraud's command in an
effort to bring France back into the war.47

Juin

was sympathetic, but explained that he could make no
move on his own owing to the presence of the. Commanderin-Chief of French Forces, Admiral Darlan.
for Darlan, who arrived a short time later.

Murphy sent
The

Admiral was extremely irritated by the news of the
Allied landings, for he suddenly realized·the precarious position in which the invasion placed him.

He

had no way of knowing the size of the landing force
and felt that premature cooperation with the Allies
would certainly lead to severe Gernian reprisals against
Vichy.

The Admiral argued that he was under obligation

to consult with Marshal Petain and Murphy agreed that
he might report on the situation.

Until this time

Juin 1 s residence had been surrounded by Mast's
irregulars but troops loyal to Vichy suddenly arrived
and took control.
under arrest.

Murphy and Pender were placed

Juin and Darlan proceeded to naval

headquarters and by this time regular Vichy troops
had also seized control of Algiers.

By the time

Allied troops had fought their way into the city they
found that the rebellion had been-crushed-and Vichy
forces were in complete control of the situation.

47Murphy, ~- ·cit., pp. 128-129.
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At 9:10 a.m. the American Charge d 1 Affairs at

Vichy, Pinkney Tuck, delivered Roosevelt's message
to Marshal Petain.

The Marshal replied by handing

him a prepared statement denouncing the Allied landings
and announced that the French Empire would be defended
against any aggressor.

Tuck was also informed that

these instructions had been .-sent to North Africa.

He

noticed, however, that the Marshal was in an extremely
affable mood:
As I rose to take my leave he
took both my hands in his looking at
me steadfastly and smiling. He
accompanied me to the ante-chamber
and turned briskly back to his office
humming a little tune.48
Despite the dangerous ambiguity of their position,
Frenchmen loyal to Vichy and Marshal Petain could
look to the future with a cert~in degree of optimism,
for it appeared that the turn of the tide was at hand.
For the first time in the war Allied forces were
striking back in force.
the history of France.

It was a crucial moment in
Vrchy leaders, Darlan and

Petain, did not want France to become a battleground
and their sympathy for the Allied cause was only
secondary to their loyalty and love of France.

Even

sympathizers and supporters still lay with Petain and

48Foreign

Vol. II, p. 432.
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his government, their support of the Allied.cause subordinated to their loyalty to Petain,

Many Allied observers

lacked the necessary subtlety to appreciate the .fact that
loyalty to Vichy did not make a Frenchman pro-Axis or
pro-fascist,

Many of Petain 1 s strongest supporters were

violently anti-German, but for some reason·this fact was
never clearly understood iri the Allied camp,49
For these reasons, Vichy had already decided on its
policy.

On the one hand it would continue to play .the

delaying game with the Axis, and the game got underway
immediately, for Laval was .summoned to Munich on the
evening of November 8.

His major objective was to avoid

definite commitments which might lead to co-belligerency
with the Axis and Laval was at his best during this
meeting. He conceded nothing. 50 On the other hand,
affairs in North Africa would be left to the discretion
of Darlan, who was expec.ted to play much the same game
with the Americans,

On the morning of November 8, a

message to this effect had been sent to Darlan by Petain:
I have received your message through
the Admiralty and am glad you are on the
spot. Take what action you like and keep
me informed~l You know you have my complete
confidence,;;
4 9 Huddleston, .2E• cit., pp, 174-181.
50Aron, .2.E• cit,, pp, 402-405, The author states
that Vichy was 11 as usual, trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, to play off the Americans against the Germans."
1
-' Ibid., p, 401,

This was as far as the Marshal was prepared to go, for he
believed that stronger action would lead to the total
occupation of France by German, forces,

Weygand had arrived

at Vichy on November 8 and was urging Petain to sign an
armistice with the Allies and declare war on the Axis,

52

The Marshal did not wish to take such drastic steps, for
he prefered to play the waiting game,
Things continued badly with the Allied landings in
North Africa owing to their failure to maintain their proposed schedule,

The conspirators' plans at Oran and

Casablanca had failed and American forces were meeting
strong resistance at both sites,

Control of Algiers had

reverted to Vichy troops early on November 8 before Brig,
Gen, Charles Ryder 1 s forces could enter the city.

A man-

ifesto broadcast in.General Giraud's name (the General had
had to go into hiding immediately upon his arrival to avoid
arrest) 53 failed to rally the French Army's support. Thus
the Allies were forced to deal with Admiral Darlan, who.had
all of North Africa under his command,

Darlan was further

determined to have nothing to do with Giraud, whom he considered to be a rebel,
Time was running out for Darlan, however, for by the
afternoon of November 8, Algiers was surrounded by Allied
troops and it was apparent that further resistance would be

52 Ibid.,

p, 402.

53G. Ward Price, Giraud and the North African Scene
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1944~P • 6

e•
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useless,

The Allies were informed shortly after 4 p.m.

that Darlan had authorized General Juin to negotiate the
surrender of Algiers.

Juin met with General Ryder and

agreed to surrender Algiers before midnight and it soon
became apparent that Darlan was prepared to di,scuss a
settlement for all of North Africa.
By this time both General Giraud and General Clark
were on the scene and it was proposed that a general armistice meeting take place the following day, November 10,
Although fighting had ceased in Algiers, the Allies were
meeting resistance in both Oran and Casablanca.

Clark

hoped to conclude an armistice that would lay the groundwork for securing French cooperation in keeping the Axis
out of Tunisia, as well as securing the French fleet for
the Allied cause,

Still Darlan was playing a cautious

game, insisting he could do nothing without the Marshal's
approval.

As Darlan attempted to evade the question of

an armistice for the whole of North Africa, Clark exploded:
"I _do not propose to wait for any
word from Vichy. 11
''Darlan replied, "I can only obey the
orders of Petain. 11
11

Then I will end.these negotiations
and deal with someone who can act, 11 Gen5
eral Clark concluded.~
Seeing that the discussions were getting nowhere, ·Juin
drew Darlan aside and warned him the Germans would probably

.54Clark, 212.• cit., p. 109,

force Petain to disavow the Admiral.for his surrender of
Algiers two days earlier, and if the Marshal made such a
move, Darlan 1 s authority would be ended.

Thus the Allies

would have no choice but to turn to Giraud.

Murphy states

that Juin .convinced Darlan to sign before the danger materialized and cease-fire orders were sent to French military commanders throughout North Africa.
This should have settled matters, but owing to the
indecision which reigned at Vichy, the cease-fire order
only complicated the issue.

Weygand was pressing Petain

to retreat to the empire and wage a war of revenge against
the Axis, but the old Marshal would not quit France.

Fail-

ing this, Weygand wished to have the Marshal reply to
Darlan 1 s earlier request for instructions with orders to
assist the Allies.

While this meeting was being held

they received the news of the North African cease-fire
and all were pleased.5'5'

Another difficulty developed

at the same time when Laval telephoned from Munich threatening to resign if Darlan 1 s move was supp~rted by Petain.
Laval was resisting Germany's demand for co-belligerency
and his task was further complicated by the apparent .
free-hand given Darlan in the empire.

In order· to avoid

antagonizing the Germans further, Petain publicly announced
5'5'

Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French.Na y
in World War II (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 19 9),
p. 238. Admiral Auphan was in attendance at the conference
when his secretary brought the news.
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that his orders for resistance in the empire were still
in force and shortly thereafter placed all French forces
under his own command, thus by-passing Darlan.

All of

this was designed for German comsumption, however, since
the Marshal had sent an entirely different message to
Darlan by means· of a top secret code:
You have all my confidence. Act for
the best. I eutrust to you the interests
of the Empire.'.>
Petain 1 s public pronouncements failed to relieve the
pressure on Laval at Munich, however, and perhaps what
was the most impressive performance and exercise in
double-talk of the shrewd politician's career was to
no avail.

The following morning, November 11, German

troops moved across the demarcation line and entered
the Unoccupied Zone of France.

Since the policy of an

·occupied country is necessarily shaped to satisfy the
invaders, Petain sent an official message to North Africa
appointing General Auguste Paul Nogues as his personal
representative.

This message was nullified by another

secret communication intended for Darlan which
st~ted:

56 Jacques de Launay, Ma.jor Controversies of

Contemporart History, (Oxford:
1965), p. 2 4.

Pergamon Press, Ltd.,

127
Inf'orm Admiral Darlan that the
Marshal I s decision • • • has only been
ta~en becg~se Admiral Darlan is a
prisoner.
Vichy was no longer a f'actor in the situation, being
occupied by the Germans and with control of' the empire
seemingly out of' her grasp, the sole remaining trump
card was the f'leet.
A period of' conf'usion f'ollowed in North Af'rica
·owing to the collapse of Vichy and there was some
doubt as to whether Admiral Darlan or General Nougues
should be considered the legitimate head of the
French administration.

Also there was the problem

of' how to deal with General Giraud.

Allied calcula-

tions had miscarried, and Algiers had not been taken
"without f'iring a shot" as Murphy had hoped.

The

"Group of Five" had only succeeded in further complicating an already desperate situation, making the
invasion only slightly less hazardous than it might
have been.

The French Army had totally ignored

Genera:l Giraud since his arrival in Algiers on November 9.

?.[Ibid., p. 267. Although the historical fact of
the secrettelegrams isn•~ in dispute, there exists no
trace of the actual documents and the wording varies from
one witness to another. The originals were destroyed owing
to the impending occupation of France. The code was known
only to a Commander Jouannin and an Admiral Battet. Jouannin
was on the staf'f of' Admiral Auphan in the Secretary of State
f'or the Navy at Vichy and Battet was in Algiers. Both men
were permanent assistants on Darlan 1 s staf'f after the 1940
armistice when the code was conceived. Jouannin inf'ormed
Admiral Auphan, a staunch supporter of' Darlan, of' the code
on the morning of November 8, thus enabling Darlan and
Petain to maintain secret liasion at a most dif'f'icult time.
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In order to redeem himself from the charge of treason
and add whatever assistance he could, Giraud decided
to join with Darlan and accept the Admiral's authority
over all French forces in North Africa,
The air in Algiers was finally cleared on
November 13 when Clark, Mu~p~y-arld Darlan succeeded
in reaching a settlement satisfactory to all concerned,58

According to this agreement Darlan would

serve as High Connnissioner in North Africa and
Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, while Giraud
would be Commander-in-Chief of the Ground and Air
Forces,

Juin and Nogues were given divisional army

commands respectively, and all Frenchmen agreed to
assist the Allies in driving the Axis forces out of
Tunisia,

This was made possible because of the

military men being willing to subordinate themselves
to Darlan,

Eise-nhower flew in to approve the agree-

ments and stated:

5SClark, .£E• cit,, pp, 12'7-132, Although Clark
devotes a full chapter of his memoirs to what he called
"the Darlan deal", he has almost nothing to say about
what formal agreements were reached, Certainly agreements were reached with Darlan on November 13, but the
formal document was not signed until November 22, and
it is believed_ that Murphy and then Colonel Julius
Holmes handled negotiations for the .Americans while
General Jean-Marie Bergeret presented the French views,
For a complete text of the formal agreements see Arthur
Layton Funk, "The Cl ark-Darlan Agreement, November 22,
1942" Journal of Modern History, Vol, XXVI, No. 3,
(September, 1954), pp, 246-254,
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There is no commitment to engage our
governments in any political recognition
or any kind and Darlan was simply authorized, by voluntary action of the local
officials, and with our consent, to take
charge of the French affairs of North
Africa while we were clearing the Germans out of that continent • • • Theoretically we were in the country of an
ally. The actual effect of Darlan 1 s
commitment was to recognize and give
~ffect to~~ position of dominating.
influence.
In the end Darlan proved to be the military man
that had to be reckoned with in North Africa.

Admittedly,

during their fifth column activities in North Africa, the
Allies did not know where the Admiral fitted into their
plans.

Even as late as a month.prior to the invasion,

Darlan 1 s representatives had made overtures to Murphy in
Algiers.

But it was hard to find a place in such a venture

for a man who had been vilified for almost two years as
the blackest of opportunists.

He endeavored to walk a

tightrope between warring powers, yet the Allies were
aware of the fact that they would need all the help they
could get in such a precarious undertakin 5 as the invasion
of North Africa, and when the time came they had no serious
qualms whatsoever in dealin5 with Darlan.

The Allies con-

tinually had their eyes fixed upon the French fleet at
Toulon which remained under the Admiral's control.

Eisenhower

later recalled the words of Prime Minister Churchill at

59 Eisenhower,

2E_.-cit., p. 108.
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the London conference only two'months before Torch:
If I could meet Darlan, much as I
hate him, I would cheerfully crawl on my
hands and knees for a mile if by doing
so I could get him to bring that fleet
of his into the circle of Allied forces. 6O
Thus in thrashing-out the Clark-Darlan agreements
the Allies quickly ran aground of the French military
tradition of cloaking with legality their every order
and action.

With Darlan in Algiers during the invasion,

it looked as if one opportunist_had simply beaten another
to the scene of action.

60

I!?l!i,, p. 105.

2. Darlan 1 s Administration In North Africa
The fact of Darlan in North A,frica was indeed
beset with all kinds of difficulties.

None of the Allies

really trusted Darlan, in view of his intense dislike of
the British, and Prime Minister Churchill bemoaned the
fact that De Gaulle had been left out of the picture.
With Darlan entrenching himself in North Africa, President
Roosevelt found himself severely criticized in the world
press for committing himself to a new edition of the Vichy
regime,

Both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hµll

continued to emphasize the military considerations as the
determining factors of the North African situation, with
Hull going so far as to question the wisdom of leaving
Darlan in the picture at all, now that his usefuJmes s1
was apparently at an end.
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Following a meeting with

De Gaulle 1 s representatives in Washington, President
Roosevelt jokingly suggested that the solution to the
problem was to "place Admiral Darlan, General Giraud, and
a De Gaullist representative in one room alone and then
give the government of the occupied territory to the man
who came out. 1162 The President continued in a serious vein,

61c
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull,
Volume IL- (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948)~ 1199.
62ill.£.

.L_;)<'.

stating that if no innnediate solution was forthcoming he
was prepared to give Murphy veto power over any act of
the French administration in North Africa,

The Free

French would not deal with Darlan, nor the Admiral with
De Gaulle's representatives and the criticism continued
in the press,

Roosevelt was bombarded with connnunications

from Great Britain as Churchill stated concerning the
Darlan deal:
The more I reflect upon it the more
convinced I become that it can only be a
temporary expedient justifiable solely by
the stress of battle. We mus_t not overlook the serious political injury which
may be done our cause •• ,
· Darlan has an odious record, , ,
Now for the sake of power and office
Darlan plays turncoat. A permanent
arrangement with Darlan or the formation
of a Darlan government in French North
Africa would not be understood by the
great masses of ordinary people whgje
simple loyalties are our strength.
Churchill's connnunique was accompanied by a letter from
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden recommending that the
Allies adopt a policy that would "necessarily entail
the elimination of Darlan, 116 4 Eden• s plea was much
like Churchill 1 s:
It may well be that Darlan 1 s collaboration is indispensable for military
reasons as an interim measure, But
neither he (Churchill) nor I feel sure
that the United States Government could

6.3

.
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have any confidence in him as
permanent head of a North African
administration. Darlan•s record
needs no emphasis. He is universally
distrusted and despised in Frgnce
and throughout Europe • • • 67
But British advice was somewhat belated, for the President
had already been forced to take ~ction to pacify his critics.
He had received from Eisenhower a note which explained the
necessity for coming to terms with Darlan, and Robert
Sherwood states that Roosevelt was so impressed with it
that when he read it aloud to Harry Hopkins, "he sounded
as if he were making an eloquent plea for Eisenhower before the bar of history. 1166 Eisenhower justified his
actions, and rightly so, on the grounds that the political
situation was vastly different from what Murphy had led
him to expect:
Existing French sentiment here does not
remotely agree with prior calculations • • •
The name of Marshal Petain is something to
conjure with here • • • The resistance we
first met was offered because all ranks believed this to be the Marshal's wish ••
All concerned say they are ready to help us
provided Darlan tells them to do so, but
they are not willing to follow anyone else. 67
The public criticism President Roosevelt encountered
forced him to issue a statement to the press on November 17.
In this statement he emphasized the temporary nature of the
agreements with Darlan, stating:

65

Ibid., p. 476.

6 6sherwood, op. cit., p. 651.
6 7Eisenhower, op. cit,, p. 109.

134
I have accepted General Eisenhower's
political arrangements made for the time
being in Northern and Western Africa. I
thoroughly understand and approve the
feeling in the United States and Great
Britain and all the other United Nations
that in view of the history of the past
two years no permanent arr~ngement
should be made with Admiral Darlan • • •
The present temporary arrangement in
North and West Africa is only a temporary
expedient, justified solely by the stress
of battle • • • • Temuorary arrangements
made with Admiral Darlan apply, without
excep~~on, to the current local situation
only.6
The President then indicated his approval of the action
Eisenhower had taken, in a letter to the General, but
warned him to keep in mind that,
(I) we do not·trust.Darlan.
(2) it is impossible to keep a
collaborator with Hitler and one with
whom we believe to be a fascist in civil
power any longer than is absolutely
necessary.
- ( 3 ) and his ( Darlan I s ) movements
should be watched carefulll and his
communications supervised. 9
The British were pleased to see that President
Roosevelt's statements corresponded so closely to
their own, for Darlan 1 s position was "weakened with the
French factions. 1170 The confusion in North Africa had

68sherw6od, ~- ci tl, pp. 653-654.
69
captain Harry C. Butcher, !i:t: Three Years With
Eisenhower, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946),~199.
70ibid.
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been compounded by.Roosevelt's temporary and expedient
statement which undermined the Admiral I s position, so
Darlan wrote Clark on November 21:
Information coming from various
parts tends to give credit to the opinion
that 1 I am but a lemon which the American
will drop after it is crushed • • • • 1
I have acted neither through pride,
nor ambition nor intrigue, but because the
place I held in my country made i-t my duty
to act.
When French sovereignty in its integrity:,ris an accomplished fact • • • I
firmly intend to go back to civilian life
and retire to end a life during which I
have eagerly served my country. If this
is the way I can interpret the decl._aration
attributed to President Roosevelt, according to which an agreement with me can be
but a temporary one, I completely· agree ••
Things being thus, the work of reuniting all Frenchmen, which I am undertaking for a common aim, would be very
difficult for me if France's allies were
themselves to spread doubts among the
Frenchmen concerning the i~terest and the
scope of that work.
I hope I can trust that the
United States government will realize
that, and • • • will not give Frenchmen
the impression that the authority of the
Chief who makes it struggle again is a
diminished one.71
Even at this time Roosevelt was considering sending
American and British representatives to Algiers to
direct the.civil administration from behind the
scenes.

Such action proved unnecessary, however,
71 c1ark, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
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in view of the fact that the Clark-Darlan agreements
were finally signed on November 22.7 2

The provisions

were essentially of a military nature designed to assure
the full cooperation of the French and subordinate the
North African· Army to Eisenhower's command.

It was

justified in view of Darlan 1 s cooperation in arranging
a cease-fire on November 13, and provided a framework
for Eisenhower to get on with carrying the war to the
Axis in Tunisia with a minimum of interference from the
French civil administration.
Despite what appeared to be a general acceptance
of his admini·stration for the time being, things became
worse, rather than better, for Darlan and his government.
The Ad:mftali remained a military figure and his only collaboration with the United States remained purely of a military
nature.

As

December arrived, the Allies apparently in-

tended to approach the political problem with a less
drastic solution than had been proposed.

Roosevelt favored

some kind of commission, which would include British, French
and American representatives, on which Darlan would serve
in a minor capacity.

Eisenhower's dealings with Darlan

were on the basis of the Admiral's position as High
Commissioner of North Africa, although the Allies treated
the French somewhat less than a full partner.
72

See Supra, p. 104.

In pursuit
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of a solution, Roosevelt elevated Murphy to the rank of
Minister and the British sent Herold Macmillan to serve
as Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters in North
Africa.

These moves did little except take the political

responsibilities from General Eisenhower's shoulders.
effect, the problem of Darlan remained the same.

In

The

British hoped to bring about the Admiral's downfall via
their continuing complaints concerning the internal situation
in North Africa.

They specifically complained about the

continued existence of fascist-type organizations, the
courts-martial of French soldiers who had attempted to aid
the Allied landings, and the Vichy pro-Nazi officials who
were allowed to remain in the government.

Eisenhower was

not happy in his dealings with General Nogues and Yves
Chatel, the Governor-General of Algeria, believing he was
getting less than their full cooperation in military matters.
But Darlan was not happy with these men either, and in turn
complained to Eisenhower:
I don't want them either, but the governing of Arab tribes is a tricky business
that requires much experience with them.
As quickly as you can produce any men, of
your own choice, who are experienced in
this regard and are loyal Frenchmen, I will
instantly dismiss t~ incumbents' and appoint
the men you desire. 3
While the United States dealt with its problems of
Darlan and his administration, Churchill was busy justifying
73
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the situation in North Africa-to his anti-Darlan opposition
in Great Britain,

"The Almighty in His infinite wisdom did

11
not see fit to create Frenchmen in the image of Englishmen, 74

he said.

The Prime Minister explained how the authority of

the French State was vested in the illustrious and venerable
old Marshal, and reminded his countrymen of the highly legalistic habits of the Frenchman's mind, stating that, "If
Admiral Darlan had to shoot Marshal Petain he would no doubt
do it in Marshal Petain 1 s name, 1175

Churchill urged the dis-

sident De Gaullist elements to bide their time, that their
day was coming, possibly sooner than they expecte.d.
Roosevelt's statement of policy and the continued
press attacks against Darlan forced action,

Darlan soon

came to believe that a more liberal policy statement from
himself on behalf of his government would be in order to
try to forstall further difficulties,

In a statement issued

on December 16 in Algiers, he said:
Once France and the French Empire is
free from the Axis yoke, the French people
themselves will decide freely the form of
government and national policy they desire,
In actual accomplishment the High
Commissioner has already granted full and
complete amnesty to all against whom any
action had been taken because of sympathy
to the Allies, , , He is now organizing
a body of representative private citizens
to work with him in an advisory and consul te.tive capacity in carrying on official
business, , •

74churchill, .21?.• cit,, Vol, IV; pp, 556-558, Also
see "Darlan: The Se,cond Secret Speech" Life Magazine,
Vol, 20, No, 5, pp, 85-100,
75 Ibid,
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The High Commissioner has begun the
restoration of rights to those persons from
whom these had previsously been taken because of race • • • His announced purpose
is to give just treatment to all elements
making up the complex North African population to the end that all can dwell and
work together under laws insuring mutual
tolerance and respect for rights, , •
I have stated emphatically and repeate·dly to the Commander-in-Chief, General
Eisenhower, that • • • I seek no assistance
or support for any personal ambitions. I
have announced that my sole purpose is to
save French Africa, help free France and
then retire to private life with a hope
that the future leaders of France may be
selected by· the Fre17-@h people themselves
and by no one else,
This was all Darlan could do and it appeared that things
might quiet down.

Secretary of State Hull praised the

Admiral's comments,

77 and even the British appeared sat-

isfied when Lord Halifax called Under Secret~ry of State
Sumner Wells to report that Churchill was apparently

·

satisfied with the Admiral's statement,

78

Churchill had

pacified his political opposition with the secret session
speech concerning Darlan on December 10.

But things were

not going as well as they seemed, for on December 19,
Captain Butcher·noted in his diary that the overseas
press opin""si.on
• • • indicates that the reaction to
Darlan is savage, but we don't )mow what
effect, if any, Darlan 1 s 'liberalization'
statement may have had -- perhaps none, as
the pr7~s, particularly British, is skeptical.

76
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??Hull, .2E.• cit., pp, 1202-1203.

While Darlan 1 s difficulties increased in Algiers,
'

the Allies continued to probe for a suitable replacement
in North Africa.

President Roosevelt made tentative

arrangements to meet with General Charles De Gaulle in
Washington sometime in early January, hoping to iron-out
a satisfactory solution to the problem of civil administration in North Africa.

The Allies appealed for unity

in the struggle against the Axis, but gave no indication
that they were prepared to changE. their attitude towards
Darlan and replace him with a De Gaul+ist.

A De Gaullist

representative, General Francois d 1 Astier de la Vigerie,
the brother of one of the "Group of Five", jotirneyed to
Algiers to meet with French, American and British officials
on December 19.

80

The mission seemed ill-fated from the

start when no one was at the airport to meet him and Murphy
had neglected to notify Darlan of his impending arrival.
As a result, Darlan ordered d 1 Astier arrested.

The emissary

of De Gaulle then lost his temper and emphatically stated
that he would have no dealings with Darlan.

Murphy inter-

vened to prevent his arrest, although d 1 Astier was still
a virtual pris0ner, for the hotel was surrounded by Darlan 1 s
troops.

About midnight Darlan and Giraud appeared at

Eisenhower's headquarters insisting that the De Gaullist

80 Tompkins, .2E.• cit., p. 180.
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be expelled from North Africa, but Eisenhower refused on
the grounds that it was a purely French problem and would
c1ave to be settled by the French.
Butcher, Eisenhower's naval aide, records the substance of Eisenhower's conversations with d 1 Astier the
following morning:
During lunch Ike said that d 1 Astier
was reluctant to see Darlan, but wanted to
have ca~te blanche, and expected to have
it from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, to
visit and talk with De Gaullists all over
French Africa, North and West. This was
too much. Ike reviewed the whole circumstances,, and arranged, after much parlezvooing, that d 1 Astier talk unofficially
with Darlan this afternoon. If d 1 Astier
travels over A~rica, this being Fr~£ch
administration, it's up to Darlan.
Although the closing comment might be taken to be a
classic example of military buck-passing, d'Astier agreed
to meet the Admiral.

On the afternoon of December 20 he

privately talked with Giraud and Darlan, and listened as
the Admiral emphasized the stability of his regime and
explained that his sole ambition was to unify all French
elements for prosecution of the war against the Axis.

He

also announced once more his intentions to retire after the
war.

Darlan insisted that he alone was capable of rallying

all Frenchmen to the cause of continuing the war and d 1 Astier
pointed out that French public opinion apparently did not
82
bear this out.
Darlan became angry and accused d 1 Astier

81
~ . , p. 226.
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of stirring up trouble in Algiers.

When Giraud attempted

to intervene, Darlan angrily replied that this was his
affair and he would handle it.

The conversation ended

when d 1 Astier accused Darlan of being the chief obstacle
to French unity.

Shortly afterwards d 1 Astier received

word from the Allies that he would have to leave Algiers.
Yet in d 1 Astier 1 s eyes the mission was not a
complete failure, for he gained the distinct impression
that the French if not the Americans, were willing to
work with De Gaulle,

Giraud was receptive to the idea of

De Gaulle as Minister of National Defense in a government
headed by himself, but the De Gaullists recognized that
Giraud was not the man to carry out a successful coup
83
against Darlan.
D1 Astier also lear:hea·· that the Count of
Paris, pretender to the French throne from the House of
Orleans, was also interested in Darlan 1 s dismissal.
Henri d 1 0rleans, then living in Morocco, expressed

Prince
hope

that the French could unite to carry on the common struggle
against the Axis and was interested in finding a place for
himself in such unification.

But Darlan 1 s opposition realized

that their supporters were too few and widely scattered to
of'f'er any hope f'or change in the immediate:: future.

The Allies

seemed to be playing the waiting game as well, for the situation was so nebulous that President Roosevelt's Darlan
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policy continued to be a day to day affair.

In the end, neither the Free French nor the Allies
had to act to remove Darlan from the North African political
On the'night of December 24, 1942, the State Depart-

scene.

ment in Washington received the following telegram from
London:
Radio Algiers has just announced that
Admiral Darlan was attacked and subsequently
died this afternoon and that his asgassin
was caught and is being questioned.

8

~oreign Relations
2.E.• cit., Vol. II, p. 492.

.2f the United States, 1942,

CHAPTER VI
ASSASSINATION IN ALGIERS
Admiral Darlan had begun the last day of his
life in a conference with Robert Murphy.

After a

dinner given in honor of the Allied High Command
and the American Consul Murphy, at his residence,
Darlan took Murphy into his study to discuss his
possible successor in the event the Admiral decided
to retire.

Darlan produced a list of pos•sible successors,

which included General De Gaulle, Pierre Flandin, Paul
Reynaud, Edouard Herriot, the Count of Paris and a
number of lesser officials.
As if by omen the Admiral said, "You know, there
are four plots in existence to assassinate me. 111
Continuing in a detached manner, as though he were
talking about the death of someone else, "Suppose one
of these plots is successful?

What will you Americans

do then? 112
Then turning again to his alleged goal of retiring, the Admiral stated, "Please tell your President
that anytime he decides I am more of a liability than
1

Murphy, .2.E.• cit., p, 143.

2Thid., p. 142.
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an asset to him, I will gladly step down.

All I ask

is the privilege of visas and transportation to the
United States for myself and my wife. n3

His reason-

ing seemed easy to comprehend for the Admiral may
have wanted to come to America as his son Alain was
at Warm Springs, Georgia, undergoing treatment at the
infantile paralysis clinic made famous by President
Roosevelt.

Polio, had in fact, played a rather

important role in the Allies decision to deal with
Darlan, for his son's illness was generally believed
to be the reason Darlan was in Algiers at the time of
the invasion.

When Murphy notified Admiral Leahy of

the circumstances surrounding Darlan•s presence in
Algiers, two days before the invasion, Leahy promptly
informed Roosevelt,

Describing the incident in his

memoirs, Leahy wrote:
The first thing that impressed·
Roosevelt was the nature of the boy's illness
and proposed that we send a letter to
Darlan, I replied I thought it would
be a very nice thing to do. Later
Roosevelt sent Darlan 1 s son to Warm
Springs and kept him there for a considerable time. Darlan was most grateful, and it is my belief that this
thoughtfulness on the part of the
President helped us in the cr.iwical
situation that was developing.4

3Ibid.
4Leahy, op. cit., p. 132.

Despite the charges and counter-charges involving
the Admiral 1 s character, he had given some stability
to the internal situation in North Africa, thus
assuring the safety of the long Allied supply lines,
Such safety would be of the utmost importance in the
campaign to expel the growing German force from Tunisia,
In mid-December, Eisenhower 1 s political advisors,
Freeman Matthews and W.R. Mack, had returned from
London, reporting that growing animosity toward
Darlan in Britain was such that it'would-0e wise, as
soon as Tunis could be captured, if Darlan was dismissed,

. ?
h llll.

But if Darlan was to go, who could replace

The Allies now faced the problem which Darlan

himself had proposed that very Christma'S. Eve morning.
Dressed in his everyday dark suit, the stocky,
poker-faced Admiral strode from his car through the
ever-present honor guard and into the luxurious
summer palace that overlooked Algiers harbor.5

It

was shortly after 3 p.m. the day before Christmas, a
radiantly sunny, crisp afternoon; a seemingly ideal
day for anything but a coup d 1 etat,

A variety of

French patriots saw an obstacle in the fact that

5wes Gallagher, Back Door To Berlin: The Full
Story of the .American Coup in North Africa, (New York:
Doubleday, Doran and Company.

Darlan was becoming more firmly intrenched as Chief
of State and High Commissioner of French North Africa
with each passing day,

The Admiral had already backed

-one losing horse in the war when he had supported
Hitler, and although the British and American did not
like him, what did it matter?

Offhand he could not

think of anyone who liked him, but he was in power,
and that was all that mattered,
As

he approached his office neither he nor his

aide gave more than a passing glance towards the slight
figure standing in the anteroom,

There was always a

caller, perhaps s.omeone wanting a political favor,
But Fernand Oliver Eugene Bonnier de la Chapelle a
twenty year old university student, was not there for
a political favor,

He stepped close to the Admiral,

raised a pistol and fired two shots,

One struck the

Admiral in the mouth, another in the neck,

As Darlan

sank to the floor, blood pouring from his mouth, his
aide, Captain Hourcade, grappled with the assassin
and was wounded in the thigh,

Palace guards subdued

the youth as he attempted to escape through an open
window,

Meanwhile, the Admiral's body had been placed

in a car and the driver ordered to rush to the Maillot
Hospital, despite the !Tact that there was a clinic only

a few blocks from the Admiral's office.

Maillot was

the same hospital where his son had lain ill with
polio.

Here within the hour the Admiral was deadl
Who was the assassin?

Rumors abounded in the

military and governmental offices but the only factyal
knowlegge was the description presented by the eyewitnesses to the murder.

The investigation was to

show that the assassin, Bonnier de la Chapelle was
an unstable youth given to violent, short-lived
6
enthusiasms.,
His father was French and worked for
an Algiers newspaper while his mother, an Italian,
was residing in Italy.

The youth 1 s parents had

divorced and ·:the boy had gone to live with an uncle
in Paris.
time.

He was but eight years of age at the

When the Germans overran France, Bonnier was in

the French equivalent of the Boy Scouts and helped with
ambulance work, 7 He joined an underground youth group
working against the Nazis, but was finally forced to
flee the German occupied section of France in December,
1940,

At Marseille he fell in with De Gaullists and

tried to make his way to London, but then changed his
mind and decided to go to Algiers to finish high school.

6
~ - . p. 120.

7Ibid.

Becoming dissatisfied with his studies, he joined the
French Flying Corps at Blida, but his enthusiasm for
flying was short-lived, and his father obtained his
release,

He then joined the Chantiers de la Jeunesse

to serve his required period of military training,
During this time he served as liaison officer to
Henri d 1 Astier, the Algiers chief of police who was
an original member of Murphy's "Group of Five. 11

But

again Bonnier 1 s tenure was brief and he returned to
school to study law,

During this time he made speeches

before student groups, in which he condemned the Axis
powers,

Had the Allied landings been one day later,

Darlan•s life ~y have been saved,

After hearing the

news of the landings, Bonnier d~cided to cancel passage
8
to Lyons which he had booked for November 8,
He had
planned to return to school to study law,
There is reason to believe that a group of older
men, self-seeking, grasping politicians, were using
the youth's idealism for their own ends, 9 General
8

9

Ibid,, p. 121.

Ibid. Also see Waverly Root, The Secret History
of the War, Vol. II, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
194'5'T,"'°pp, 559-560, Also see the Hoover Institute 1 s
France During the German Occupation (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1959), pp, 692-699. Here Paul Saurin,
who was the President of the Oran Council, claims that
Darlan 1 s mu~der was engineered by Henri d 1 Astier de
la Vigerie,
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Giraud expressed the belief that the fanaticism of
Bonnier de la Chapelle had been exploited,

"I

would like to believe that the murder was the work
of a lunatic, but such men must not be lead by those
with ideas and perhaps other plans, ,.lo

he said.

Immediately after the shooting Bonnier was taken to
the basement of the palace for questioning.

He in-

sisted that his name was Morand, exibiting a regulation
identity card and a passport bearing •:this name. 11
He insisted that he had acted alone, without the help
or backing of !,Ilyone.

Seemingly he was made the dupe

of underhand intrigue, a victim of sinister motives.
Afterwards, when taken to the central police station
the boy kept insisting that he had acted alone and
did not regret it.

The police had no dossier in

the name of Morand ~d by nightfall had determined
that the addresses on the identity card and passport
were false.

By this time the true identity of the

young man had been established; he was the twenty
year old son of the law reporter of the Depeche
Algerienne, to whose name he had added that of his
Italian mother (della Cappella, who lived in Venice,
separated from her husband).

10 Gallagher, op. cit., p, 121.
11 Tompkins, op. cit., p. 189.
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On Christmas Day, as Admiral Darlan 1 s body lay in
state at the Government House, a court-martial convened
at 6 p.m. to try his murderer.

An order had already

been put through channels for the boy's coffin.

Standing

before the court, Bonnier insisted once more that he had
acted alone, without accomplices, and that all he had
done was "to bring justice to a traitor who stood in
the way of the union of France. 1112 After a short deliberation, the tribunal of the XIXth Military Region condemned Bonnier de la Chapelle to military degradation
and to death, the sentence to be carried out by shooting
at dawn the following day.

His defense lawyer, a M. San-

sonetti, hired by the boy's father, argued that the inquest
and trial had been too short.

The tribunal declared it-

self to be sufficiently informed of the facts, for as
evidence they had the body of the late Chief of State,
and a killer, with a weapon still hot in his hand who
duly acknowledged the crime.
Placed in a cell in the same building where he had
been tried, Bonnier was again questioned by police.

The

youth expressed the opinion that a mysterious hand would
come that night to free him.

He is reported to have said,
"I am calm, London has been advised. 1113 He wanted to

know if anything unusual was going on in town, if there
12
~

•• p. 195.

13~.

had been any trouble, any changes?

As late as midnight

Giraud reaffirmed his order to have the execution carried
out.

The hope for a stay of execution was gone.
During th~ night, the full impact of his position

struck Bonnier,

Something_had gone wrong.

There was no

commotion in the streets; no news of a take-over.

Towards

11 p.m. on the night of the 25th, a Lieutenant Schillings
of the Garde Mobile entered the boy's cell where Captain
Gualar.dof the Algiers police was already questioning the
youth.

Bonnier talked of powerful personages who would

come to free him if he said nothing.

But as the hour of

execution drew nearer, and the expected coup did not take·
place, the boy became panic stricken and blurted out
a confession:
I killed Admiral Darlan because he
was a traitor who was selling France to
Germany for his own profit; I had in my
hands the proof of his treason; it is the
same as with Laval, they want power for
themselves. I decided to kill the Admiral a few days ago, I learned that acertain person, who came from General De
Gaulle, had asked to be received by the
Admiral. The Admiral refused to receive
General De Gaulle's envoy, showing he
wished to keep for himself the power.
Certain people spoke before me of
this fruitless demarche and said: 1 Darlan must disappear.• So I said to myself: 'Then I will undertake to make
him disappear,•
I came to the Palais d 1 Ete on the
morning of December 24th but could not
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accomplish the deed, vJhen I reported this
fruitless attempt I was told: 1 Time is
running short, Darlan must disappear.'
So I went back in the afternoon. I
did not kill the Admiral's adjutant; I
could have easily done ao if I had wanted
to, as I had his head five centimeters
from my pistol; it would have been silly.
I had no reason for animosity against
him. I shot at his legs to defend myself,
The pistol was given to me, I had
been given another, but either the ammunition was defective, or the pistol was no
good; when I tried it out it would not
work; I could have taken a submachine gun,
but it was too bulky under my coat.
I was told that after the deed I
would be caught, condemned to death and
reprieved.
However, they have tried me too fast.
My friends needed two days in which to
intervene.
I know my lawyer, M. Sansonetti, is
trying hard.
Furthermore, the Comte de Paris, whom
I know, has been here for several days,
twenty minutes from Algiers.
I also know d 1 Astier de la Vigerie;
they are several brothers, one of who is
with De Gaulle, another was with me in
the Chantiers.
In the end if they do not reprieve
me and shoot me tomorrow morning, it will
be because my friends could do nothing.
Henry IV said that Paris was worth a mass;
I say that France is worth my skin. For
I know Germans; that famous November 11
(1940) I was in Paris, on Boulevard Saint¥.dchel; if the person for whom I made Darlan
disappear did not take power, we would become Anglicized or Americanized; this, for
France's sake, must not be.
Though my name sounds royalist, I have
been so barely two months; and I am a good
believer; I confessed before the murder and

1.5'4
told the priest I was going to kill; clearly
the Ten Commandants forbid killing, but there
are moments when one must go so fast that
the death of one who stands in the way of
the general good is a necessity, This is
such a time, You cannot understand me, because, despite my youth I know a great deal.
One thing worries me now, I was made
to sign several papers; among them there was
one which put some friends of mine en cause;
I 1m afraid that the person who mademe sign
it may use it, not to betray our cause, but
to blackmail my friends,_
So, either I am reprieved and this will
have no more meaning, or, I am shot and my
friends IlfNe let me down, But I don't
think so, LIUnfortunately for Bonnier, the details of this confession, after going through proper military channels, did
not reach authorities until three days later, on the 28th,
According to Darlan 1 s son, Lieutenant Shillings and Captain
Gualard thought the confession implicating the Algiers
police chief and a Jesuit_ priest was simply that of a
maniac grasping for a straw that would save his life,
There is also evidence to indicate that Bonnier made a
full confession to Commissioner Garidacci during his first
hour of captivity at the central police station. 1 .5'

The

boy supposedly made a statement to the commissioner in the
intimate conversation they had in Garidacci 1 s office, but
the confession was so revealing that it; is said to have
16
been burnt.
rt· is also thought that the boy wrote a
14 .
Ibid,, pp, 202-204,
l.5'~., p. 222.
16 cole, .2E.• cit., pp, 236-237. Tompkins states however, that ~aridacci merely withheld the confession incriminating d 1 Astier, from fear that revealing d 1 Astier 1 s role
might endanger his own life if d 1 Astier became Minister of
Interior in the Count of Paris government, or the fear that
he would not become minister if it was :revealed prematurely,
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list of his accomplices on the back of a visiting card
engraved with the name of Henri d'.Astier de la Vigerie. 17
.Apparently Garidacci convinced the boy that his only hope·
for a reprieve was to repeat his original confession that
he had acted alone in the interests of France.

Thus

Bonnier 1 s full confession was placed in the dossier that
was later handed to General Giraud three days after the
assassin 1 s execution.
At dawn on December 26th a chaplain entered Bonnier 1 s
cell,

In a last desperate attempt to save himself, Bonnier

pleaded for.permission to write a note.
any paper to give him.

But no one had

Fumbling through his pockets, he

found a visiting card, not of his own, but that of'!Jis
uncle in Paris, and addressing it to Abbe Cordier, 2 rue
Lafayette, he ecr:j.bbled, "Please intervene immediately.
I believe it is absolutely vital.

I have full confidence
18

in you, but you must act fast, very fast.II.

Abbe Louis

Pierre Marie Cordier was a thirty year old Jesuit, an
army chaplain, who acted as Henri d 1 Astier 1 s secretary and
confessor.

It was promised that the note would be delivered,

In-:the ?treats the dawn tented the sky.

The young

prisoner -- exac~ly twenty years and fifty~six days old
stood firmly before the firing post.
1 7cole, .21!.• cit., p. 237.
18

Tomp k"ins, .21?.• _c_.,
it
p. 19 7 •

At precisely 7:45 a.m.

l;:,b

he received the last rites of his church.
A

few hours later his body was buried in an un-

marked grave.

Church bells tolled, but not for Bonnier.

At almost the same moment the remains of Admiral Darlan
were being quietly interred in a secret plot in the naval
cemetery.

As one reporter was to write, the members of

the North African War Council, "composed of octa.genarian
reactionaries with no hope in the world but to hold on
to their present positions, would quickly try to bury
.
19
the Admiral, bury the boy, and bury the story. 11

1. The Aftermath
Rumor begat rmnor.
one was involved.
investigation.

Everyone was involved.

No

Yet each bit of hearsay warranted

Prominent names were becoming the

main subjects of discussion.

One tale spread that

there was a vast plot to gain power at the turn of the
year by killing off Giraud, Murphy and Yves Chatel, the
Governor-General of Algiers.

At the same time came the

report of Bonnier 1 s confession during the night of December 25-26.

When Giraud was awakened in the middle of

the night of December 28-29th, he could not believe the
dossier handed him.

Everyone on the list had been part

of the November 7th plot to place the general in power,
and to this list had been added the names of others whose
lives were in danger, including his own, Murphy, Chatel
20
and many others.
General Jean-Marie Bergeret, as Minister of Interior, ordered the Gardes Mobile to arrest the
conspirators, claiming they were· Axis agents.

1-{ith Rigault

as Secretary of Political Affairs and d 1 Astier as chief
of police, as well as four other policemen named in the
dossier, Bergeret could hardly trust the job to the Algiers
police.
20

Those arrested included Dr. Henri Aboulker, and

Ibid., pp. 206-207. Tompkins states that an Algiers
police ~issioner named Esquer, who was the only other
officer who knew that Bonnier had made a lengthy second
confession believed that this whole scheme was an imaginary
plot devised by Rigault, Chatel and others to give themselves
new virginity in the Allies' eyes.
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his nephews, Marcel, Raphael and Jose; Jacques Brunel,
son of a former mayor of Algiers; Dr. Fernand Morali,
who had assisted Allied landings on the beaches; Andre
Achiary, chief of Algiers security under Darlan; Achiary 1 s
assistant commissioner Bringard, who along with Pierre
Alexandre had tied up communication centers on the night
of November

7-8; and Louis Joxe, who along with Rene

Capitant were De Gaullist propaganda agents in Algiers.
In all fifteen were arrested.

Rigault 1 s and d'Astier•s

names were striken from the list when Joxe was immediately
sent to the Tunisian front and Pose escaped by virtue of
his position as head of Darlan 1 s Economics Ministry,·
The involvement of Pose, Rigault and Lemaigre-Dubreuil
has given rise to the belief that Darlan 1 s assassination
21
was part of a larger plot engineered by Synarchists.
Synarchy was the name given to a group of economists,
bankers, industrialists and businessmen who held posts in
the Vichy government under Darlan and were rumored to be
the power behind the government,

The Synarchy was depicted

as a secret society wtth international political and economic ramifications.

According to these stories, it was

the political instrument of a combine of French banking
and industrial interests, in league with large chemical
21

The Synarchist 1 s plot is the thesis of Peter
Tompkins 1 , The Murder ·or Admiral Darlan, .QE.• cit., passim.,
as well as Root•s contention in The Secret History of the
~ • .2£• cit., Vol. II, pp • .544-%ff.
Both accounts stress
the large volume of francs transfered to North Africa. immediately proceeding the Allied invasion. In this transaction,
Lemaigre-Dubreuil and Pose are key figures, for through -them
the conspirators hoped to take out insurance against any
eventuality. Pose would protect their interests with Germany, and Dubreuil in the Allied camp.

159
and metallurgical firms in Germany, Great Britain and
the United States,

Although such stories are common

political rumor in Europe, the Synarchist idea cannot
be dismissed as patently absurd,

Conceivably there

might be some truth behidethe Synarchy, but as yet ample
evidence to support the theory has not been produced,
Of the fifteen arrested, two were released owing to
advanced age, and the others carted off in chains to
Laghouat, 200 miles into the Sahara,

General Bergeret

planned a hasty military trial, a la Dreyfuss, to dispose of the prisoners,
Then came the surprising turn in the st~ry of
Darlan 1 s murder,

Commissioner Garidacci, despit.e his

ppssession of Bonnier 1 s confession, had never been arrested,
Garidacci reported to the pre-feet of Algiers, a M, Temple,
that the four policemen being held were innocent, Garidacci
felt he could only discuss the matter with Giraud,

The

General referred him to Bergeret, but in the meantime,
Temple had learned from Garidacci of d 1 Astier 1 s and
Cordier 1 s involvement in the plot~ 22 This story was
corroborated in a formal depostion signed by Achiary,
taken by the Civil Tribunal of Algiers on January 23, 1943,
22
Evidence of their involvement in the plot is
abundant, and Kenneth Pender, Murphy's Vice-Consul in
North Africa states that he personally saw telephone
recordings, police reports, manifestos and newspapers
which had actually been printed ahead of time, and held
in readiness, They announced that, upon Darlan 1 s death,
the Count of Paris had assumed control of French destinies
and the French Empire, See Pender, 2.E• .£il., pp. 126ff;
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The statement read:
I accuse two persons of being the
direct instigators of the murder of Admiral Darlan: They are: the Abbe Cordier
and Henri d 1 Astier de la Vigerie, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs
at the High Coillil')issariat, both residing at
2 rue Lafayette.
These two persons had Admiral Darlan
assassinated on behalf of the Count of
Paris, who according to a statement of
M. Jacques Brunel, made to me at Laghouat
on January 7, urged them to be quick about
carrying out the crime. The presence in
Algiers of the Count of Paris at the .time
of the murder, which appeared to be fortuitous, as well as the luncheons and contacts he had with high personalities such
as General Giraud, General Nogues, and M.
Pose, constitute an element of proof to
the above accusation, and the Count of
Paris most certainly tried to have himself named High Commissioner in the place
of Darlan.
On this last point I can .,i.dduce_ the following personal testimony: The·Count
of Paris, counting on obtaining the post
of High :Commissioner, had promised M.
d 1 Astier de la Vigerie the portfolio of
the Interior. The latter sounded out my
schoolmate M. Jacques Brunel to see if he
would fill the role of head of the police
in North Africa. The Saturday following
the murder (December 26), Brunel asked me ,
to call on him to discuss a complete change
of political life in the country as a result
of the murder of Darlan,
In the course of this conversation,
·which took place in M. Brunel 1.s flat at
26 rue Michelet, the latter avowed that
the Count of Paris was about to assume
power and that d 1 Astier had offered him
the job of police chief, Before accepting
he wished to have my accord, I refused,
categorically, and tried to show Brunel
that he had been led on; I then gave him
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proof that d 1 Astier and his friends were
actually maneuvering against his father,
a known republican, who was then a candidate for the post of Governor-General of
Algiers.
Jacques Brunel seemed shaken by my
remarks, and when M. Luizet, ex sub-prefect
of Tiaret, arrived on the scene he made
the following remarks to me: 1 I know who
you are·and esteem you, and would like to
demonstrate to you that the Count of Paris
can save the country.•
Very ~iolently I rebelled at this
opinion, branding it as the attitude of
people who wanted to indulge in low politics when they should be thinking only
of fighting the Germans. I must add,
·however,, that I believe in the absolute
sincerity of M. Luizet in this affair.
At the end of this conversation I insisted on giving my opinion directly, and
in their presence, to M. d'Astier de la
Vigerie, whom I made an appointment for
1700 chez M. Langlois at 119 rue Michelet.
The:i:?esM;. d 1 Astier confirmed that the
Count of Paris was about to take power, and
in the face of my refusal to collaborate,
and the reproaches of Jacques Brunel with
regard to his father, M. d'Astier seemed
extremely ill-at-ease and·expressed the
desire immediately to return to the High
Commissariat.
That same· Saturday afternoon, before
seeing Jacques Brunel, I found Abbe Cordier
and expressed to him my feeling about the
crime.
On the day before Bonnier 1 s execution
I had a meeting first with Cordier and then
d!Astier (at the Paris restaurant), wherethey confirmed to me that Bonnier was
their envoy. They also affirmed they
intended to get him out of his predicament
and asked me to help in arranging an escape. I answered that this was absolutely
impossible, that special police measures
had most certainly been taken. It was
then that Cordier asked me to take·a
piece of paper to the prisoner on which
he had wr,i tten his signature, saying,
'with this piece of paper Bonnier de la
Chapelle will understand that the bearer
comes on my behalf. 1
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I left them in front of the
Paris restaurant and it was then that
:d 1 Astier said to me: 'The Count of
Paris is here, everything will work
out, don't worry. 1
If I did not report this conversation earlier it was for two reasons: Firstly, M. d 1 Astier de_la
Vigerie was still, in my eyes, the
ardent combattant, and comrade, who
had proved at my side that he had
faith in a final v1ctory of France
and her Allies against the GeI'.lllans.
Also he was considered by all our
friends as a sort of chief of the
resistance movement against the
Germans; secondly, he was the Chief
of Police at the High Commiss.ari!l-t,
and so considered; in all of what he
did he gave- the impression of acting
in the name of the government.
.
I must add that I violently
reproached the Abbe Cordier for the
criminal role he played, and in the
face of my indignation he went away
without saying a word.
The same Saturday, at·1430,
I went to the headquarters of the
Corps ~anc d' Afrique at the invitation of Captain Castaing, chief
of its Deuxieme Bureau. This officer
and General Monsabert were afraid
there might be suspicion about the
Corps Franc because of Bonnier's
belonging to it. In the course of
the conversation, Captain Castaing
told me he believed the weapon used
in the crime had been obtained·by
Bonnier from another member named
Sabatier, who had, I believe, reported
the weapon was stolen.23

At 6 a.m. on January 10, Cordier and d 1 Astier
were arrested.

Charges of plotting against the state

were brought against Alfred Pose, who was charged with
2 3Tompkins, ~- cit,, pp. 212-214,
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with leading the plot and influencing the others.

In

addition Marc Jacquet was accused of being Pose 1 s

lia-

ison man and Gilbert Sabatier was charged with furnishing
the murder weapon. 24 During a police interrogation Cordier
admitted knowing Bonnier and of having heard his confession
on the morning of the murder.

The priest insisted he had

learned of the murder only by chance that evening and of
having asked Achiary to intercede in Bonnier 1 s behalf.
Cordier said he was a monarchist and felt no affliction
over the death of Darlan.

He believed also that the

Count of Paris could play a political role in North Afr-ica,
but doubted if the monarchy could be established before
the end of the war.

But the priest would add no more,

taking shelter behind the privilege of sacerdotal secrecy,
saying he could not reveal what the boy had said during
confession. 25
The next day Commissioner Garidacci was arrested
and produced the "true confession" of Bonnier•s which
he said ran as follows:
In the year 1942 and the 24th of the
month of December, before us, Garidacci,
Commissioner of Police Mobile, officer of
the P,J., M. Bonnier de la Chapelle, Fernand,
student, 20 years old, resident of Alger, 56
rue Michelet, declares:
I affirm having killed Admiral Darlan,
High Commissioner in French Africa, after
24
~ - , p. 215.
25 Ibid.
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having told Abbe Cordier I would do so
in the form of a confession.
It was M. Cordier who gave me the
plan of offices at the Commissariat
and of the office of the Admiral. It
was through him that I was able to
execute the mission I had assigned myself which was to dispose of the Admiral.
When I joined the Corps Franc I recruited on my own initiative men of action
from among the NCOs and troops of who
M. d 1 Astier might have need, though M.
d 1 Astier was never informed of my personal
actions.
I lmow that Mssrs. Cordier and d 1 Astier
have recently received the Count of Paris,
as well as other personalities. Finally,
I have the impression that M. de la Vigerie
is no,t on excellent terms with M. Rigaul_t,
whose activities for the Admiral ~ e a
hindrance to him and his friends. 6

26

Toid., pp. 216-217.

2.
1

The Day of the-Assassination

Darlan must go!

1

This was the feeling of many

of the conspirators after Darlan had taken their victory on November 8.

Whether it was Darlan 1 s refusal

to deal with De Gaulle's envoy, or Eisenhower's refusal
to unite Giraud and De Gaulle under Prince Henri d 1 Orleans,
December 19 seems to be the day the decision was made.· On
that day General Francois d 1 Astier de la Vigerie, a De
Gaullist representative and the brother of Henri d 1 Astier,
arrived in Algiers,

Although fighting with the Free

French, Francois also paid allegiance to the royalists,
During his stay in Algiers he was continually in contact
with his brother and Abbe Cordier,

Later, $35,OOO was

found in the hands of four De Gaullists, which d 1 Astier
had apparently left behind for Free French propaganda
efforts when he departed Algiers on the morning of Dec-

27

ember 24 •.

Francois d 1 Astier 1 s political affiliations implicated
two new factio,ns in the maze of Algerian rumors:
Charles De Gaulle and Comte de Paris.

General

Both Henri d'Astier

2
qibid,, p. 184. Tompkins states that it was
$38,000, but this was thought to be the original sum
left behind, Both Pender and Cole agree that the amount
found by Algiers police was $35,O00. Docteur, QE.• .£ii.,
pp. 247-248 states that the assassination was decided
that morning by De Gaullists.
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and Cordier were devout royalists.

Royalist feeling

was still alive in France, and may felt that all Frenchmen
might resolve their differences by rallying to the pretender.

Various provisional governments had been dis-

cussed and lists drawn up with De Gaulle serving as
Premier in North Africa.and the Count as Chief of State.
Other lists had De Gaulle as Minister of War and the
Count as Premier.

Positions were also to be given Giraud,

Henri d 1 Astier, Lemaigre-Dubreuil, and one proposal even
advised giving Darlan a post as Ambassador to the United
28
States.
The Comte de Paris agreed to a coup on two
conditions.

On that the take-over be Qioodless, and sec-

ondly that the Allies approve.

Under the pseudonym

of

M. Robin, the Count was whisked from Spanish Morocco on
December 10 and motored to Algiers with the assistance of
Abbe Cordier and Mario Faivre.

In conversations held

during the two weeks before the assassination, the Count
assumed to his satisfaction the support of a number of
men surrounding the Admiral, including Giraud, Nogues,
Pierre Bisson, the Governor-General of French West Africa,
and General Jean-Marie Bergeret, of Darlan 1 s staff.

These

men agreed to support the Count in the event Darlan removed
himself or was removed from the scene.
28

Tompkins, .212.• cit., p. 185.

This in no way

implies that they actively participated in plans for a
coup or in the assassination of the Admiral, for the
Count 1 s conditions remained that the take-over be bloodless as well as approved by the Allies,

A frequent

visitor to M, Robin in Algiers was Robert Murphy.

The

plot failed to materialize when Eisenhower presented the
argument that even a palace revolution might endanger
public order,

With this the Count gracefully retired

from the scene,
On the same day that General Francois d 1 Astier
arrived in Algiers, December 19, two attempts were made
to choose Darlan' s would be assassin, by drawing lots,
Both drawings proved abortive, resulting in Bonnier de
la Chapelle volunteering for the task,

He was given a

floor plan of the Palais d 1 Ete, a window in the building
was left open for his escape to the car waiting at the
curb and he had excellent papers and a valid passport
to escape to Tangiers,
M-Day was to be Christmas Eve,

Cordier, who had

been Henri d 1 Astier 1 s right hand man, reminded the youth
it was time to put himself !:E_ regle ~ le bon Dieu, 29
They made a date for 10 a,m, on December

24.

Meeting in a side street a short distance from
Cordier 1 s dwelling on rue Lafayette, the assassin-to-be
confessed the deed he was preparing to perform.
29 Ibid,, p. 219.

He wa~-
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given absolution before the crime and it amounted to a
double precaution of safety

spiritual for the boy,

temporal for the priest -- who was protected by the
secrecy of confessional,

The priest and youth then

went off to have lunch with Henri d 1 Astier and d 1 Astier 1 s
son Bernard,
For what transpired during lunch, the testimony of
an anonymous witness at the Paris restaurant on that day
was published exactly three years later, December
ink Figaro,

24,

1945,

The witness was lunching with a friend at

a table near Cordier, d'Astier, Bernard and another young
man,

The witness states that a few days earlier Cordier

had asked his companion if he could put him in touch with
someone who was willing to assassinate Darlan,

This

anonymous witness already knew of a larger plot to assassinate Darlan, so he was not surprised at the request,

So

on this day (December 24) Cordier informed the two that
he had found his man and introduced Bonnier de la Chapelle,

30

Cordier sug~ested they drive the boy out in the
country where he could test his pistol, since it had a
tendency to jam,

On the outskirts of Algiers the weapon

did indeed jam and Bonnier borrowed the pistol of one in
the group,

The witness does not name his luncheon companion,

but since the confession of the assassin stated that the
30rbid,, pp. 220-221,

169
weapon and shells were obtained through Cordier and since
the priest knew the individuals well enough to reveal the
assassin and their plans, it is quite possible that the
gun was furnished by Mario Faivre, who had assisted

Cordier in bringing the Count of Paris to Algiers from
Spanish Morocco.

In any case, continues,the witness,

they then drove Bonnier to the Palaia d 1 Ete:

That is,

Sabatier, Bonnier 1 s companion from the Corps Franc,
d 1 Astier 1 s son Bernard, and Mario Faivre,

There the

assassin accomplished his deed.
Although Bonnier admitted that Cordier and d 1 Astier
had put him up to the murder and had provided him with
the weapon, he played the role requested of him at his
court-martial -- insisting that he had acted alone and
in the interests of France.
And so he went to his death.

3. A Year Later
On the first anniversary of his execution homage
was paid to young Bonnier de la Chapelle.
A group of about fifty persons, the
majority of whom fill official positions
under the orders of General De Gaulle,
celebrated the anniversary of the death
of Fernand Eugene Bonnier de la Chapelle,
who assassinated Admiral Darlan, by
placing a wreath on his tQib and observing a minute of silence.j
.Among them was Ennnanuel d'Astier de la Vigerie, brother
of Henri and Francois d 1 Astier, who had financed an
underground movement with leftist leanings, in France,
after the German occupation in 1940.

He was now Sec-

retary for the Interior in North Af'rica.
Later, an Algerian Court of Appeals was to annulthe sentence against the assassin, citing in part as its
reasons "documents found after the liberation of France
which showed conclusively that Admiral Darlan had been
acting against the interests of France and that Bonnier•s
act had been accomplished in the interests of the liber32
ation of France. 11
Now that he was morally and legally rehabilitated,
Bonnier 1 s crime disappeared from the record.
31

As a conseq-

New York Times, December 26, 1943, p. 5. The
youth's father, step-mother and teenage sister also
attended the ceremony which was performed in a pouring
rain that reduced the expected attendance.
32

Tompkins, .2E.• cit., p. 271.
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uence, so did the guilt of his alleged accomplices.
In September of 1943, only three months after
De Gaulle's arrival in Algiers, Giraud rendered a
!!QB-lieu in favor of Henri d 1 Astier, Cordier, and
Garidacci, who were released.
The day he was released from jaU;_, d 1 Astier
received the Croix de guerre with palms from Giraud,
and the following day the Medal of the Resistance
from De Gaulle.

Two days later he was named a

member of the Consultative Assembly.
Cordier was awarded the Croix de guerre.
Garidacci was fired.
Of the twelve men who had been arrested for
conspiracy in the murder of Darlan, Muscatelli bec.ame Prefect of Algiers, Jacques Brunel, Prefect
of Police--with Jose Aboulker as his chief of
cabinet--Bringard the Chief of Police of Algiers,
and Achiary Assistant Prefect of Batna.

Of the

other conspirators some went even further: Rene
Capitant became a minister in De Gaulle's cabinet
_and Louis Joxe became Ambassador to Moscow.
Following the liberation of France Rigault
and Lemaigre-Dubreuil slipped across the border to
Spain where they were promptly arrested for having
negotiated with a foreign power.

By this time

Murphy held the rank of Ambassador, and was Eisenhower's
special political advisor for most of Europe.

In this
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capacity he interceded on their behalf and the cbarges
were dropped.

Rigault set about recording the events

that transpired in North Africa in a two volume history
written under the pseudonym of

11

Charnine~1 ,'

He later

became editor of a Paris financial paper along with
Pierre Flandin.
On July 12, 1955, Lemaigre-Dubreuil was shot
to death by unkno,m assailants on the doorstep of his
Casablanca home,

The Ydnister of Moroccan Affairs

announced that he had been the victim of counterterrorists.

EPILOGUE • • •
What k:Lnd of man was ~dmiral Jean Francois
Darlan?

Was he the ambitious politician, .opportunist

and collaborator he has been accused of being, or
was he really serving the best interests of France?
From the day of his accession to power in Vichy to
the d/J,y of his assassination in Algiers he was the
great enigma of the war.

The political arena brought

him dishonor and ridicule both in France and abroad.
Cruel accusati,ons were made 13,gainst him in every
political camp.

The Admiral was stripned of his

French nationality by Petain and declared a rebel by
De Gaulle.

In the end he was felled by the shots of

a young fanatical patriot, Fernand Bonnier de la
Chapelle, who believed he was serving France,
Darlan was born into a family of sailors and
had always loved the sea.

He was responsible for

creating the modern French Navy.

Many naval per-

sonalities considered it a magnificent fleet.

The

Admiral believed in his fleet, in France arid in
Darlan,

To serve these three wl:!,s his raison d 1 etre.

Thus he navigated the waters of political life as
if at the head of his fleet which had to be brought
to port by using or cheating the currents.

What

Darlan really wanted to achieve was results.

As a
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realist who was contemptuous of political and intellectual labels, he was concerned only with the
goals to be attained.

Through the attainment of

these goals the Admiral revealed his true colors-he was a blatant opportunist.
Despite his exceptional gift for organization
and capacity for work, the Admiral also had obvious
eccentricities which he was apt to display to excess.
He was a vain, contemptous man and people around h:im
knew how to play upon his vanity and his contempt
for political enemies to their own advantage.

His

vanity, contempt and eccentricities, however, regardless of their notoriousness, are not enough:to ex-plain the hatred in which Darlan has been held.
The Admiral's overweaning ambition and the
deep vein of authoritarianism in him will lead his
critics to conclude that he was the crafty, scheming,
self-seeking egotist that they have already labeled
him to be.

The Admiral's critics recognize no enigma

at all, but sum him up in the one word

11

trai tor 11 •

Even the sympathetic accounts of the man's career
have been damaging beyond the dreams of his worst
enemies.

In their atl;empts to show the Admiral to

be a true patriot, his admirers contend that the
Admiral was alw_ays right, always acting in the best
interests of France.

But by design, rather than

coincidence, these acts were also in line with Darlan•s
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own ambitions which lead to the conclusion that the man
was no more than an opportunist.

In the general collapse of France in 1940 the
fleet remained France's supreme asset.

So long as it

remained in being, France had a bargaining point with
Hitler -- and with the Allies.

It is only through the

mistaken belief that Darlan retained command of the
fleet until his death that any case at all can be made
for the dynamic little Admiral.

If' Darlan was patriotic

he was a patriot of the Hitlerian authoritarian school.
This represented the very kind of fanatical patriotism
we were fighting to defeat.
and country.

He was ambitious for self

He was ruthless and unscrupulous.

He hoped

to be the Fuhrer of France.
Darlan was hated because of his refusal to bring
the navy to the side of the Allies.

When France fell,

both Churchill and Roosevelt desired Darlan to become
the leader of Frenchmen who would continue the war against
Germany.

It is true that he had but to sail to any Allied

port to become the leader of France.

His error and mis-

calculation was the belief that Great Britain as well as
France was beaten.

When the opportunity presented itself,

Darlan attempted to rectify his mistake.
too long.

But he had waited

He was more than two years too late.

His self-

ishness, ambition and desire for political power led to
his assassination in Algiers on December 24, 1942.
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While metropolitan France lay .p lunged in a state
of numbed confusion , the government of the armistice
moved to the health resort at Vichy .

Although the

I

re g ime began in a spirit of despair , many of its supporters found conso l ation in t he defeat t h at brought
an end to the Third ~epublic .

Marshal Petain ,

~

feebl e ,

fri ght ened old man , declared himself Chef de 1 1 Etat
francais .

The Marshal was surrounde d by self- se eking

conspirators and opportunists .

This s t udy concerns one

of these opp ortuni sts -- Admiral J ean Francois Darlan
the Commander- in- Chief of the French Nav y from the
beginning of t he war .
The French Fl e et , by the r ema rkable capacity and
long administrati on of Admi ral Darlan had been brought
to the h ighest s tr 0ng th and degre e of efficiency since
the days of the monarchy .

Undefeat ed, although its

record was s l i gh tly blemished, the navy ' s presti ge i ncreased by its exploits against the Germans be fore t he
armi stice end against the Brit ish after , the French Navy

2

was in good shape and morale was high.

Despite the

armistice Darlan had managed to keep control of the navy .
The Admiral ' s first political office was the V.inistry of ¥arine in Petain ' s cabinet .
was a complete opportunist .

In pol i tics Darlan

He had de cide d that since

the Germans had won the war, an understanding with them
was the best poli cy , possibl y for France and certainly
for his own personal ambit i ons .

Desp ite his continuing

efforts to collaborate with the Nazis , the Germans seeking
somethin~ for nothing , and Vichy , in general, willing to
sell its aid only at a price , this policy worked against
him .

As a result both the Allie s and Nazi s became in-

creasingly discontented with Darlan duri ng his fourteen

months (February, 1941 - Apri l, 1942) as Vichy Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Vice - Premier .
The next turning point in the h istory of war- time
France came not in France itself but in North Africa .

In

preparation of the North African invasi on the Al l i es
undertook a most complicated diplomati c maneuver in the
autumn of 1942 .

This mission , headed by Robert D. Murphy ,

was des i gned to produce a friendly French reception to
the invasion and reached its quite unexpected climax three
days after the landings with the so- called

11

Darlan deal "

3

whi ch became one of the most controversial dec isions
of the war.
The Allies were aware of the fact that Darlan
had an unsavory record .

The important fact was that

in November, 1942 , Da rlan and only Da rlan, c oul c bring
about an effe ctive cease- fire order and swing t he a r med
forces and civil administrat i on of French Nor th Africa
to the s i de of the Allies .

In such a vast military

enterprise, squeamishness c oncerning the source of such
help was not a factor .
In the last about- face of his life , the nan who
had pursue d a vigorous p0licy of co llabor at i on with
the Germans aligned hi mself with the Allies following
th..:~:..· ::.andings in French North Africa .

Admiral Jean

Francois Darlan was assassinated in Algiers on Christmas

Eve, 1942, by a young misguided p atriot who thought he
was serving only the inte rests of France in his deed .
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